Improving Community Resilience for Hounslow by Shaikh, Ahsan Aadil et al.
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Digital WPI
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) Interactive Qualifying Projects
April 2016
Improving Community Resilience for Hounslow
Ahsan Aadil Shaikh
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Miguel Goulart Almeida
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Shelby M. McQueston
Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all
This Unrestricted is brought to you for free and open access by the Interactive Qualifying Projects at Digital WPI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Interactive Qualifying Projects (All Years) by an authorized administrator of Digital WPI. For more information, please contact digitalwpi@wpi.edu.
Repository Citation
Shaikh, A. A., Almeida, M. G., & McQueston, S. M. (2016). Improving Community Resilience for Hounslow. Retrieved from
https://digitalcommons.wpi.edu/iqp-all/1659
 Improving Community Resilience in 
Hounslow 
An Interactive Qualifying Project Report submitted to the faculty of Worcester Polytechnic Institute in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degrees of Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Arts 
 
 
Submitted by: 
Miguel Goulart de Almeida 
Shelby McQueston 
Ahsan Aadil Nizam Shaikh 
 
Submitted to: 
 
Project Advisors: 
Joel J. Brattin 
Lauren Mathews 
 
Project Liaison: 
Fiona Hodge 
 
 
This report represents the work of WPI undergraduate students submitted to the faculty 
as evidence of completion of a degree requirement. WPI routinely publishes these reports on its 
website without editorial or peer review. For more information about the projects program at 
WPI, please see http://www.wpi.edu/academics/ugradstudies/project-learning.html 
Submitted on 28 April 2016 
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
The London Borough of Hounslow currently has a Community Risk Register (CRR) 
that is confusing and unappealing to the average citizen. The purpose of this project was to 
update the CRR and create promotional tools for the Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) to 
use. To do this, we assessed various CRRs across the country and revised the Hounslow 
Multi-Agency CRR to reflect the best practices of those we analysed. We also created a new 
community resilience document to educate and inform Hounslow residents about the risks 
they are most likely to face. Finally, we created a communication plan for the HRF to use to 
increase awareness about the new community resilience document and emergency 
preparedness. 
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Executive Summary 
The London Borough of Hounslow is located in West London and has a population of 
over 250,000 (London Borough of Hounslow, 2011). Like every nation and region in the 
world, Hounslow faces potential emergencies from a variety of risks. According to the 
Hounslow Multi-Agency Community Risk Register (CRR), the borough is most susceptible 
to risks such as fluvial floods, disease outbreaks (especially influenza pandemics), loss of 
utilities, and local failure of the electricity network (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). 
In 2004, the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) received Royal Assent from the national 
government. Parliament created the Act to improve the country’s ability to respond to 
emergencies in the 21st century. One of the requirements of the Act is for local authorities to 
create and publish documents assessing risks in their localities. This document is the CRR.  
The purpose of a CRR is to communicate to two distinct audiences, authorities and 
community members. However, because of the differences in knowledge, it can be hard to 
reach effectively both these audiences using a single document. Hounslow currently has a 
document that reaches an audience that has background on risk, but does not communicate to 
the community. Therefore, this project’s goal was to fix the technical and outreach problems 
with the current Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR with the intent of improving community 
resilience. To achieve the project goal, we completed three objectives: 
1. Determine which elements we should modify in the borough’s multi-agency CRR, 
and edit the document accordingly. 
2. Create a new community resilience document for awareness and warning.  
3. Create a communication plan for the Hounslow Resilience Forum to use in 
combination with the new public document. 
 
Background 
 The purpose of risk planning is to reduce the impacts of an emergency. Officials 
measure the effectiveness of risk planning in the amount of damage prevented, number of 
casualties avoided, and the reduction of recovery time (Schultz, 2008). The Civil 
Contingencies Act improved the government’s ability to respond to emergencies in the 21st 
century. The CCA requires the creation and publication of risk assessment documents.  
 One risk assessment document in the UK is the National Risk Register (NRR) of Civil 
Emergencies. The NRR guides the creation of CRRs and provides a local framework for local 
plans, and it mandates the creation of local resilience fora. The Hounslow Resilience Forum 
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(HRF) is responsible for the creation and maintenance of the Hounslow CRR. The Hounslow 
CRR details the possible risks for the community, identifies the lead agencies in charge 
should these events occur, and describes the plans that have been put in place. However, it 
does not provide details or plans regarding malicious events, as the CRR is a public 
document, and this information is confidential. The Hounslow CRR also lacks information 
for community members to create their own emergency preparedness plans.  
 Resilience fora devise CRRs based on the NRR framework. However, these entities 
can make mistakes. Mark Leigh, of the Emergency Planning College, has done work 
regarding UK CRRs. He identifies mistakes made in these CRRs. Many of these mistakes 
seem insignificant to a community member with limited knowledge about CRRs, but can be 
very important to emergency planning and response teams.  
 One of the objectives of a CRR is to increase public awareness. To accomplish that it 
is necessary to understand how to communicate risk. The communication process needs to be 
a two-way process, leading to better decision-making because all parties involved are better 
informed (Cabinet Office, 2011). The community will know how to prepare themselves and 
the authorities will know what public perceptions of risk are. It is important to understand the 
different human dynamics in the community. The way different people form perceptions of 
risk, how personal beliefs can affect the perception of risk, socio-economic factors that 
contribute to different responses to risk, and how public trust in the authorities affects 
accepting advice are all important factors to consider.  
 To communicate effectively, it is not only necessary to consider the content of the 
community documents, but also the design. If a document has correct information, but 
unappealing design, it is unlikely that community members will read that document, negating 
the purpose of the document. However, excessive design features used inappropriately can 
cause distractions, making people miss the message entirely.  
 
Methodology 
 To accomplish objective 1, we reviewed other CRRs from local resilience fora across 
England and incorporated their best features into the new, edited version of the Hounslow 
Multi-Agency CRR. We did this preliminary assessment to decrease the number of CRRs we 
had to analyse closely afterwards in the secondary assessment. It also highlighted best 
practices across the country. The analysis consisted of running the CRRs through a checklist 
composed of “yes” and “no” answers, which we created based on Leigh’s (2013) 
recommendations and design aspects. We converted “yes” and “no” answers to numerical 
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values of one and zero respectively. After summing all the answers numerically, we chose the 
best scoring CRRs. After, we put the best scoring CRRs through Leigh’s assessment tool. 
This tool rates the CRRs on a scale of zero to 34. Each question in the tool is worth 2 possible 
points as they can be answered as “yes” (2 points), “to some extent” (1 point), or “no” (zero 
points). We also put Hounslow’s CRR through the same assessment tool in order to 
determine its relative position against other CRRs, and to determine which elements were 
missing from it. The assessment of Hounslow’s CRR allowed us to change incorrect sections, 
and add missing sections.  We also included several images and a map to make the document 
more visually appealing and easier to use for the Hounslow Resilience Forum.  
 To complete objective 2, we interviewed Mark Leigh, of the Emergency Planning 
College. We asked questions regarding the design of CRRs, and most important aspects to 
include when creating one. After our interview, we started a preliminary design of the 
community resilience document, following the borough’s branding guidelines. We 
determined the document should have an introduction, a list of top risks, a map containing the 
location of risks and infrastructure, explanations for all top risks, and a contact section. We 
based this determination on the analysis of other resilience fora’s CRRs. These other official 
CRRs were informative to our community resilience documents, which we intended to be 
fundamentally different from the official Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR. The top risks we 
explored on the document were the highest rated risks according to the Hounslow Multi-
Agency CRR, and risks selected by our liaisons. Finally, we edited the document according 
to recommendations of our liaisons, advisors, and members of the community. 
 To achieve our final objective, we interviewed experts from the National Health 
Service England (London), Public Health England, the London Resilience Forum, and 
community members of Hounslow. We conducted these interviews to determine what experts 
and residents thought to be the best ways of communicating the information contained in the 
community resilience document. After our interviews, we brainstormed different 
communication ideas, and discussed their validity with our liaisons and advisors. After our 
interviews and discussions, we created a communication plan for the HRF to use in 
combination with the new community resilience document.  
 
Results & Recommendations 
 For objective 1, we analysed 39 CRRs using the preliminary assessment checklist. 
The top nine CRRs were, in order from lowest score to highest score, Northumbria, Durham 
& Darlington, Merseyside, Cumbria, Derby & Derbyshire, Humber, Gloucestershire, Greater 
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Manchester, and Nottingham & Nottinghamshire. We then rated these CRRs using Leigh’s 
assessment tool. The average was 18 points of a total of 34. Rating the CRRs gave us 
strategies for how to correct missing or incorrect information in Hounslow’s CRR.  We also 
scored Hounslow’s current Multi-Agency CRR. It scored 18 points. Based on this 
assessment, we changed several features of the CRR.  
 To complement the new Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR, we created a community 
resilience document. The goal of this document is to educate the public on what to do in case 
of an emergency, and what the consequences might be of a poor personal preparedness. We 
also provided further contact information in the document, if people desire to know more 
about emergency preparedness.  
 Finally, we created a communication plan to ensure community awareness of our 
Community Resilience document. We divided the plan into two major categories. The first 
part of our communication plan was education. We developed an outline for a workshop for 
schools around Hounslow. The workshop has activities that target students and parents. We 
focused these activities on educating the community regarding emergencies in Hounslow, 
what to do in case they happen, and how the location of homes affects susceptibility to 
different risks. The other part of our communication plan was promotion. We developed 
plans to create refrigerator magnets containing important contact information, banners 
publicizing the community resilience document, a display case in the Hounslow Civic Centre 
to advertise our document, and an article for Hounslow Matters magazine providing details 
on risk. 
Overall, we make three main recommendations. First, we recommend that the 
Hounslow Resilience Forum replace their current CRR with the new Hounslow multi-agency 
CRR. Our updated version provides more information for community members and is easier 
to understand for people with no exposure to risk communication and the HRF should 
therefore use it. Our second recommendation is that the HRF publish our community 
resilience document. This document was specifically made to be “public-friendly” and is 
easier to read with less technical jargon. It also includes information for community members 
to use during an emergency. Publishing this document would assist in make the Hounslow 
community better prepared for several risks. Our final recommendation was that the HRF use 
our communication plan to promote risk awareness and our community resilience document. 
By going into Hounslow primary schools and using a variety of promotional materials, both 
in print and online, the HRF can make sure that a more of the population knows about risk, 
which will decrease causalities and impact during a civil emergency.  
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1. Introduction 
People perceive risks in different ways. Although risk perception is largely based on 
fact, it can be subjective, and everyone judges the attributes and the severity of a risk 
differently. The way a person perceives a risk might not necessarily be in line with the actual 
characteristics and the mathematical probability of that risk. One reason why perceived risk 
might differ greatly from the actual risk is the lack of experience one has with that particular 
risk (Sjöberg, 2000). People who are familiar with a specific risk might have a more realistic 
perception about that risk as compared to people who have never had any experience with it 
(Sjöberg, 2000). Another vital aspect of risk perception is “risk denial,” which is derived 
from “unrealistic optimism.” People in “risk denial” tend to think a potential hazard is more 
likely to affect others, and that they themselves are subject to a lesser degree of risk (Sjöberg, 
2000). 
Like every nation in the world, the United Kingdom, and more specifically its capital 
of London, faces potential emergencies from a variety of risks. Approximately a quarter of a 
million people in the United Kingdom died in the large outbreak of pandemic influenza in 
1918-19 (Taubenberger et al, 2005). Today, in a “reasonable worst case scenario” of 
influenza pandemic, one of London’s boroughs, Hounslow, could lose up to 2.5% of its 
population (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). In addition to this, one-sixth of the 96,000 
properties in the borough are vulnerable to flooding from a one in 1000-year event (London 
Borough of Hounslow, 2014).  
The London Borough of Hounslow, located in West London, is one of the thirty-two 
boroughs that constitute Greater London and has over 250,000 residents (London Borough of 
Hounslow). About half the population is Caucasian and slightly over 75% has English as a 
first language. Other languages spoken in the borough are South Asian, as the borough is 
home to many migrant communities (London Borough of Hounslow, 2011). Hounslow has 
the third-largest Indian British population in London, including over 19.7% its residents, 
according to the 2011 census (London Borough of Hounslow, 2011).  
In order to combat risks, the United Kingdom’s government implemented the Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA) in 2004, to improve emergency response (Cabinet Office, 2015). 
The CCA defines what an emergency is, and divides emergency responders into two 
categories. Category 1 responders are the first responders in an emergency, emergency 
response teams. Category 2 responders cooperate with Category 1 responders, for example, 
transport and utility companies. This division allows the creation of distinct emergency 
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response plans for both category responders. The CCA also requires governments to create 
risk registers and identify specialized responders in the geographical area. Locally, the 
Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) is responsible for planning for multi-agency emergency. 
The HRF is also responsible for creating the Community Risk Register (CRR) for the 
borough. As the chair and secretariat of the Resilience Forum, the Contingency Planning Unit 
(CPU) is responsible for maintaining the CRR and updating it periodically. The CRR is a 
public document that addresses the local risks that the borough faces. One of the problems 
with emergency response is the lack of communication among national government agencies 
and local government agencies with the community, regarding emergency preparedness and 
risks (National Research Council, 1989). 
The problem in Hounslow is that although they have a CRR, community members do 
not know it exists and therefore cannot use it. Even if they know the document exists, the 
HRF designed the document for an audience that has previous knowledge about risk and risk 
assessment procedures, making it extremely confusing for community members. 
The goal of this project was fix the technical and outreach problems with the current 
Hounslow multi-agency CRR with the intent of improving community resilience. The team 
determined which elements to modify in Hounslow’s version of the CRR, created two risk 
assessment documents, and devised a communication plan for the HRF to use.   
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2. Background 
The purpose of risk planning is to improve outcomes in the aftermath of an 
emergency. Officials can measure the success of the risk planning in the amount of damage 
prevented, number of casualties avoided, and the degree to which recovery time is reduced 
(Schultz, 2008). It is important to note that officials cannot always prevent damage or 
casualties, but may have more control over recovery time, reducing the overall impact to the 
community. Risk planning, including risk communication, is key in letting a community 
know the different hazards to which it is vulnerable, and the degree to which it is susceptible 
to that particular risk. One part of risk planning involves educating the public on how to 
respond in case of an event. If a society is well aware of how to react when it is exposed to a 
certain risk, it can alleviate the consequences that might follow. Therefore, this chapter 
presents information on the origins and versions of CRRs, the methodology used to create 
CRRs, and effective strategies for using CRRs as communication tools for risk response.  
 
2.1.  The Civil Contingencies Act 
The Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) received Royal Assent on 18 November 2004 
(Alexander, 2004). Its creation improved the UK government’s ability to respond to 
emergencies in the 21st century. This improved ability comes from better planning for local 
emergencies and better communication between agencies, local areas, and the central 
government. The CCA defines an emergency as “an event or situation which threatens 
serious damage to human welfare…the environment… [or] to the security of the United 
Kingdom” (Alexander, 2004). 
Two major parts form this act. The first part regards civil protection at a local level. It 
places local responders into two categories. Category 1 responders focus on assessing local 
risks, and develop and maintain a CRR, while Category 2 responders focus on providing 
additional information to Category 1 responders regarding transportation, utilities, 
government, and strategic health authorities. They also create and maintain emergency plans 
for their specific organizational area. The second part of the CCA deals with only the most 
serious emergencies that require immediate attention. This part of the law allows central 
government authorities to make temporary provisions in the law for the most serious 
emergencies. It is an instrument of last resort and officials rarely use it.  
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2.2. National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 
In compliance with the CCA, the Cabinet Office began publishing the National Risk 
Register (NRR) of Civil Emergencies in 2008 (Cabinet Office, 2013). The government 
published the updated version of the NRR on 27 March 2015, improving previous editions. 
The NRR is extremely clear in both its objectives for the British government and the 
community, and includes dozens of resources (Cabinet 
Office, 2015). The NRR has three distinct sections: types 
of civil emergencies, summaries of risks, and 
methodology.  
It first begins with defining an emergency using 
the same definition as the CCA. It then describes the risks 
with the highest priorities - pandemic influenza, 
catastrophic terrorist attacks, coastal flooding, and 
widespread electricity failure - before moving to discuss 
new risks recently added to the risk register such as poor 
air quality. Sidebars like the one in Figure 1 include 
references to additional resources and links for the 
community to utilize should individuals want more 
information regarding these risks.  
When discussing the possible risks in section two, 
the NRR describes the risk along with any relevant 
background, including previous incidents in the UK, 
consequences of the risk, and the government’s plan for 
handling the incident. For instance, under poor air quality, the NRR examines problems with 
the ozone layer, volcanic ashes and gases, and severe weather, and includes historical 
examples such as the 2010 eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland, which resulted 
in an ash cloud covering much of Europe for almost a week. The NRR details plans the 
government has been working on including infrastructure, scientific studies, and updated 
technology. However, the NRR does not reveal the government’s plan regarding the 
emergency, simply that there is a plan in place and the government is doing more research to 
ensure the safety of community members.  
 The final section in the NRR describes the methodology used to assess risk. 
Government experts in different departments identify risks and put them into the NRA, which 
is a confidential government document, not accessible to the public, due to its details about 
Figure 1: An example of the types 
of additional resources the NRR 
provides to its readers 
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war and terrorism. These officials estimate likelihoods from 0.005% to 50%. They determine 
impact by analysing a number of factors: number of fatalities, illnesses, and injuries, level of 
social disruption, economic harm, and psychological harm. Officials use the NRA data to 
determine which risks they can safely disclose to the public without endangering national 
security. The final paragraphs of the NRR disclose that the document is meant to guide the 
creation of CRRs and provide a framework for local plans. The NRR also mandates the 
creation of local resilience fora, comprised of Category 1 responders and supported by 
Category 2 responders, to provide insight in creating the CRRs.  
 
2.3. Hounslow’s Community Risk Register 
The CCA requires the creation of the National Risk Assessment (NRA) and the 
subsequent NRR before it requires every council to make CRRs. Accordingly, each borough 
in London must create a risk register and identify a variety of specialized responders in the 
geographical area. After the UK government performs the (NRA), it gives each local council 
the potential risks determined and charges them with creating a CRR (Cabinet Office, 2013). 
The CRR is the local, public version of the NRA that allows community members to learn 
about the possible risks that may affect their area within the next five years. However, 
although a CRR is available to the public, it is usually not written with the community as its 
audience. Officials update most CRRs annually to ensure the most up to date information is 
available to the community.  
The Hounslow CRR is very similar to its national counterpart in that it details the 
possible risks for the community, identifies the officials in charge should these events occur, 
and describes the plans that have been put in place (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015).  It 
does not provide details or plans about any malicious events such as terrorism or war, as it is 
a public document. However, this information exists in confidential files should it be needed. 
Just like the NRR, Hounslow’s CRR identifies how government officials from the Hounslow 
Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) estimate likelihood and impacts of various events.  
The Hounslow CRR lacks information for community members to use to create their 
own emergency preparedness plans. Below, Figure 2 shows what an entry in the Hounslow 
CRR looks like. The first column, risk reference, is the code given to each risk so readers can 
easily refer to it on both the risk matrix and within the document. The hazard sub-category 
column gives the name of the risk, while the next column, outcome description, gives more 
information on the risk. The Resilience Forum assigns risk ratings, along with both the 
impact and likelihood scores, and a primary responsible responder. Unlike the NRR, it does 
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not offer any additional references or resources to community members who wish to learn 
more, and instead of a clear response plan, it only provides a list of laws that would reduce 
the probability of the event occurring.  
 
Figure 2: A sample of the risks listed in the Hounslow CRR including the risk reference name, hazard sub-
category, further information, likelihood and impact scores, risk rating, responsible parties, and government 
controls in place to prevent and prepare the community for an impending emergency, taken from the Hounslow 
Community Risk Register, Contingency Planning Unit, 2015. 
 
 
2.4. Methodology for Creating CRRs 
Mark Leigh of the Emergency Planning College, based in York, England, has done 
work regarding many of the UK’s CRRs. He cites obvious mistakes that many resilience fora 
are making when they compile and develop their required materials (Leigh, 2013). Many of 
these mistakes are small issues that may seem insignificant to a community member with 
limited knowledge about CRRs, but there are also several important features missing from 
CRRs across the country. Leigh (2013) also identifies the two main parts of a CRR. These are 
the esoteric, where priorities like training and planning are identified, and the exoteric, where 
the “warning and informing” information for the public is located. The esoteric training 
section helps communities identify what they need to do to create a plan for preparedness. 
The exoteric section is the section that communicates to the public what the risks are, how 
likely they are, and what to do in an emergency. 
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One of the main errors in the risk registers evaluated by Leigh (2013) was calling a 
disaster a “worst-case scenario” rather than a “reasonable worst-case scenario.” A “worst-
case scenario” refers to the worst situation imaginable, while a “reasonable worst-case 
scenario” refers to a situation that could possibly happen within the district. In a reasonable 
worst-case scenario, local factors account for the mathematical probability of risk. The usage 
of incorrect nomenclature prepares community members for a different situation than the one 
that may realistically occur and could increase panic within the community. Inconsistencies 
in nomenclature also plague the risk matrix included in almost every CRR. The risk matrix is 
a tool risk experts use almost universally to determine risk ratings based on an event's 
likelihood and impact. For several years, the terms for likelihood have been Low, Medium-
Low, Medium, Medium-High, and High. However, there are still CRRs using the outdated 
terms of Negligible, Rare, Unlikely, Possible, and Probable. The national government 
updated these incorrect terms due to their ambiguity. Updated risk registers, like the 
Hounslow CRR, include an appendix with the definitions of each new term to minimize 
possible misconceptions regarding what each term means (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). 
These new terms not only help prepare the community for events that may realistically take 
place, but also educate the population on how to respond better to emergencies. 
Another main problem that Leigh (2013) identified in several risk registers is the 
incorrect way in which some communities make use of or draw information from their risk 
matrix. Most of the risk matrices included in CRRs appear as Table 1 does. To use the risk 
matrix, one first identifies the likelihood of an event, and then cross-references it with its 
given impact score. These two numbers then give a risk rating on the matrix: Low, Medium, 
High, or Very High. For example, the risk in Figure 2 from the Hounslow CRR, “fire or 
explosion of an offshore fuel pipeline,” has a likelihood score of 1 (Low) and an impact score 
of 3 (Moderate) (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). Using the risk matrix, its risk rating is 
Medium.  
Usage of this risk matrix gives unique risk ratings for different events but community 
members can misinterpret it easily. For instance, an event with a likelihood of 4 (Medium-
High) and an impact of 2 (Minor) does not have the same risk rating as an event with a 
likelihood of 2 (Medium-Low) and an impact of 4 (Significant) even though the user applies 
the same numbers. The first case would have a risk rating of “medium” while the second 
would have a rating of “High.” In the example from the Hounslow CRR, misuse of the risk 
matrix would give an incorrect risk rating of low rather than the medium rating the risk 
deserves. Although it seems like a straightforward process, several governing agencies have 
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published CRRs that are structured in a way that makes user error more likely, according to 
Leigh (2015). 
 
 
Relative 
Impact 
Catastrophic 
(5) 
High 
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Very High 
Significant  
(4) 
Medium High 
Very 
High 
Very 
High 
Very High 
Moderate 
(3) 
Medium Medium High High High 
Minor 
(2) 
Low Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Limited 
(1) 
Low Low Low Low Low 
  
Low 
(1) 
Medium 
Low (2) 
Medium 
(3) 
Medium 
High (4) 
High (5) 
 
 Relative Likelihood 
Basic outline taken from: National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies, 2015 and Hounslow 
Community Risk Register, 2015. 
Table 1: An example of the classic risk matrix used in several CRRs 
 
2.5. Risks 
As per the Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR of May 2015, the main risks to which the 
borough is most vulnerable are fluvial floods, disease outbreaks (influenza pandemics), loss 
of utilities, and local failure of the electricity network (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). 
Not only are the consequences of each one of these risks detrimental, but also the probability 
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of one occurring in the borough is “very high” according to the risk matrix. Hounslow is 
susceptible to other hazards as well, such as dam failures, serious constraints on fuel supply 
at petrol stations, local road accidents, and marine pollution, but these risks are either too 
unlikely to occur or are not catastrophic in nature (London Borough of Hounslow, 2016). 
 
2.5.1. Flooding 
One of the major hazards that Hounslow faces is fluvial flooding. Fluvial flooding has 
a likelihood score of 3 and an impact score of 4 on the borough’s risk matrix (table 1), giving 
it a “Very High” risk rating. The Hounslow Resilience Forum defines fluvial flooding as an 
event of persistent heavy rainfall over a period of two weeks that results in damage to up to a 
thousand properties and involves the evacuation of up to five thousand people (Contingency 
Planning Unit, 2016). One of the several controls that are in place for an event like this is the 
Flood and Water Management Act of 2010. According to the Hounslow Flood Risk 
Management Strategy of November 2014, a strategy under the Flood and Water Management 
Act of 2010, one-sixth of the 96,000 properties in the borough are vulnerable to flooding 
from a one in 1000-year event (London Borough of Hounslow, 2014). The borough of 
Hounslow is located on the Middlesex bank of the river Thames, which is the chief cause of 
floods in the borough that is home to more than 250,000 people (London Borough of 
Hounslow, 2011). Even though the possibility of tidal flooding from the Thames is quite low 
because of the surge barriers in place, the possible impact of any such occurrence is high, 
which is why it poses a major threat to the wellbeing of the residents of Hounslow. The 
damage to the borough as a result of fluvial flooding can affect the economy to a great extent. 
This is why the risk register implies that not only should officials monitor it on a frequent 
basis, but also that they should devise policies and regulations to alleviate this threat 
(Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). 
 
2.5.2. Influenza Pandemics 
The borough of Hounslow faces another risk with a similar risk rating to fluvial 
flooding: influenza pandemics. Approximately a quarter of a million people in the United 
Kingdom died in 1918-19 when the world saw one of its largest outbreaks of pandemic 
influenza (London Borough of Hounslow, n.d.). Medical patients, pregnant women, and 
elderly people are at a higher risk of catching influenza, but since the virus is easily 
transferrable, it can affect anyone. A worst-case scenario could see up to fifty percent of the 
population contracting the disease, bringing productivity down drastically (Contingency 
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Planning Unit, 2015). Authorities still need to conduct extensive research in order to 
eliminate the threats posed by an influenza pandemic to the London Borough of Hounslow, 
which could lose up to 2.5% of its population to the disease in a “reasonable worst-case 
scenario” (Contingency Planning Unit, 2015). 
 
2.6. Communicating the Risk 
Currently, there is little information regarding the best way to communicate risk with 
the community. A major factor to consider is that this communication needs to be a two-way 
process – not only do the authorities need to inform the population regarding risk, but also 
community members need to know how to report potential risk to authorities and also need to 
know how to seek additional information (Cabinet Office, 2011). There are several reasons 
that effective communication with the community is critical. Firstly, preventing panic and 
eliciting an appropriate response from community members is one of the goals in all 
communities. Communicating concerns to the responsible authorities allows the authorities to 
take action before a concern transforms into a crisis (Cabinet Office, 2011). Furthermore, 
having an open conversation between the authorities and the community allows the 
communication of different views and experiences, which leads to better decision-making. 
There is not always agreement in the implementation of risk management policies, as there 
may be disagreements and misunderstandings between authorities and community members. 
Involving the public in conversations increases the probability of reaching a consensus 
(Cabinet Office, 2011). 
Creating a CRR that is effective in communicating risk with the general public 
requires that it takes how people react to risk into consideration. How people react to risk has 
the same level of importance as understanding risk itself since the main objective is to protect 
the population (Cabinet Office, 2011). The differences in assumptions and values are 
responsible for the different interpretations of risk by individuals in the community. It is 
important to understand the different beliefs and points that the diverse population of 
Hounslow represents. (London Borough of Hounslow, 2011). The way people react to risk 
can be divided into five major categories: “vicarious rehearsal,” “denial,” “stigmatization,” 
“fear and avoidance,” and “withdrawal” (Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, 
2001). Vicarious rehearsal means that the further away, by distance or relationship, people 
are from a risk, the less they exercise reasonable reactions. These reactions are a problem 
because a certain geographical area may contain specific risks, but people might not act upon 
the risk because of its distance. Denial is one other way people respond to risk. Denial can 
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happen for several reasons, including confusion or mistrust in the communicating source. 
Some communities may stigmatize victims of local emergencies, and refuse services. Fear 
also prevents people from responding to risks, since an easy response to fear is avoidance, or 
pretending some risk does not exist. People might also be able to accept that a risk is real, but 
feel that the threat is so great that they assume the situation is hopeless (Oak Ridge Institute 
for Science and Education, 2001). 
An important factor 
in being successfully 
prepared for an emergency 
is having trust in the 
authorities. This trust allows 
the community to focus on 
the message, rather than 
disregarding it based upon 
their negative feelings 
towards the source 
(Frewer, 2004). One way 
to start building such trust 
is having the public involved in the discussion about emergency planning (Cabinet Office, 
2011). Authorities’ mistakes can also affect the population’s trust negatively. Table 2 shows 
how prediction and warning integration has improved for certain hazards. Warning 
integration corresponds to the incorporation of certain hazards in the warning systems. In the 
past, while prediction of hazards like drought, fire, avalanche, earthquake, and tsunami has 
improved, systems for warning members of the public about such hazards have not seen 
similar improvements. However, prediction of hazards like flood, landslide, and hazardous 
materials has seen improvement, even if the warning integration has not. The importance of 
forecasting and warning integration relates to public trust in the authorities. If authorities 
forecast and warn of an impending emergency that does not occur, people are less likely to 
believe the authorities in the future.  
Another important factor in being successfully prepared for an emergency is to 
understand how people form judgment regarding risks. One major factor corresponds to 
ethical and value judgments (Cabinet Office, 2011). Depending on personal beliefs, people in 
the community respond, and accept risks differently. Socio-economic factors also play an 
important roll in how well people respond to risk.  
Table 2: Improvements in prediction, forecast, and warning 
integration (Sorensen, 2000. 
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Different countries’ emergency response agencies have explored various 
communication strategies. In the United States of America, the most common means of mass 
communication used in emergencies are sirens, tone alert, telephone, and print media 
(Sorensen, 2000). Figure 3 relates the time to disseminate an alert versus the percentage of 
the population that receives such an alert. This study is over twenty-five years old, but the 
lesson learnt is timeless. Targeted ways to reach the community are more effective than 
unspecialized. For example, by 
using a telephone to warn the 
community directly, authorities 
can convey information about 
emergencies to a large section 
of the population in a short 
period of time. In contrast, 
untargeted means, like printed 
media that contain information 
regarding topics other than 
emergency response are less 
efficient at reaching the 
community. The downsides of 
targeted means are that not all 
the population has access to 
them, and that they are more expensive than untargeted means. The emergency response 
teams should prefer targeted means when trying to inform the community regarding risk, but 
a combination of both will provide greater access to risk information. 
One way that authorities can communicate with the population is through social 
media. Officials have previously used social media for communicating with the population 
during a crisis, for example in the November 2015 Paris attacks (Merchant et al, 2011). 
Social media is a widely used source of communication in the world; the Office of National 
Statistics suggests that in 2015, about 61% of the UK population has a social media profile 
(Prescott, 2015). These means of communication allow people to know the location of 
emergency services, and can also allow authorities to publish information regarding 
emergency preparedness (Merchant et al, 2011). It is fundamental to understand that the 
population might be reluctant to believe certain pieces of information transmitted via social 
media, since the information posted does not have to be verified, or even truthful (Merchant, 
Figure 3: Average dissemination time for warning Systems (Rogers et 
al, 1988) 
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et al, 2011). One other aspect of social media that is necessary to understand is usage. Despite 
the high percentage of people with a social media profile, the hours a day of usage, and the 
percentage of active users is low (Fleischmann, 2015). This is a problem because the 
communication of emergencies should be instantaneous. 
 
2.7. Design for Communication 
To communicate effectively, officials must actively consider the design of their work 
as well as the content. Design is a natural part of communication that creators often overlook 
(Aakhus, 2007). If a document or brochure has correct information but is unappealing to the 
eye, it is unlikely that community members will read it or retain any information they do 
read. However, adding too many design features is a distraction that will cause readers to 
miss the message entirely (Narayanan & Hegarty, 2002). Similarly, if a document or brochure 
is appealing to the eye but has technically complex information, it is likely people will tend to 
give up on reading it. This is the fine line that authorities must consider when designing 
documents for public education. 
When preparing the content for any document, it is imperative that the content is 
relevant to the target population, is clear on what the communication is about, and is 
straightforward about what the reader should do. In addition to this, one should also ensure 
that the language used in the document is not too complicated, and is rather plain and makes 
the text easy for people to follow (Waller, 2011).  
 Designing visuals for communication is older than of written languages (Lankow et 
al, 2012). Scientists have determined that people retain information more accurately and in a 
greater volume when they can visualize it. When attempting to spread awareness about 
important issues, an image, or posters and brochures containing images, will be more 
effective at communicating the main objectives to the average person than a block of text. 
This is because remembering facts is closely related to the comprehension of the material 
(Narayanan & Hegarty, 2002). Incorporating emotion is another effective means to 
communicate, as people are more likely to respond to something to which they have an 
emotional connection (Gregory, 2006). Appealing to emotion is especially useful when 
attempting to communicate to audiences who have no previous knowledge of a subject or 
interest in the subject, which makes appealing to emotion a good method for risk 
communication. However, officials must be careful to remain objective and calm when 
creating communication materials to avoid upsetting the community and creating unnecessary 
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panic. Creating several drafts of each potential communication tool is necessary as each 
design is a hypothesis and creators must test each one (Aakhus, 2007). 
Infographics are an especially effective way to communicate complicated data and 
information to people who cannot understand charts or be bothered to read them (Lankow et 
al, 2012). The Oxford English Dictionary defines an infographic as “a visual image such as a 
chart or diagram used to represent information or data in an easily understandable form” 
(“Infographic,” 2003). Infographics became popular in the late 1930s and have continued to 
grow in popularity as a way to convey information. Infographics can make boring 
information seem exciting and innovative through the use of good visualization. The 
introduction of appealing colours and words in various fonts and sizes is more appealing to 
the brain than the standard format of blocks of text. When confronted with an emergency, 
people will be less likely to remember important information they glanced over in a booklet, 
but a graphic may come back to them when they need it most (Lankow et al, 2012). 
 To create a document that contains good data visualization, four main aspect need to 
be taken into account (figure 4). These aspects are the information itself, the story we are 
trying to convey, the goal, and the visual form. Respectively, this is data, the concept, 
function, and metaphor. One must combine all of these factors to create a document with 
successful visualization. 
 
 
Figure 4: The necessary aspects of good data visualization. 
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One powerful example of poor data visualisation is the table regarding religious 
beliefs (Figure 5) (McCandless, 2014). This table shows what practices different religions 
accept, reject, or are neutral about. The presentation of information should be simplified, 
allowing the reader to interpret data easily. When looking at Figure 5, it is easy to get 
confused. There is too much information for viewers to process easily, and the ineffective use 
of colours adds to the confusion. Considering that the information presented is based on yes 
or no answers, there are other simpler ways to display such information.  
 
 
 
  
Figure 5: The Moral Matrix, a good 
example of poor data visualization 
(McCandless, 2014). 
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3. Methodology 
The goal of this project was to fix the technical and outreach problems with the 
current Hounslow multi-agency CRR with the intent of improving community resilience. In 
order to fulfil this goal, the team created several objectives listed below: 
1. Determine which elements the Hounslow team should modify in the borough’s 
multi-agency CRR and edit the document accordingly. 
2. Create a new community resilience document for awareness and warning.  
3. Create a communication plan for the Hounslow Resilience Forum to use with the 
new  public document.  
This chapter will discuss the methods we used to achieve each objective, beginning 
with a comparative analysis of local resilience fora’s CRRs. Then we interviewed different 
experts to determine what the Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) wanted in a new CRR and 
what would engage readers most effectively. Finally, we used the examples of other CRRs 
and expert opinions to edit the current technical Hounslow CRR and create a new “public-
friendly” CRR. 
 
3.1. Determine which elements we should modify in the borough’s multi-agency 
CRR and edit the document accordingly.          
In order to create a version of the Hounslow CRR that is both up-to-date and more 
effective at communicating risk, it was necessary to review other local resilience fora’s CRRs 
and to incorporate their best features into the new, edited version of Hounslow’s CRR. We 
were not able to simply apply Leigh’s principles without creating new ways to present 
information. Although Hounslow already has a published CRR, as required by the Civil 
Contingencies Act (CCA), it may be too technical for the community to use effectively. To 
improve upon its version, the Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) began research on other 
resilience fora’s CRRs. We continued this research and critically analysed and compared 
other CRRs from local resilience fora across England.  
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Table 3: The checklist we used to analyse CRRs 
Correct 
Terminology 
 
Yes No Description 
 Appropriate language used 
for likelihood, impact, and 
risk rating 
  
Officials changed these descriptions for the levels of likelihood, impact, 
and risk rating several years ago and these changes should be reflected 
accordingly in recently updated CRRs.  
"Reasonable worst case 
scenario" 
  
This term replaced the outdated term of “worst case scenario” a few years 
ago and this should be appropriately revised in all CRRs.  
Updated 
Risks 
 
 Severe volcanic activity 
  
Officials added this risk several years ago and should be included in 
updated CRRs. 
Severe space weather 
  
Officials added this risk several years ago and should be included in 
updated CRRs. 
The Matrix  
 Cell 2-2: medium risk 
rating 
  
Officials changed the risk matrix several years ago and CRRs should have 
the updated matrix with the appropriate rating in cell 2:2. 
Risk rating assigned 
correctly using matrix 
  
Risk ratings should be assigned using the matrix, not by multiplying the 
impact and likelihood scores together.  
Explanation Includes: 
 Methodology description 
  
CRRs should include some description about how the document was 
compiled. 
Definition of impact and 
likelihood 
  
Impact and likelihood should be defined within the CRR. 
Definition of risk ratings   Risk ratings (Low-Very High) should be defined within the CRR. 
Discrepancies 
  
Any risks that have not been included should have an explanation as to 
why.  
What to do in case of 
emergency 
  
A CRR should have a section dedicated to telling community members 
what to do during an emergency.  
Differences between threat 
and risk/hazard 
  
The CRR should tell a reader the difference between a risk and a hazard, 
along with which ones the CRR covers (risks, not threats).  
Definition of emergency   A CRR should contain the definition of an emergency.  
Design  Scale 1 -10  
 Colourful/visually 
appealing  
 
The use of colour may enhance the message of a CRR. 
Easy to read - limited 
amount of text  
 
Limited amounts of text and careful design may enhance the message of a 
CRR. 
Images   The use of images may enhance the message of a CRR.  
 Yes No  
Uses limited technical 
jargon 
  
A CRR should use terms that are “public-friendly” and limit technical 
language.  
Is short - <20 pages   A CRR should be a reasonable length. 
Other Includes: 
 Preamble 
  
A CRR should contain a preamble or introduction to inform readers why 
the document was created.  
Introduction of resilience 
fora 
  
A CRR should introduce the idea of a Resilience Forum and credit them 
with authorship. 
Date of last update 
  
A CRR should contain the last revision date so readers can know when the 
risks were last reviewed and ensure they are up to date.  
Top risks 
  
A CRR may choose to include all risks or only the top risks that will 
plague the area.  
Notes  
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The first task required to complete this objective was to analyse the CRRs from across 
the nation to determine best practices and eliminate CRRs that were below average. Our 
liaison, Miss Fiona Hodge provided us with a list of 39 County Resilience Fora from across 
England, all of which we chose to analyse. After determining which CRRs to read and 
analyse, we created a list (Table 3) of criteria based on Leigh’s (2013) recommendations (see 
section 2.5 for more information) and design aspects. In addition to Leigh’s 
recommendations, we also carried out a comparative analysis with the other CRRs to identify 
“best practices” in CRR content and format. Furthermore, this analysis also allowed us to 
determine whether Hounslow’s current approach to publishing CRRs was common among 
Resilience Fora, or if Hounslow had a unique approach. Miss Hodge at the CPU highly 
recommended using Leigh’s work as a resource for more information on CRRs and the 
correct methodology to follow. 
To create this list of criteria, we read through Leigh’s (2013) paper and added 
everything he mentioned to the necessary list of criteria. We also used a handout from a class, 
led by Leigh, that Miss Hodge attended (Appendix A), and the recommendations of the CPU 
members. This checklist does not include all the qualifications of a good CRR, although it 
does include several items that are characteristic of a well-developed CRR. Ideally, a CRR 
should have a yes checkmark in every row and higher numbers in the three design categories. 
After creating this checklist, we applied it to 39 CRRs from Resilience Fora across the 
country (Appendix B). To choose the “best” CRRs for secondary scoring, we converted all 
“yes” answers on the checklist to be one point, all “no” answers to be zero points, and all 
“N/A” to be zero points. For the questions that required answers on a scale of 1-10, we 
awarded the total number of points, divided by 10. For example, if a CRR earned a six, a 
seven, and a five, on the three scaled questions, it would earn 0.6 points, 0.7 points, and 0.5 
points for those questions. We then tallied the scores out of 22 points and determined every 
score above 14 to be a top score. Fourteen was chosen as the benchmark for a top score 
because there were less than ten CRRs that scored above 14 points, making a manageable 
number of CRRs to score.  
We used Leigh’s assessment tool (Appendix A), to score the top nine CRRs 
(Cumbria, Derby & Derbyshire, Durham & Darlington, Gloucestershire, Greater Manchester, 
Humber, Merseyside, Northumbria, Nottingham & Nottinghamshire), and Hounslow’s CRR. 
The tool comprises 17 questions, which can be answered by “yes,” “to some extent,” or “no.” 
Each of those answers is equivalent to two points, one point, or zero points, respectively, and 
the maximum score is 34 points. We performed two assessments because it would be 
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inefficient to test every CRR in the country with Leigh’s assessment tool as it is time 
consuming and extremely thorough. Initially, we planned to only score the CRRs using the 
checklist we had made. However, once we finished analysing the 39 CRRs using our 
checklist, we discovered the assessment tool. Instead of reassessing all 39 CRRs, it was 
logical to take only the top CRRs and assess them with Leigh’s tool. Although our checklist 
was more superficial than Leigh’s assessment tool and could not provide the necessary detail 
we needed to make a clear decision, it was useful to decrease the number of thorough 
assessments we needed to perform. 
We used this lengthy assessment process to determine what parts of other CRRs we 
could incorporate into our new CRR. This allowed us to improve the Hounslow CRR in an 
effective way, as we did not have to invent new material or new ways to present this material. 
We used the CRRs we evaluated as model to create the edit for Hounslow’s CRR. Once we 
identified an error in Hounslow’s CRR, we used the other CRRs to find a strategy to fix the 
problem. If we could use multiple strategies, we used a combination of strategies to make the 
changes that made the most sense logically.   
 
3.2. Create a new community resilience document for awareness and warning 
To create the community resilience document we followed several steps. We began 
by interviewing Mark Leigh, of the Emergency Planning College. We asked him about his 
research in designing CRRs and what he thought were the most important features to include 
when creating one. Following our interview, we began drafting our community resilience 
document on paper. We thought carefully about what risk information to include and how to 
present it in the most effective way. We considered using text, images, tables, and charts. We 
also thought about how to balance text and images. We used the borough council’s guidelines 
on design and branding to decide which colours to use for our cover page and headers. 
Finally, we considered the best way to discuss risks without inciting panic or instilling fear in 
our readers. 
We determined that we should include four top risks by consulting with the risk 
matrix and Miss Hodge. We created an eight-page document, complete with an introduction, 
four top risks, and important contact information. For the top risks, we created a page for 
each of the four risks (flooding, fire, utility loss, and pandemic flu) that contained 
information about what the risk is, how community members can prepare, what the 
consequences of the risk are, and how the borough is preparing. Each page also contained 
images and colours with a limited amount of text. Although each page contained important 
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information, we tried to limit the amount of text and technical language we used to ensure 
that community members would read and understand what we presented. We then edited our 
document according to the recommendations of Miss Hodge, Mr. Palmer, and our advisors.  
Following the creation of our community resilience document, we conducted several 
interviews with community members who work at the Hounslow Civic Centre. Our 
interviews with Rosaline Harris, Billy Regan, and Andrea Tidy provided us with community 
feedback on our community resilience document and allowed us to make changes.  
 
3.3. Create a communication plan for the Hounslow Resilience Forum to use with 
the new public document 
To create the communication plan for the Hounslow Resilience Forum to use with the 
new community resilience document, we first interviewed experts in risk. We interviewed 
Peter Davison of Public Health England and Steve Waspe of the National Health Service 
England (London), as well as Matt Hogan, of the London Resilience Forum. We also 
interviewed Rosaline Harris, and Andrea Tidy, residents of Hounslow who work at the 
Hounslow Civic Centre. We chose to interview these people to determine what experts and 
residents wanted out of a new community resilience document and the best way to 
communicate community resilience. The questions we asked our interviewees are available in 
Appendix C. Miss Hodge helped us arrange these interviews by contacting her colleagues in 
the Hounslow Resilience Forum and within the Hounslow Civic Centre. Of the many people 
we contacted, only seven responded, and therefore, we were able to only conduct seven 
interviews.  
After our interviews, we then brainstormed different communication ideas as a team, 
and discussed them with Miss Hodge and Mr. Palmer. We also became more observant of our 
surroundings to determine how other people were advertising to the community. 
Matthew Hogan, during his interview, suggested that we examine the London 
Curriculum and find a pilot programme for teaching emergency awareness and preparedness 
at schools. The programme consists of activities related to major emergencies. We used this 
programme as a model to draft a programme that can be used for outreach in Hounslow. We 
focused on floods, since it is one of the top risks in Hounslow. One activity related to floods 
consists of students identifying their house on a map, and assessing if it is in the flood zone. 
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According to Mark Leigh, the County of Essex has been doing work related to 
education outreaches. We researched what Essex has developed, and came across more 
activities related to emergencies. These activities consisted of choice making games, 
colouring books, books, videos, and jigsaw puzzles.  
Taking this information into consideration, we developed a communication plan that 
incorporates the best of both the London and Essex programmes.  
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4. Results & Discussion 
4.1. The Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR 
For the preliminary assessment of CRRs, we used the checklist we created earlier in 
our project to assess the 39 local resilience fora CRRs in England. Below in Table 4 is an 
example of our assessment of one of the 39 CRRs, which scored 11.7 out of 22 possible 
points. 
 
Table 4: Our preliminary assessment checklist filled out with the Avon & Somerset CRR. 
Correct Terminology  Yes No Description 
 Appropriate 
language used for 
likelihood, impact, 
and risk rating 
X  
Officials changed these descriptions 
for the levels of likelihood, impact, 
and risk rating several years ago and 
these changes should be reflected 
accordingly in recently updated CRRs.  
"Reasonable worst 
case scenario" 
X  
This term replaced the outdated term 
of “worst case scenario” a few years 
ago and this should be appropriately 
revised in all CRRs.  
Updated Risks  
 Severe Volcanic 
Activity  X 
This risk was added several years ago 
and should be included in updated 
CRRs. 
Severe Space 
Weather  X 
This risk was added several years ago 
and should be included in updated 
CRRs. 
The Matrix  
 Cell 2-2: medium 
risk rating 
X  
The risk matrix changed several years 
ago and CRRs should have the 
updated matrix with the appropriate 
rating in cell 2:2. 
Risk rating assigned 
correctly using 
matrix 
X  
Risk ratings should be assigned using 
the matrix, not by multiplying the 
impact and likelihood scores together.  
Explanation Includes: 
 Methodology 
Description X  
CRRs should include some description 
about how the document was 
compiled. 
Definition of 
Impact and 
Likelihood 
X  
Impact and likelihood should be 
defined within the CRR. 
Definition of Risk 
Ratings 
X  
Risk ratings (Low-Very High) should 
be defined within the CRR. 
Discrepancies 
 X 
Any risks that have not been included 
should have an explanation as to why.  
What to do in case 
of emergency 
 X 
A CRR should have a section 
dedicated to telling community 
members what to do during an 
emergency.  
Differences 
between threat and 
risk/hazard 
X  
The CRR should tell a reader the 
difference between a risk and a hazard, 
along with which ones the CRR covers 
(risks, not threats).  
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Definition of 
Emergency 
 X 
A CRR should contain the definition 
of an emergency.  
Design  Scale 1 -10  
 Colourful/Visually 
Appealing  
3 
The use of colour may enhance the 
message of a CRR. 
Easy to read - 
limited amount of 
text  
4 
Limited amounts of text and careful 
design may enhance the message of a 
CRR. 
Images  
0 
The use of images may enhance the 
message of a CRR.  
 Yes No  
Uses limited 
technical jargon  X 
A CRR should use terms that are 
“public-friendly” and limit technical 
language.  
Is short - <20 pages  X A CRR should be a reasonable length. 
Other Includes: 
 Preamble 
X  
A CRR should contain a preamble or 
introduction to inform readers why the 
document was created.  
Introduction of 
Resilience Fora X  
A CRR should introduce the idea of a 
Resilience Forum and credit them with 
authorship. 
Date of Last Update 
X  
A CRR should contain the last revision 
date so readers can know when the 
risks were last reviewed and ensure 
they are up to date.  
Top risks 
 X 
A CRR may choose to include all risks 
or only the top risks that will plague 
the area.  
Notes Too focussed on tables 
 
We assessed all 39 CRRs listed in Appendix B using the checklist above, which we 
filled out for the Avon & Somerset County CRR. All other results are listed in Appendix D. 
We set each “yes” response as 1 point, each “no” response, and each “N/A” as no value. For 
the scaling questions, we took the score given and divided by ten, making the maximum 
score 22 points (Appendix E). If a CRR contained no colour, but was visually appealing, it 
received a score of 5. Conversely, if a CRR was colourful, but not visually appealing, we 
assigned a score of 5 as well. When deciding whether a CRR was visually appealing, we used 
our best judgment, making the scoring subjective. Reflecting on this methodology choice, we 
acknowledge that there is a better way to perform the subjective analysis. After assessing all 
the CRRs and converting answers to the point system, we discovered a large range among 
scores. The Nottingham & Nottinghamshire CRR had the highest score of 18.47, while the 
Devon & Cornwall CRR scored only 3.6 points. The 39 CRRs scored had a range of 14.8 
points, with an average score of 10.38 points. There was a standard deviation of 4.55 points. 
The criterion for which the largest number of CRRs scored a “yes,” (38 out of 39) excluding 
the criteria that required a ranking from 1-10, was the correct risk rating for cell 2:2 on the 
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risk matrix. The criterion for which the largest number of CRRs scored a “no,” (34 out of 39) 
excluding the criteria that required a ranking from 1-10, was whether the CRR mentioned any 
discrepancies in risk ratings. The range of scores made it critical that we took the top scores 
and excluded the bottom scores for our secondary assessment so we could see the best 
practices.  
To continue with the secondary assessment, we chose the top CRRs as those that 
scored above 14 points on the preliminary assessment. For the secondary assessment, we 
used the top seven CRRs from the preliminary assessment as well as Hounslow’s CRR. The 
assessment tool Mark Leigh provided us was very straightforward to use. It consisted of 17 
questions, which could be answered using “yes,” “to some extent,” or “no.” We awarded each 
“yes” two points, each “to some extent” one point, and each “no” zero points. 
 
Table 5: The results of our secondary assessment of the top CRRs 
CRR 
Score  
(out of 34) 
Cumbria 25 
Derby & Derbyshire 21 
Durham & Darlington 9 
Gloucestershire 10 
Greater Manchester 23 
Hounslow 18 
Humber 16 
Merseyside 17 
Northumbria 17 
Nottingham & Nottinghamshire 24 
 
Out of all the CRRs (table 5) we scored using Mark Leigh’s assessment tool 
(Appendix A), Cumbria scored the highest with 25 out of 34. Durham & Darlington earned 
the lowest score with 9 out of 34. The ten CRRs scored had a range of twelve points and an 
average score of 18 points. The standard deviation among scores was 5.48 points. None of the 
CRRs answered “yes” or “to some extent” for questions 17 or five, meaning that there were 
no scored CRRs that included “a statement of intent to engage with the public” nor any that 
included “discussion of the limitations of risk assessment and risk management.” 
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Furthermore, every CRR scored in the secondary assessment answered “yes” to question 
nine, which asked, “Does it provide information about local risk control measures that are in 
place?” The full raw data scores for each CRR for each question is available in Appendix D.  
The assessments provided us with the necessary information to update Hounslow’s 
multi-agency CRR. We learned what the current best practices were across the country and 
what elements (colour, images, and less text) we should try to include in our updated version. 
Furthermore, the assessments, although long and tedious, provided us with material to put in 
our CRR without having to reinvent the wheel. These assessments were an important step in 
creating the new multi-agency CRR and without them, we would have struggled in ways to 
improve the CRR. 
To create the updated version of the technical multi-agency CRR, we used the 
information we gathered from the secondary assessment of the CRR. Hounslow’s score of 18 
of out 34 showed us that there were many things that could be improved in the document. 
There were nine different questions that the Hounslow CRR scored less than the maximum 
two points on. We decided the assessment step was necessary so we could identify “good” 
parts of other CRRs and then incorporate those parts into our CRR. We started by changing 
the colours on the risk register to make it look more appealing to the eye. We also redefined 
the stated purpose of the CRR in the document and it now reads, “The purpose of the 
Hounslow public CRR is to educate people about the risks that could occur where they live, 
so they can think about what they are able to do to be better prepared for emergencies.” In 
addition to these, we also included the local history of emergencies for risks they were 
available for, incorporated reasons for withholding certain information into the document, 
provided the community reasons for possible limitations of risk assessment, and specified 
contact details at the end of the document for the readers to get in touch with the CPU on the 
topic of risk assessment. 
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Figure 6a: An excerpt of the current version of Hounslow’s CRR. We changed the design of the 
document, as shown in figures 6a and 6b. Both figure 6a and figure 6b show the same risk, H 17 
Storms & Gales, but there are several differences between the two as we not only changed the colour 
scheme, but we also included a local history of the risk in Hounslow. We changed the colour scheme 
to green and purple to reflect that the Hounslow multi-agency CRR was a product of the borough, as 
those are the borough’s marketing colours used on all official documents. 
 
Figure 6b: An excerpt of the updated version of Hounslow’s CRR. 
 
We made several changes to the design of the multi-agency CRR. First, we changed 
the colour scheme from blue to purple in order to reflect the borough council’s preferred 
colour scheme used in all official documents. We also ensured that the colours used in the 
CRR were consistent throughout the document. In the old CRR, the colours for the 
likelihood, impact, and risk ratings were inconsistent, changing from grey to green and pink 
to red.  
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Table 6: The new colour scheme of the Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR. 
Likelihood and impact 1 2 3 4 5 
Risk rating Low Medium High Very High  
 
Table 6 shows the new colour scheme we used in the updated version of the CRR. We 
also made the following changes to the Hounslow multi-agency CRR (Appendix R) 
following the questions listed on Leigh’s Assessment Tool (Appendix A): 
 Question 1: We changed the introduction to include that the purpose of the 
document is to keep the community safe rather than say that the document is a by-
product of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. (page 8 of the updated Hounslow 
multi-agency CRR) 
 Question 5: We added a section discussing the limitations of risk assessment and 
how risks are constantly changing (page 10) 
 Question 6: We attempted to make the design more “user-friendly” (Leigh 2013). 
 Question 8: We added the local history of emergencies in Hounslow for each risk 
(page 18) 
 Question 10: We provided more information about control measures that the HRF 
is planning (page 18). 
 Question 11: We added a section about why some details are withheld due to 
security and community safety (page 5). 
 
All of these changes are highlighted in yellow in the full technical version of the 
Hounslow multi-agency CRR, available in Appendix R. Although not radical, these changes 
did improve the score of the Hounslow CRR using Leigh’s assessment tool to a 31 out of 34, 
much higher than its previous score of 18. We were not able to improve upon question 16 
(Are public views about risk in the CRR area actively solicited?) or question 10 (Does [the 
CRR] provide information about local risk control measures that are planned or under 
development?). However, by answering the questions that were previously unanswered in the 
secondary assessment, we were able to improve the multi-agency CRR. By making simple 
changes in colour and layout, as well as adding a few sentences about public awareness and 
risk history, we improved the Hounslow CRR to make it a more “public-friendly” and usable 
document for both residents and the HRF.  
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4.2. The Community Resilience Document   
To create the new community resilience document, we first interviewed Mark Leigh, 
of the Emergency Planning College. He provided several recommendations about risk 
registers including that they should be “public-friendly,” contain localized risks, and include 
an assessment. According to Mr. Leigh, “public-friendly” risk registers should be easy for the 
common member of the community to read, should be focused on the information the public 
needs to understand, and should be visually appealing.  
We then began drafting our community resilience document. After consulting with 
Miss Hodge, we determined that the document should discuss four risks: influenza pandemic, 
flooding, fire, and loss of utilities. Using the information in the technical version, we wrote 
sections about what community members can do, what the consequences of risk are, what the 
council can do, and what the possible impacts of the risk are.  
We reduced the complexity of technical information because we reasoned that it is not 
important for the community to understand the technicalities of the responses to different 
emergencies. It is important for the community to know what to do in case an emergency 
occurs, and to know what are the consequences of a poor response. The colour scheme used 
through the entire document is part of the Hounslow’s Civic Centre design recommendations. 
We have picked two contrasting and vivid colours from the palette to make the document 
appealing to the public. As for important graphics in the document, there is a map of 
Hounslow containing major infrastructure and risks locations. We decided to use a map 
because it allows the public to localize the risks in relation to other locations in the borough. 
The community members can locate their houses and determine which risks are more 
applicable to them. 
We had two interviews with local community members. We presented the 
interviewees with a copy of the latest community resilience document and asked them to 
provide feedback page by page. This feedback allowed us to change the document to match 
the needs of the public. We then made changes to the map and the order of information 
presentation to satisfy the community members  
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Figure 7 shows an 
example page of the Community 
Resilience Document. The full 
size document is available in 
Appendix Q. The pages 
containing risk information are 
the most important sections of 
the document, because it is 
where we advise the community 
members of what to do in case 
of each specific emergency, and 
what the consequences of the 
emergency may be. We decided 
to divide the subsections of this 
page into colourful boxes. We 
did this to achieve the goal of 
making the document appealing 
and keeping the public focused 
on the information residents 
need at a certain time. We tried 
to increase the number of 
images used and reduce the 
amount text in each box, by using graphics to communicate statistics and ideas of what to 
pack for an emergency evacuation. We want to make sure the community members know 
exactly what to do, and at the same time keep the information simple without losing content. 
As such, we included more text than images for each page. We kept the information simple, 
focused on what behaviours we want to change, and made sure to acknowledge the potential 
of risks without causing fear in the population. 
After drafting the document we conducted interviews with community members to 
determine whether they liked the document and what could be improved. Rosaline Harris, a 
Hounslow resident and Civic Centre employee, suggested many changes to the first draft of 
our community resilience document. She suggested that instead of relying too heavily on text, 
we simplify the pages and include links for more information if people wanted it. Her 
Figure 7: Example page of Community Resilience Document 
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rationale was that if people read the document, they only want to learn the bare minimum and 
if they are interested in learning more, we could provide them with the necessary resources. 
We also interviewed Billy Regan and Andrea Tidy, both residents of Hounslow. 
Together, they offered few suggestions including adding information about not using lifts 
during fires and a potential colour change. The information we gained from these interviews 
allowed us to make our document more “public-friendly.” The entirety of the new community 
resilience document is available in Appendix Q.  
 
4.3. Communication Plan 
To create our communication plan, we began with interviews with local experts in 
risk communication to learn the best way to spread awareness and elicit a behavioural change 
in community members. Table 6 contains a list of all interviews we conducted. The 
transcripts of those interviews are available in Appendices F-L. Through our interviews we 
learned that a communication plan is unequivocally necessary for a risk register to be 
effective in teaching the community about public resilience. Both Davison and Waspe 
suggested going into schools to teach children about risk. They noted that although our 
intentions were good, simply creating a document would not be enough to change the 
behaviours of community members. Waspe pointed out that in order to make a big difference, 
we had to create a long-lasting plan rather than a short-term plan. 
Harris gave us information on how she would like to receive risk education. She 
believes writing in Hounslow Matters will make more people aware of the document and 
refrigerator magnets are a good idea.  
Hogan gave us information on where to find previously made communication tools. 
As a member of the London Resilience Forum, he had experience in communicating risk to 
the public and was eager to share. He suggested using maps to help people find if their homes 
are in flood plains and fun activities to determine what risks community members perceive as 
most substantial. His informative interview gave us inspiration for our own educational 
programme.  
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Table 6: The list of interviews we conducted.  
Name Title Affiliation Date 
Steve Waspe North West London 
EPRR Manager 
NHS England (London) 31 March 2016 
Peter Davison Emergency 
Preparedness Manager 
Public Health England Office 
for London 
01 April 2016 
Mark Leigh Director of the Faculty 
of Civil Protection and 
Crisis Management  
Emergency Planning College 04 April 2016 
Rosaline Harris Early Intervention 
Service Support Officer 
Hounslow Resident 13 April 2016 
Matthew Hogan Resilience Officer London Resilience Team 15 April 2016 
Andrea Tidy Caretaking and 
Concierge Manager 
Hounslow Resident 26 April 2016 
Billy Regan Social Worker Hounslow Resident 26 April 2016 
 
From our interviews we learned that we needed to go into schools around the borough 
to teach Key Stage 1-2 students about risks. After our interviews, we began brainstorming 
ideas for the communication plan and discussed our ideas with our sponsor, Miss Hodge. We 
also began observing how other organisations advertise their services to the community to 
develop ideas. We looked at ads from non-profits, government agencies, and companies to 
determine the best way to advertise and gain ideas. We looked at local advertising because 
Hounslow residents are accustomed to receiving information in certain ways, and using 
existing advertisements gave us a starting point for us to create our own advertisements.   
Our communication plan contains two main domains: education of Key Stage 1-2 
children and promotion of the community resilience document. We decided that the 
education of Key Stage 1-2 students (ages 5-11) would be most beneficial because of the way 
these students learn. We learned that starting the conversation about risk early on in 
childhood creates a generation of people who are more prepared to face emergencies 
(personal communication from Matthew Hogan, 2016).  
One of the focuses of our communication plan is to use the national education system. 
Communicating risk preparedness via schools gives us the possibility of interacting directly 
with students and parents. Educating from a young age promotes a culture of risk 
preparedness guaranteeing that the generations of tomorrow are better prepared to respond to 
emergencies. By integrating the parents and grandparents, we can also promote risk 
preparedness in the generations of today, improving the way they respond to risks. 
As we have previously discussed, communication needs to be a two-way process. 
However, since this initiative is one of the first of its kind in the borough, we believe the 
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Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) will have to take the first steps towards educating the 
population. The next steps are for the HRF to open communication lines between the 
community and the authorities, allowing for better understanding of the perception of risk 
from the community. 
In order to accomplish our objective of educating the community, and encouraging 
better preparedness for this and future generations, we have developed a pilot programme. 
This programme takes the form of a workshop. The programme’s main focus is bringing 
teachers, students, and parents together to get involved in different educational activities. 
Ideally, the programme would take place during the school day as part of the school 
curriculum. Parents would be invited and encouraged to attend. However, we understand that 
this is not realistically possible and foresee this programme only involving students who can 
pass information to their parents, and teachers, who can provide the HRF with feedback. 
To start the workshop, there will be a risk assessment activity (Appendix M) based on 
an activity the London Resilience Forum implemented at a public risk meeting. The activity 
begins with a list of risks Hounslow may face, in no particular order. Participants will then 
circle the risk they believe to be most consequential in the community. This activity will 
determine what public perceptions of top risks are and then activity leaders can then tailor the 
programme towards whichever risks need the most attention.  
After the risk assessment activity, the teachers will give a quick presentation 
(Appendix N) on risk planning and preparedness. We based the presentation on the 
community resilience document created previously. The presentation will start by 
distinguishing what civil emergencies could possibly occur in Hounslow. This presentation 
may either support earlier perceptions of risk, or change the perceptions the community 
showed in the start of the workshop when participants did the first activity. After the 
presentation, teachers will explain the top risks in the borough, and provide some information 
regarding consequences, and what to do in case an emergency occurs.  
Following the presentation, teachers will provide fun activities for the students. We 
suggest the teachers use activities they can obtain from the County of Essex or from the 
London Curriculum. These activities can take the form of computer or tablet games, 
colouring books, jigsaw puzzles, and story books regarding risk preparedness. The County of 
Essex has previously used similar activities to engage students. Examples of similar activities 
are at the following website: http://www.whatif-guidance.org/. The goal of these activities is 
to keep the students concentrated on the subject, while having fun. As these activities are 
occurring, teachers will guide parents and grandparents to computers, where they will 
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identify their houses on a map. This map will include details of where the risks exist in the 
borough. This is important to know, because it makes the community focus on the risks they 
may face in the future. 
Finally, attendees will answer a quick 
questionnaire to assess the workshop’s effectiveness 
(Appendix O). Since this is a pilot programme, it is 
important to understand what factors were and were not 
educational or helpful to the community. Teachers will 
provide students with a copy of the resilience document to 
take home for their parents. The purpose of the 
questionnaire is to provide feedback regarding the 
programme. We believe it is important for teachers and 
the Hounslow Resilience Forum to assess how well the 
programme is working. Depending on the feedback, 
teachers and the HRF can change the programme, by 
adding or removing activities, and providing different 
explanations for risks depending on the understanding of 
the audience. 
 For the promotion of the community resilience 
document, we brainstormed several different ideas. Many 
different types of people visit the Hounslow Civic Centre daily. In addition to employees, 
many residents visit to complete business with the council. The ground floor lobby is almost 
always full, usually with people waiting in line to pay their taxes, talk to social workers, or 
file paperwork. These employees and visitors are therefore our intended audience for several 
of our promotional ideas. Copies of the community resilience document will be available in 
the Hounslow Civic Centre with various other documents near the main entrance (figure 8). 
In addition to having copies of the document available, there will be a banner in the lobby of 
the Civic Centre (figure 9) giving more information about the documents and risks in 
Hounslow. We decided a banner would be a worthy addition to our communication plan 
because of a banner (figure 10) that caught our attention one day walking in to work. 
Although it describes online borough tax management, it was appealing and eye-catching. 
We thought if a banner on tax information could catch our attention, it might be a good way 
to teach visitors and employees about risk.  
Figure 8: The lobby of the Civic 
Centre where we recommend the HRF 
provide copies of the community 
resilience document.  
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We also wrote an article to be 
published in the borough’s magazine, 
Hounslow Matters (figure 11), which 
is distributed for free every six 
months. This magazine covers topics 
related to the borough including the 
council, parks, and activities, and the 
editor has expressed an interest in 
publishing our article in an upcoming 
issue. It is available both online on 
the borough council’s website and in 
print, as it is delivered to every 
resident in the borough. The article, 
which is titled, “What to Do in an 
Emergency,” describes the new community resilience 
document as well as more information about how to access it. Furthermore, it will detail 
several easy things community members can do to prepare for an emergency. The article is 
available in Appendix P.  
 
Figure 11: The cover of the spring 2016 issue of Hounslow Matters. 
 
 
Figure 9: The banner 
that caught our 
attention. Figure 10: Our proposed banner 
design. 
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Social media is a good way to transmit information to masses. In 2015, about 59% of 
the U.K. population had active social media accounts (Fleischmann, 2015). Besides this, 
authorities have used social media before in 
emergency situations. During the Paris terror 
attacks, people were able to use Facebook to 
inform their families and friends that they were 
not affected by the attacks. This allowed 
emergency means of communication, like 
emergency telephone lines, to not get disrupted 
by overuse. While the article should be 
effective at reaching members of the 
community who read periodicals like Hounslow 
Matters, many other members of the community may prefer other communication platforms, 
such as social media. We plan to advertise the community resilience document through social 
media. The borough has a Facebook page “London Borough of Hounslow,” full of 
information for the community. The borough also has a Twitter handle, @LBofHounslow, 
run by the communication team, who makes posts multiple times per day. The borough uses 
its Twitter handle to provide information for residents. Residents can also ask quick questions 
and receive answers in a timely fashion.   
There is also a display window in the front entrance of 
the Civic Centre (figure 12), which is available to rent for any 
department in the council. We propose the HRF create a plan 
for various decorations for the window in order to spread 
awareness about the community resilience document. The 
intended audience would be anyone who visits the Hounslow 
Civic Centre. People who notice the display and are intrigued 
by its content are likely to want more information and will 
continue into the lobby to find the available pamphlets and 
banner. 
Our final promotional idea is to create a refrigerator 
magnet with emergency phone numbers on it and space for 
community members to add their own important phone 
numbers. Figure 13 shows what these magnets will look like. 
Figure 12: The display window at the entrance of 
the Civic Centre.  
Figure 13: The fridge magnet we 
will distribute to the community.  
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The magnets will be available to all community members via Hounslow Matters. We will 
attach magnets to the back cover of the magazine for easy distribution to community 
members. Our proposed audience is all homeowners. These magnets would be beneficial for 
during emergencies when homeowners need a quick reference or when power goes out and 
homeowners need to know who to call. 
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5. Conclusion & Recommendations 
The purpose of this project was to update Hounslow’s CRR and create resources and 
strategies that should result in a more educated population in Hounslow. By updating the 
Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR, creating the new community resilience document, and 
creating a communication plan, we helped the Hounslow Resilience Forum begin the 
necessary changes to make residents aware and prepared for emergencies. However, our 
work only created the tools for communication and in order for the HRF to change 
community perceptions of risk and preparedness, they must continue to work on education 
and outreach efforts. By making the following changes, we believe the HRF can make a 
positive impact by reducing unpreparedness in the community. 
We first recommend that the HRF replace their current CRR with the new Hounslow 
multi-agency CRR (Appendix R) we created. The HRF should publish this multi-agency 
CRR on the borough website, although we primarily intended this version for HRF usage and 
less for community usage. We make this recommendation because the new Hounslow multi-
agency CRR is more “public-friendly” than the current version as it uses colour more 
carefully. Furthermore, it uses similar branding to most other Hounslow council documents. 
We improved this document to the specifications of Mark Leigh’s assessment tool (Appendix 
A) and we presume it does a better job of communicating risk to the public, while still 
maintaining its role as a HRF risk assessment document.  
We also recommend the HRF publish our community resilience document (appendix 
Q) in addition to the new Hounslow multi-agency CRR. We make this recommendation 
because the community resilience document allows community members to read and learn 
about risks without having to read the entirety of the multi-agency CRR, which is over 60 
pages long. It also teaches community members about the top risks that they are susceptible 
to in Hounslow and how to prepare their families for them. This preparation can make a 
world of difference when emergencies occur. This document is intended to educate the 
community on what the repercussions of the top risks are and what the borough council is 
doing to prepare the borough for them. Finally, the community resilience document gives 
guidance on how people can learn more about risks and how to prepare for them via links to 
websites for the fire brigade, police, and NHS. 
Another recommendation is that the HRF use the communication plan we created to 
help promote the community resilience document and teach the community, especially 
children, about risk. As we have already created the plan, all the HRF has to do is implement 
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it. This will make community members more aware about the risks in Hounslow, the 
community resilience document, and the HRF. It is likely that the implementation of this plan 
will not only educate community members, but also decrease the impacts of top risks in 
Hounslow, as more people will be adequately prepared for civil emergencies.  
 Furthermore, we recommend that the HRF run several tests to determine the 
effectiveness of our deliverables. They should field test our new community resilience 
document to determine if it accurately informs community members about possible risks and 
their corresponding reactions. They should also pilot test our educational programme to 
determine its effectiveness in educating families about risks and emergency preparedness. 
Pilot testing could involve establishing a relationship with at least one Hounslow school, 
organizing the pilot, and evaluating the programme. We suggest the evaluation come from 
both focus groups and interviews of participants and teachers. 
 We also recommend expanding outreach that we began through our article in 
Hounslow Matters. The HRF can continue to expand outreach efforts by creating a specific 
section in the magazine dedicated to the Hounslow Resilience Forum so that they can publish 
various pieces of emergency information and preparedness throughout the year. Also, we 
propose that the HRF utilize the borough’s social media and perhaps create their own 
accounts. By posting regularly, they can increase their number of followers and reach more 
people. Furthermore, they may choose to use advertising on Facebook to reach Hounslow 
residents. By following these recommendations, we believe the Hounslow Resilience Forum 
can promote a culture of awareness and preparedness that will aid its residents.  
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7. Appendix A: Leigh’s Assessment Tool 
 
This is the assessment tool (Leigh, 2013) we used to perform the secondary 
assessment of CRRs. We learned about this tool after our sponsor Miss Fiona Hodge 
recommended it. It contains 17 questions that can be answered using “yes,” “to some extent,” 
or “no.” Each answer is then turned into a numerical value (2, 1 or 0) respectively and the 
total score is tallied. The maximum score is 34 points.  
 
Mark Leigh       Emergency Planning College 
Annex to  
Emergency Planning College 
Occasional Paper 
New Series 
Number 1 
 
COMMUNITY RISK REGISTERS 
 
Assessment Tool 
 
The aim of this exercise is to carry out a documentary analysis of community risk 
registers, assessing them against a set of criteria which are generally accepted as 
indicators of good practice in public risk communication. 
 
There is a template below for recording the scores you allocate. 
 
Objective 1 
Establish the extent to which the purpose of the register, the manner of its creation and reason 
for its publication are explained to the public in clear and non-technical English. 
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Questions 
1. Is it a stated purpose of the CRR to give members of the public a balanced 
understanding of the risks they face, in order to make them better able to respond to 
an emergency and reduce its impact on the community? 
2. Is it made clear, down to the level of participating organisations, who was responsible 
for the CRR’s production, how it was produced and how it is maintained.  
3. Are the underlying concepts of risk, likelihood and impact explained clearly and 
without technical language? 
4. Are the underlying concepts of controls, risk treatment and lead agencies explained 
clearly and without technical language? 
5. Is there any discussion of the limitations of risk assessment and risk management – 
especially in respect of issue such uncertainty, professional judgement, scientific 
evidence and environmental change? 
6. Does the design and presentation of the document suggest a deliberate attempt to 
make it “user-friendly” for a lay readership? 
 
Objective 2 
Determine the extent to which each register is explicitly contextualised, giving a clear and 
informed sense of its relevance to the local community. 
 
Questions 
7. Is the CRR locally contextualised throughout, so that readers should be able to grasp 
easily its relevance and applicability to themselves and the local community? 
8. Does it provide information about the local history of emergencies? 
9. Does it provide information about local risk control measures that are in place? 
10. Does it provide information about local risk control measures that are planned or 
under development? 
11. Are the reasons for withholding information, including the locations of hazardous 
sites, explained and justified? 
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Objective 3 
Establish the extent to which the registers are linked to other forms of local resilience and risk 
communications that the public may be exposed to.  
 
Questions 
12.  Does the CRR make reference made to other forms of communication about 
emergency preparedness that the public are likely to receive? 
13. Does it give reference to other forms of emergency preparedness information that are 
available to those who wish to learn more? 
 
Objective 4 
Assess the extent to which the public are given the opportunity to engage in the process, 
through feedback and consultation mechanisms. 
 
Questions 
14. Are the public given a point of contact to use if they want to ask questions about the 
purpose or content of the CRR? 
15. Is that point of contact accessible by means other than letter? 
16. Are public views about risks in the CRR area actively solicited? 
17. Is there a statement of intent to engage with the public on the assessment of risks in 
their area at any time in the future? 
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Each question will be answered with a response of “no,” “to some extent” or “yes.” These 
responses are given numerical values of 0, 1 or 2 respectively. The survey form requires a 
short, supporting statement where a score of 1 is given, but no statement is required to 
support an unequivocal score of 0 or 2.  
 
Objective 
Scores for 
Each 
Question 
Comments 
1 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
 Total for Objective 1 (out of 12) 
2 
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
 Total for Objective 2 (out of 10) 
3 
12  
13  
 Total for Objective 3 (out of 4) 
4 
14  
15  
16  
17  
 Total for Objective 3 (out of 8) 
  Grand Total (out of 34) 
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8. Appendix B: List of Local Resilience Fora in England 
 
Northwest: Cheshire, Cumbria, Greater Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside 
 
Northeast: Cleveland, Durham & Darlington, Northumbria 
 
Yorkshire and Humber: Humber, North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire 
 
West Midlands: Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, West Midlands 
 
East Midlands: Derby & Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, 
Nottingham and Nottinghamshire 
 
East of England: Bedfordshire & Luton, Cambridgeshire & Peterborough, Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Norfolk, Suffolk 
 
South West: Avon & Somerset, Bournemouth, Dorset & Poole, Devon, Cornwall & Isles of 
Scilly, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire & Swindon 
 
South East: Hampshire & Isle of Wight, Kent, Surrey, Sussex, Thames Valley 
 
London: London 
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9. Appendix C: Interview Protocol and Questions 
 
Interview Protocol 
Project: Creating a New Risk Register for Hounslow 
Date ___________________________ 
Time ___________________________ 
Location ________________________ 
  
Interviewee ______________________ 
Interviewer______________________ 
  
Notes to interviewee: 
Thank you for your participation. We believe your input will be valuable in helping 
create a new Risk Register for the London Borough of Hounslow. 
 Do we have your permission to record this interview? Do we have your permission to 
use your name for future reference? 
Approximate length of interview: 30 minutes, three major topics. 
Objectives of project: 
1. Determine which elements the Hounslow team should modify in the borough’s 
current CRR. 
2. Create two risk assessment documents, a multi-agency CRR for resilience planning, 
and a community resilience document for awareness and warning. 
3. Create a communication plan for the Hounslow Resilience Forum to use with the new 
public document.  
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Questions for Rosaline Harris, Andrea Tidy, and Billy Regan: 
Introductory Questions: 
1. Are you familiar with the Hounslow Community Risk Register? 
2. Have you read it within the past year? 
3. What would make you more likely to read it more frequently? 
Questions about the CRR: 
1. Are there any parts you find confusing? 
2. Do you have any suggestions for improving it? 
3. Do you think adding more images and colours would make it better? 
Community Questions: 
1. What part of Hounslow do you live in? 
2. Do you think your neighbours know about the Hounslow Community Risk 
Register? 
3. Has there ever been a civil emergency in your area? A fire, flood, or loss of 
utilities? 
4. How did you respond? How did your neighbours respond? 
5. Do you wish you were more prepared in case of emergency? 
6. How have you learned about emergency preparedness in the past? 
7. How would you like to learn more about emergency preparedness? The radio, 
a news broadcast, a magazine article? 
Questions for Matthew Hogan: 
1. Are there features that every CRR should include? 
2. Are there certain things that we should not include in the public version?  
3. Are there any parts of the CRR you think people find confusing? 
4. Does the design of a CRR play an important part in effectively communicating 
risk to the community? 
5. When you update the London Risk Register, do you incorporate design and 
communication aspects? 
6. What strategies do you think we should employ in order to inform the community 
of civil emergencies? 
7. What is the best way to promote a Community Risk Register? 
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10. Appendix D: Primary Assessment Raw Data Results 
These are the results of our primary assessment after the answers had been changed 
into numerical values. 
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11. Appendix E: Secondary Assessment Raw Data Results 
 
This appendix contains the raw data for the secondary assessment of the top nine 
CRRs and Hounslow’s CRR. The questions are based off of Mark Leigh’s Assessment Tool 
(Appendix A).  
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12. Appendix F: Steve Waspe Interview Transcript 
We interviewed Steve Waspe because he is risk expert. The transcript of the interview 
can be found below. We conducted this interview on 31 March 2016. This interview helped 
us complete objective 3.  
 
Steve Waspe Interview Transcript 
31.03.16 10:00 am 
 
Date:  31 March 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Steve Waspe, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Shelby McQueston (SM): Would you mind if we recorded you? 
Steve Waspe (SW): So, the NHS in the UK, um, is generally speaking, healthcare that is free 
of a point of contact. So whilst there is an insurance scheme called National Insurance, that’s 
a government tax in effect, that funds a whole bunch of stuff. But when you present to your 
GP or to your [unintelligible] or any other healthcare facility, generally speaking, the care 
you get is free. You don’t pay for it, you don’t need private insurance or anything like that. 
Okay? So, in order to manage that, you’ve got the Department of Health, and they are at the 
government level, and they are purse string holders and they set policy and all the rest of it. 
And the operational management of the health service as a whole in England sits with an 
organisation intriguingly entitled NHS England. Alright, snappy. I work for them. So I work 
for the London region. 
SM: Okay 
SW: And my ____ within London region is northwest London. So, the eight boroughs that 
make up northwest London. And I am head of emergency preparedness, resilience and 
response, EPRR, which is something you’ll hear quite a lot. Um, and I ___ between the two, 
and our job fundamentally is to ensure that um, NHS bodies, such as hospitals, and I’ll talk 
about those in a minute cause they’re varying sorts of NHS Trust, uh, conform to the Civil 
Contingencies Act, 2004, which I’m sure you’ve come across. The um NHS, EPRR 
framework document, which is available on the website, free of charge, uh in November 
2015, which, basically tells people how to do emergency planning within Trusts. And there’s 
a document called the Core Standard. And they are a set of standards that each hospital or 
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each Trust is assessed against annually, to measure their level of compliancy, in terms of 
emergency preparedness. And a ____ of that, is the risk management process. There are 
several types of NHS Trusts. So a trust in its simplest form is an autonomous, body. Alright? 
It receives money, commissioners, so there’s a group ----- called commissioners, and they 
buy services on behalf of the population. And technically, they can buy healthcare from 
whomever they like. But generally if tends to be fairly local. Um, so you’ve got the acute 
trust, so that’s the big general hospitals and such, most of whom have got emergency 
departments, you’ve got community health trusts, so they’re the folks who are out and about 
delivering primary care, so GP’s, for example, or district nursing services, um, so that could 
be podiatry,  -----, um, dialysis, or whatever. Then you’ve got mental health trusts who by 
their very name deliver mental health services, either in hospitals or in the community. They 
also manage high security units like Broadmoor(?) and medium security units as well, which 
you’ve got not far away from here. Um, and then you’ve got ambulance trusts, so Bill, the 
guy I was talking to is a member of that service, so there’s an ambulance trust, and then 
there’s one or two other trusts which deal with specialist services, so for example, Royal 
Brompton(?) in Hairfield(?),  which is a northwest London trust, primarily focused on dealing 
with cardiology so it’s a cardiac centre. So what happens there is that a patient presents with a 
very very complex cardiac  ____ and they get referred to a specialist trust. [unintelligible] and 
similarly with cancer. That’s it in its simplest form. It gets a bit more complex because some 
ordinary trusts deliver specialized services and some mental health trusts deliver ____ 
services and visa versa. Essentially, if you look at it in those terms, that’s how it works. If 
you go on to the Kings fund website, there’s a really good video, lasts about seven minutes. 
You might have to watch it three or four times to get the gist, but it will give you an 
understanding on how health care works in the UK, England in particular. Because it’s a 
multi-layered organisation, which has broader components like the NHS England, and all 
these little individual organisations that function with delivering health care. But in any event 
of a major incident, it is NHS England’s role, it is my role, it is to ensure that all of those 
separate groups come together, and deliver a coherent and unified response, which is what we 
will be doing next week during the doctors’ strike.  
SM: The doctors are striking? 
SW: Yes, all the doctors, three days. So emergency care from 8 o’clock on the 6th of April to 
8 o’clock on the 8th of April, and then on the 26th and the 27th of April between 8 o’clock and 
5 o’clock, there is a full withdrawal of cover by the junior doctors. It’s rate, and it’s possible, 
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so we are heavily planning for that at the minute. Um, yeah, health care is very very 
complicated in this country, but ultimately the end result is in the vast majority of cases you 
turn up somewhere saying you don’t want to be treated, you will be treated, which makes it 
really really expensive and complicated.  In terms of emergency preparedness, um, we are 
Category I responders, which is why I come to groups like this. I come here to 1) as a 
responder, and 2) as a representative of the NHS in this particular area. And similarly when I 
go to the borough resilience forum, I go as a Category I responder in my own right, and ---- 
They all attend, we work within the borough. I take responsibility to represent the NHS --- 
which is basically a group that represents six or seven borough resilience forums. And then 
my boss, my ultimate boss, sits on the London wide resilience forum. And we also have a 
representative on the London ___ resilience group for risk. So, they set the risks for London 
based on the London risk register, and then it comes down to the boroughs, and the boroughs 
look at risks in the context of the borough specific assessments. Now the NHS has started its 
own health focused risk register. So for London, we have a London wide risk register, which 
we are pushing down to through two mechanisms – health resilience partnership structure, 
which there are four – one for whole of London, and then there are three main partnerships 
that are purely health. They work in a similar way to these partnerships, but they are just 
literally health attendees and focus on health issues and strategies for emergency 
preparedness. And then each of the areas has its own emergency-planning networks, a group 
of emergency planners from all over the NHS --- which is eleven or twelve. And I also coach 
a group of --- sort of private providers. So they are hospitals services, health services, that’s 
where your insurance bit comes in. But from an emergency planning point of view, they’re 
poorly represented – underrepresented, not poorly represented. Um, so we’re trying to get 
them together as a group to try the same thing as we do with our own trust networks and 
borough managing risks, and understanding the integration between ---- so that’s where we 
are. So, in a nutshell, that’s the environment in which I work and how I get involved in 
emergency planning at a local level. It is very complex. I have just explained to you forty 
years’ history in about five minutes. If you start going through this as part of your general 
work over here, you want to come and visit us and talk to us about health service, in 
particular, and how it responds and how it functions. We are more than happy to talk for 
hours and hours.  
SM: Excellent! I think that video will be very beneficial too! I am also quite intrigued about 
the health risk register. Are those available online? 
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SW: No, they are not. The reason they are not available publicly is because we are still 
developing the matrix, so we’ve got the core risk register, done, that’s been agreed. Now, 
we’re doing is developing a front-end dashboard, so you could look at each individual risk, 
start to put it into context of the area where you work, and look at not only the top end risks, 
but what our assessment is of the --- so we’ve got residual risk in there as well, so that will 
then be used to inform the strategy of what we’ve been doing, what the priorities for health 
are. --- but it also likes to look at things like organizational re-structure, lots of services, 
finances, bits of normal risk assessment which are, which we need to respond to, and try to 
contextualise it within the boundaries --- can be slightly different. We might let you have 
copies of one of the drafts. 
SM: That would be excellent! Is that supposed to be like a public friendly document? 
SW: Uh, no. One other things that we have realised is that risk assessments when they are 
read by the public get misunderstood --- public document for the National Risk Assessment, 
so basically it says, you know, the chances of you dying from swine fever are pretty low, but 
chances of a cyber attack are pretty high. It doesn’t go into the background detail, it doesn’t 
go into the --- process, all it does is it says we recognise these are risks to a particular area 
and we are putting plans in place, and that’s all the public needs to know. Public don’t need 
to know is the detail across likelihood and impact, so yeah, social impact, economic impact, 
and what we are actually doing about it. We got things in place to do things about it. 
SM: Oh, okay. So it is more of a planning document. 
SW: If you look at the public National Risk Register, it is very very high level. But that starts 
to take you into the mitigation factors, and well, in fairness, most of the risk registers --- I am 
sure you have seen the London wide one, and I am sure you have seen this one, if you look 
another borough’s one, you’ll see there are similarities, and ours follows that trend, but we’ve 
gone slightly off it. But once its agreed --- it’s nearly there, but we’ve only got some things 
left to do. Alright. Marvellous.  
Miguel Almeida (MA): We are just going to go really quickly over what we are doing right 
now. So, the main goal of our project, we are trying to create a new CRR for Hounslow, an 
updated version of it. We are going to do this via three main objectives. We are going to start 
by reviewing what we have right now, determining what is correct, what is less correct. We 
are going to create an effective communication plan for the CRR, and then divide the CRR 
into two documents: have a technical internal version, and have a public-friendly version. 
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Most of what we are going to ask you is related to this and you can help us focus our 
attention on the topics we need to cover.  
SM: You have covered some of our questions already, which is actually quite good! 
MA: So there was one here that I was particularly interested in, to what extent is the design 
of the public document important in determining how the community receives the 
information? 
SW: Yeah, um, it’s about, I think the key bit for me is making the public aware of what the 
risks are, but personalise it to them. We all know the risk of a cyber attack is increasing on a 
day-by-day basis --- because what they need is their computer, and they wouldn’t necessarily 
grasp the context of some hacker sitting in some other country, it could suddenly take out 
their home computer. But if you look at it in terms of electricity supply, your basic needs in 
life, then that’s got greater resilience. Um, so it’s about looking at the individual risks, and 
determining which of them are the most pertinent to the public. So if you got risk information 
on ---, which is on couple of our risk registers, actually from a public point of view: not 
interested. But if you say your house is likely to flood, um, and you may not get insurance, 
and these are the measures you need to take to mitigate that risk, then it actually means more 
to them because it is a threat to their person. Um, so it’s very much about looking at your risk 
register, the population’s demographics, try to strike a balance between the two. You want to 
tell them they need to certain range of measures to give themselves a certain degree of 
responsibility. Um, risk register, it has the potential to give the audience the impression that 
the council recognises that as a risk so they are going to deal with it, and then when it 
happens, and the council says it’s not for them to deal with since it’s private property, and 
then you ask them that they identified the risk, they told you, they should do something about 
it. Probably the best analogy to think about would be water supply.  So, the water company 
owns the pipe, and will put water through your property, but there is a point where the 
boundary line ends, so the responsibility of that water supply is yours as the household. So if 
your water pipe bursts inside that boundary, and you have not taken any measures to mitigate 
against that, then actually you are at fault, it’s your responsibility. This is why a risk register 
can revolve around social responsibility, the public facing one. ---but also, to respond to 
particular types of incidents. There are various documents floating around different boroughs 
that give basic advice to the public as to what they should do in any emergency. But it’s 
simple things like if somebody has been evacuated out of their house because of any reason, 
you have to make sure you’ve got money, you’ve got medication, you’ve got all that you 
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need, so grab those and not the CD collection, but it’s about creating that social responsibility 
that your public facing document should cover, your risk awareness document. You have got 
those that are risk aware, who would things on a minimum data set, but would not prevent the 
risk from stopping them from doing their job. Certain emergency services --- in terms of 
response. So, your average fireman will not go into a building unless it is safe, like when he 
knows he has got this, he has got this, he has got this this this. So, there’s a risk awareness 
and a --- 
SM: Where do you think the NHS falls on that?  
SW: Um, where, the problem with the NHS is that there are a significant number of risks that 
would not appear on an emergency preparedness risk register, so, if you start to look at 
clinical risks around incorrect prescribing, the should-never happen events, there’s a tight 
process that sits around that which is very tightly regulated. So, in terms of mitigation, you’ve 
got, you know, documentation, printing, theatre procedures so everybody has to stand around 
--- we are dealing with issues, we’ve done this this this, have we done this, have we done 
that, so you actually do a complete checklist before you put the knife into the patient. So 
that’s the mitigation to the risk, marking an era, a surgical procedure --- so from that point of 
view, yeah, very much so. You are asked on a yearly basis, the --- commission, they come in 
and review the processes, so there is this process. And you will get penalised if you do not 
demonstrate how you have addressed these issues. In terms of emergency preparedness, um, 
we are probably in the middle because we can operate in an environment whereby its multi 
agencies, so the risk management if you like, make a decision. So, we contribute towards risk 
work rates, we look at specifics, and then we take that back. Oh, okay, so the flood risk in a 
borough is low, what’s your flood risk in a hospital in the bottom left corner of the borough 
next to the river? What are you doing about it? You can’t just sit there inside saying that the 
borough risk register says it, so you will just sit there. Actually, it’s not a very high likelihood 
for you, an individual organisation, this is another issue that we need to address.  We’ve got 
this --- which is why we are developing this plan…health risk register, health service risk 
register. We are trying to focus attention.  
Ahsan Shaikh (AS): Great! I have a question to ask. Do you believe that Hounslow can have 
two versions of the CRR – a public one, and then a technical one? 
SW: Um, I think you need to be very very careful about creating additional versions because 
what tends to happen is the, if we you’ve got ten different versions flying around, they might 
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not get updated in sequence. I think that…but the core risk register remains as the core risk 
register. What it does is that it generates additional documentation that is appropriate to the 
audience. So, in effect, you’ve got, I don’t know, thirty risks identified on your risk register. 
Out of them, maybe only ten apply to one specific group. So, you present those ten to the 
group in a way that makes them go, “Oh, we need to do something about this.” That’s the 
tricky bit because if you present a risk register to a bunch of folks, if you start putting ‘red’ 
risks in there they might take a notice, and this goes back to what I said before about public 
perception. So, uh, what I also don’t --- your core risk register has to be a single document, it 
has to have your risk assessment, your mitigation, and your residual risk. It is your residual 
risk that in some respects is more important because that’s what you take to your seniors and 
ask them if that is an acceptable risk for them to live with, and if they say yes, that’s fine. If 
they say no, then you’ve got to get back and start again, put in some more mitigation. That’s 
exactly what we did for the Olympics. When we made the risk register there, we reported the 
residual risk. That’s where the --- came in to say, “No, we can’t accept this.” But out of that 
came a public risk awareness document rather than a risk register. So, yeah, um, there’s going 
to be risk with travelling in the Underground, so make sure you leave early, make sure you’ve 
got your ticket. don’t carry big bags, have lots of water. So, it generated a lot of advice and 
responsibility on the part of the public, we told them what to do, now it was up to them to do 
anything about it. So, that’s how I would suggest the public facing document needs to go 
rather than a very lengthy document, so make it more into a public information type thing. 
MA/SM: So, what features do you think our public facing CRR should have? 
SW: The public facing one, um, they are all about public reassurance, so it’s got to be written 
in such a way that you don’t scar the public to a point where they lock the door and run away. 
Um, but you’ve got to make sure they understand the context, I think this is something that 
people tend to miss some of the time, is that actually what experience has shown me is that 
when we identify a risk, and we walk in and tell people this is a risk, we scare them. Because 
we don’t put it into context. And I am a great believer in if you are discussing risk and 
mitigation, there has to be some context in it. If you don’t establish that context in terms of 
the public, their perception, then actually they either won’t react or they would overreact. So, 
come the day you want them to evacuate, um, or you want to give them some instructions on 
how to deal with these risks, it’s going to impact their life. They’ll either not want to take the 
measures because they perceive the risk out of context. For example, what’s the risk of a food 
shortage? You might not be able to milk, but you don’t have to think beyond that. It’s a 
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slightly odd example, but you need to tell them what to do in preparation, as opposed to, 
“There’s no water, so you all go to Tescos and clear the shelves.” You are actually making 
the situation worse because now nobody’s got water. Um, you’ve also damaged the 
environment by driving 50 miles in your car, which has polluted the area. There’s petrol 
crisis as well – a slightly similar subject. You are limited to two gallons at the pump, for 
example. --- last fuel strike, and people were wasting two gallons of fuel to go and get 
another two gallons of fuel. So, instead of saying that you are allowed two gallons from your 
local station, don’t travel unless you actually have to. You had people going from petrol 
station to petrol station, it is about putting into context the risk, that again refers to the social 
responsibility aspect we talked about earlier. And if it says don’t use your car, then don’t use 
your car. Um, so that’s what I’d kinda like to see in a public-facing document, um, it’s the 
personal impact on that particular member of the public, it’s about telling them this is what 
they need to do, and equally emphasise on what they don’t need to do because that has a 
bigger impact than they might envisage. Um, don’t use the car to go to work, get on the train.  
SM: Sounds like common sense.. 
SW: It is common sense, but we need to breed common sense back into people, because 
society has changed so much everything is readily available. I had a power cut in my area last 
year, and we were out of power for forty-eight hours, and it took twenty-four hours for the 
power company to start bringing generators in, and I had quite stiff discussions with members 
of my family that why we weren’t eligible for a generator. We don’t need it because we have 
alternatives. We can go out to eat, we can cook on a BBQ, but we can still survive. We could 
all take showers at work or we could take showers at university, just get up half an hour early. 
And it’s that kind of practical, pragmatic view that you need to instil in public, as opposed to, 
“…oh, the council’s going to do this do that.” Policemen don’t come and put a lock on your 
door. They advise you to put a lock. It’s that simplistic view sometimes that a lot of these 
things miss, and they are written by risk managers, no disrespect. They’ve got their own 
jargon, their own structures, way of explaining things. 
MA: We really think one of the biggest challenges is reaching the public, and getting their 
attention. 
SW: Yeah, and this is where we need to, again, this kinda to me demonstrates the levels of 
integration that we need for emergency planning generally, around making sure that if we’ve 
got a message we go to the professional and communicators and ask them, “How do we get 
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this message across?” as opposed to coming out with a document – I don’t understand this --- 
it doesn’t quite deal with the equality issues, and again, your public facing risk document, 
part of your analysis should be is it going to people who are vulnerable, is it going to people 
who have learning disabilities, you and I around this table can have a very intellectual 
discussion about risk, emergency planning, but you can’t talk to somebody who is learning 
impaired, they’re not gonna have the attention span to have that kind of discussion, so your 
message has to be short and concise, and this is what you need to do, and then the cultural 
issues as well. I mean this borough, in particular, is a multi cultural society, and everyone’s 
perception of risk is based on their person, their culture, their understanding, it actually 
makes it really difficult to write a single document for all --- your communications right, so 
you can appeal to a wide range of public. What I really really hate seeing in a document is 
their classic phrase “…and there’s more information available on our website.” People in 
their nineties can just about use a computer, but they use it for very very specific things. 
What they don’t do is sit about and read stuff because they can’t read very well. 
MA: A lot of people can’t even access the Internet. 
SW: Yeah, yeah, that’s right. So it’s taking all the peripheral things into account when you’re 
preparing your final document. Quality impact analysis, that you’d need to do. 
AS: So, talking about how most people in the borough itself don’t have access to the Internet 
or are too old to use the Internet, what in your opinion would be the best way to promote our 
CRR?  
SW: Yeah, you know, what you’ve got is, if you own a standard demographic understanding 
of the area, then you can create a campaign to target the groups that you need to target in a 
way which is appropriate to them.  So, if you wanted to go into all the borough’s schools, you 
can go in there with a pre-determined lesson which can be delivered by the teacher or by 
somebody else, that actually says to a five year old that this is risk, they are very visual and 
very hands on, they wants things to play with, videos and all, but then you go into the older 
generation, they don’t have time for that, they want a really simple and straightforward 
lesson, a lot of them don’t have the attention span, the delivery is going to be different. Then 
there’s that tech savvy group in the middle that would sit there accessing websites, doing all 
sorts of things that they do day to day. So, target your message to the group that you’re trying 
to target. You know, I am reasonably tech savvy, but I don’t have a lot of time to play around 
with apps, I don’t like apps, genuinely speaking, and from a teaching point of view, I like to 
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be very hands on, very visual, I like to see things, I like to have things explained to me. So, 
probably one of the things you might want to consider in terms of your target, is when you 
are talking to your communications specialists, also start talking to your educationalists, start 
talking to them about how they would deliver. If you know --- basic education, um, courses 
or, you know, teaching courses or whatever, the key is this, um, I can’t remember the phrase 
at the top of my head, but basically it’s about identifying how you teach the same subject to 
lots of different people who’ve got lots of different needs. Um, if you look up --- educational 
website, you’ll find stuff on how you change your method of delivery, even though the core 
message is the same, what we need to do, what you need to do, address in terms of how you 
get your message across to the public. It might be leaflets, it might be phone calls, it might be 
going into places and explaining stuff, it might be, um, a few years ago we dished out lots of -
--- for people to put onto their fridges, and they had important contact messages. ----- it’s a 
really really simplistic process, that’s just going around and talking to people as opposed to 
just dropping it through the door and there’s an expectation that they’ll read it and they’ll 
abide by it.  Alright, so, it costs a bit more to do it in a more targeted way. What’s your end 
goal? If you end goal is you are increasing social responsibility by taking actions to mitigate 
risks which are pertinent to an individual, then you have got to do it the right way. 
AS: If I am not wrong, you did mention that the NHS has its own health focused risk 
register? Does the NHS itself have any specific strategies for communicating it to the 
required audience?  
SW: What we tend to do is the two, sort of, common periods of high risk to health: summer 
and winter. So, we have something called the heat wave plan. The heat wave is a risk in the 
risk register, and part of the mitigation to that risk is there is national heat wave plan, and at 
certain levels, certain things have to happen. One of them is a massive campaign to educate 
the public on drinking lots of water, some --- real kind of health advice, which is our 
mitigation for the risk. Similarly, in the winter, the peak flu season, there is a --- getting your 
flu check, which is free. We target particular groups within the population, people over 65, 
pregnant women; I can’t remember what the other ones were. Um, so, then you talk about 
some of the Ebola risk and some of those other health risks, we have a targeted campaign, 
getting public the message. Go back years when --- first came into prominence, massive 
health campaign to raise awareness of the issue and what you needed to do to become 
socially responsible to prevent that disease from being transmitted. A lot of our risk 
mitigation is around public messaging, and targeting vulnerable groups, making sure that it’s 
 
 
61 
 
not just, you don’t just have to go to the doctor to get your flu jab, for example, so if you go 
around some of the big grocery stores, they got their own pharmacy, and will get you jabbed 
while you’re doing your shopping, and then that’s again how we tried to get the numbers up. 
You can go and get your voucher, and then you can walk in, give him the voucher, and get 
your free flu jab. So, there are targeted advertised campaigns to mitigate those kinds of risks. 
Um, similarly, when these big disasters do strike, um, we start talking about flooding, for 
example, Public Health England, who are responsible for public health in its broadest sense, 
they will start putting targeted messages out there about drinking lots of water, boiling water. 
There was a --- outbreak somewhere, and then there was another case where water was 
tasting a bit strange, um, so Public Health England, the Water Authority, NHS England 
worked together to get the public message out there, to say, you know, don’t drink the water, 
boil it etc. If you start finding symptoms, please don’t go to the hospital, phone your GP, 
phone 911, which is the non-emergency service, and they will give you further advice and 
guidance. They’ll get back to you by putting algorithms on their call-taking system, which 
gives specific advice and guidance to people who present with symptoms, which may be the 
result of water contamination, which is where the risk starts.  
AS: That was very helpful! Thank you so much! 
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13. Appendix G: Peter Davison Interview Transcript 
We interviewed Peter Davison, a Public Health England employee, who is a member 
of the Hounslow Resilience Forum. We interviewed Mr. Davison because he is risk expert. 
The transcript of the interview can be found below. We conducted this interview on 01 April 
2016. This interview helped us complete objective 3.  
 
Peter Davison Interview Transcript 
01.04.16 10:30am 
 
Date:  01 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Peter Davison, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Miguel Almeida (MA): Okay, so I’m just going to go over what we’re doing really quickly. 
So, the main goal of our project here is to create a new version of the Hounslow CRR. We’re 
focusing on creating a public document to talk about the CRR itself. We’re going to do that 
through three objectives. Um, we’re gonna, sorry, we’re going to um, analyse the current one 
and try to see what’s right or wrong with it, what we should add or delete from it. We’re 
going to come up with a communication plan to advertise the CRR and then we’re going to 
create the two versions, the technical one, and the public one. 
Ahsan Shaikh (AS): So we want to start the interview asking, uh, what factors do you 
personally think we should consider when determining, uh, to create an updated version of 
the CRR. What factors do we need to take into consideration, um to come up with updated 
versions? 
Peter Davison (PD): Uh, I think it’s, what the end goal is for community risk register. So, 
what you want to achieve out of the community risk register. So, if it’s an increased 
awareness of risk in the community, or whether it’s a tool that you’re going to use to drive 
change in people’s behaviour. So I think that determines what kind of document it is or what 
kind of um, process you use for kind of delivering that information. So, I, I think that kind of 
a really good starting point before you kind of go down the road of making changes or… 
Shelby McQueston (SM): So, I think right now it’s being geared towards uh, more towards 
making people change their uh, actions around risk, rather than informing, if that makes any 
sense. 
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AS: Like the way they respond to emergencies. 
PD: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, 
AS: Um, do you think there are any parts of with the CRR or CRRs in general that you find 
or think the public might find confusing? 
PD: Yeah, I think a lot of boroughs use the same community risk register and, and, that they 
use for professional partners that they do as promoting out to the community. I think the 
problem with that is, it ticks the boxes and says yes, we’ve produced a community risk 
register, and yes, we’ve put it out there but, actually, what does it achieve? Uh, does it drive 
change with people’s behaviour? Uh, probably not, cause it’s so technical. Um, so I think that 
that’s a problem with the majority I think of the ones in London that have been produced. 
There’s some examples of like Brent, they’ve done one which is slightly different so, um, 
they focus in on sort of a few different um, risks, ah, and, and then they they’ve given them a 
lot more information and then actions that people can take to reduce their vulnerability to 
them. So, in that way they’ve tailored it to kind of do more of what they want it to with it, to 
try and make change. But then, I don’t think even they have a, a plan of how they then use 
that document, within a programme of kind of communication with the public. So, that’s 
another one that’s just put out there and’s got nothing behind it that kind of delivers 
SM: So it’s not enough to just make the document 
PD: No 
SM: You have to actively work with it in the community 
PD: That was a good paraphrase there 
AS: So uh, do you believe the design, plays a really important part in getting the message 
across and if yes, uh, what recommendations do you have for the design of our updates 
version of the CRR? What design aspects, like infographics, or diagrams, or anything that 
you think, uh, we could employ for our updated version of the CRR? 
PD: Uh, yeah, so I think infographics are an, um, good way of um getting across uh 
information. Erm, but I think it’s got to be coupled with how you um, push change, 
behavioural change. Um, and I mean that is the really tough bit about it. So you could have a 
CRR that’s really fantastic but then if the program behind it, that kind of delivers those 
messages is just as important you know, then what goes into that kind of document so, it’s 
almost like whether you go the CRR is um gives you the kind of the program that you’re 
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gonna follow and the, uh gives you kind of your main topic areas and what you want to 
achieve and then it’s broken down into individual bits and that’s the delivery bit. 
[Unintelligible] So whether that’s linked to the time of year, so when there’s cold weather or 
a heat wave, you know, but using things that are in kind of peoples interests anyway to help 
push that message. So, I think that’s…uh… 
SM: That makes sense 
PD: So I potentially answered that? 
SM: Yes, how would you suggest in delivering those like, kind of information? 
PD: That’s a good question. Um, I think it’s worth talking to um, bits of the organisation that 
um probably do this more often with things. So, public health will do it wit public health 
messaging and um it’s worth seeing how they kind of deliver those. I always thought that its 
better if the public have an interest or its something that’s going on anyway and then you 
look at what…what overall change you want out of the whole program and what bot that little 
segment actually adds to the overall kind of message. So, with a lot of the risks, if you want 
to, say your aim is to reduce peoples vulnerability to it, a lot of those actions are the same or 
very similar throughout, so, um, its normally social isolation, its an increasing vulnerability 
factor, well if you break that down, then actually you can tackle that throughout your whole 
program, and have that as one of your over-arching check ---- you know, being more socially 
inclusive, etc. So, yeah, that’s just my train of thought. 
AS: So, what methods do you actually think the CPU, uh, should employ, or we should 
recommend to the CPU in order to promote this document to the public? Because right now 
it’s only an online version, and most people in the borough don’t have access to the Internet, 
or most people in any other borough won’t have access to the Internet either. Um, so we are 
just trying to come up with a communication plan of promoting it with the borough. Do you 
have any recommendations on the different methods we can use to do that?  
PD: So, um, one of the things I thought that works quite well is to look at some of the 
different end-points were the council has contacts with people already, and to see which ones 
of them fit within, so whether that are pamphlets that are in, kind of, the Civic Centre that 
people can pick up and then pick in a relevant topic in the CRR that, uh, will be very 
engaging with those people, and they can find out further information about it, refer the CRR 
from that kind of pamphlet. You can do it that way to try and drive, kind of, awareness to 
people to seek out that information. 
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AS: You said pamphlets at the Civic Centre. What about people who don’t actually visit the 
Civic Centre? Because if that’s the only way we’re promoting the document, we’ll have to 
expect everyone to visit the Civic Centre. 
PD: No, for that, uh, I really think this works with, like, a multi kind of delivery method for 
it, so you look at where the council has interactions with most of the public, and you see what 
outlets the council has already that you can utilise, whether that is people going into people’s 
homes, um, because they have some kind of social care, or whether it’s people visiting the 
Civic Centre, or whether it’s people going into the religious centres that the local authority 
owns. These are going to be your avenues that are going to be the most open to you for 
delivering that message with little expenditure on actually commercial campaigns or anything 
else. It’s also worth looking to see what’s already being pushed out there. I mean if you and 
look at…there’s a lot of information downstairs already. There are already a couple of 
banners downstairs about information that you can go and get, so, uh, there is one for social 
care, there is one for the one new campaign, there is another one down there, so try to get 
your message down there, or how you tie it to some of those things.  
SM: It will definitively be worth going down there. 
AS: Um, also, as Miguel mentioned earlier in this interview that we are planning to have two 
different versions of the CRR. Almost every other borough, including Hounslow, as of now, 
has just one version – one public version. We are planning to have one public and one 
technical version of the CRR. What are your views on that? Is that a good way that we can go 
about updating it? 
PD: Yes. I think that is a progressive way of doing it. Probably a lot of other boroughs would 
like to do it, but the time element of doing it, and then the work behind that all of is just not 
the public facing one, it shouldn’t just be a document that goes onto the website, it needs to 
have some kind of program behind it, and so definitely spilt the technical and the public 
facing one. The public doesn’t need to know about risk scoring, how it is done. The --- office 
already have a problem with, um, communicating risk on things that people see every day, so 
something is --- we look at. Also, you want to make it relevant to them, so some of the stuff 
we, that is written in the risk registers, is not. 
AS: Do you believe two versions are going to require more time to maintain? Do you think it 
is worth it, time-wise and effort-wise, to have two versions? I mean, I just got your answer, 
but.. 
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PD: Yes. But that is the problem with it, in that it requires the time to do it, and I think a lot 
of boroughs because they are able to put the CRR out there, it’s an easy way of, kind of, 
utilising their time, so you just do one, and you put it out there, and then you have done that 
element of it, and you have got that bit you need to work on. Um, I think it almost needs to be 
seen as a habit in front of work stream, I mean you have got your technical risk register; the 
community risk register that you promote is set for an entity, given the appropriate time to 
deliver, but is the more challenging part. 
MA: I mean, even us, we were confused when we first read the technical version. 
PD: Yeah, yeah, and you see a lot, some boroughs, it is worse than, I mean, Hounslow’s. It’s, 
I think, one of the best. Um, and then there are ones that are more complicated. Kensington 
and Chelsea, its risk registers is very different from anyone else’s, so they only have one, but 
theirs is, it is more of a description of risks, and a lot less than…they have gone kind of 
halfway between a technical and a proper kind of community facing risk register. It kind of 
sits in the middle. 
MA: We have also seen some places where they don’t even put in a document. It is just a 
website with different hyperlinks to different things, like this is what you should do, this is 
how you prepare, these are the risks, and it becomes very confusing navigating through so 
many pages. Nothing is concentrated. 
SM: Do you work exclusively in Hounslow, or throughout other boroughs as well? 
PD: No, I work for the London Office of Public Health. So, although, I cover London as a 
whole, I specifically cover the northwest, the rrf boroughs, plus two others. 
SM: Oh, okay.  
PD: Just the way we do it. And actually, a couple more. So yeah, I cover a large part of 
Hounslow itself. It normally means you get to see quite a few ways of doing it. But I don’t 
think any of the other boroughs, I have seen, have gone as far down this road of what to 
actually do with it and what change do we want to drive within.  
SM: So we are a little bit ahead of the game here. 
PD: I think so, which means you will make the first mistakes with it, but, say, it is an 
important element of what we should be doing, but it is a difficult one.  
AS: Have you seen in Hounslow, or in any other boroughs, if the religious beliefs or the 
cultural practices of a community have been interfering in the way they have been responding 
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to emergencies, like if they have been associating floods with, quoting Miguel’s words here, 
God’s wrath? Do you think it affects the way they respond to emergencies, in general? 
PD: I haven’t seen it. To be honest, it is more of a social and economic issue that I have seen 
that impacts some people’s responses to emergencies. I used to work in another London 
borough, which I will remain nameless of, and we saw a big difference in, um, the public’s 
response when it happened in an area of higher deprivation to one where there was, kind of, 
more social mobility. The response was quite a bit different, so it’s our, the council’s duty to 
take care of the local population. There was a greater burden placed on responding agencies 
where there was, kind of, more affluence, more social mobility, but they intended to take care 
of them themselves. That is what I have seen, rather than religious aspects. 
SM: So, you think it is wise to tailor that new public facing document to the people who are 
less likely to respond, people in those deprived areas rather than more affluent areas? 
PD: I think it is my understanding that they probably don’t, why they are less able to 
respond, or have resource to take care of themselves in emergencies, I mean with the religion 
aspect there is a lot of work that goes into drawing the religious community into the response 
that they understand why responders have to do things in a certain way, and but also the other 
way --- can make sure that their procedures aren’t, kind of, detrimental to people’s religious 
beliefs, which is very important to get people on side for actually, you know, supporting --- 
MA: Just a quick thing that I saw that I really want to cover, so you communities that have, 
in the risk register, very high probability of catastrophe or emergency happening, but it never 
happens. Do you think people will be less susceptible to that, or to prepare for that, because it 
never happened, even though there is a high likelihood of happening? 
PD: Um, yeah. I think there is a thing for, it’s part of an issue with communicating risk, and 
how we do that, and the environmental agency of --- how they communicate risk to the 
public. And --- changing their flood warning system, so it was more, kind of, they were better 
able to use it to create change in what people were doing. So they learned the lesson that 
people would adjust the way they talked about. Risk, I think is part of the, um, so you need to 
pick things that they experience or they know could happen, you build on those, severe 
weather does happen, so, you know, these things that will happen more regularly than the 
ones that are higher up on the risk register, and it is possibly easy to use those ones that are 
more likely, but lower impact, to, kind of, actually drive the chain that you want to work with 
than the higher impact ones. Because you can use snow to get people to, you know, to have a 
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couple of boxes of water in their houses; you can’t use pandemic influenza to get people to 
stuff a few boxes of water in their houses. So, it’s that bit. You use more of what that does 
happen. I mean, I think it’s people’s perception of risk and what they are willing to, what risk 
appetite they have for different things. 
AS: Do you think the community here actually knows that the borough has a CRR?  
PD: I don’t think they do. Any borough you go to will have, probably, a low kind of 
awareness of the CRR, but then I think coming back to it, do you want, what is the goal out 
of the Community Risk Register, is it that they know about the document, or is it that they 
know they have changed their behaviour and are more resilient. 
AS: We are focusing on both aspects. We need to update it to have a better version, but we 
also are focusing on the communication aspects because as you just mentioned most people 
here in the borough don’t know that they have a CRR. We are trying to focus on the fact that 
they should know that they have a CRR and how they should respond to emergencies. Um, 
do you think this has a lot to do with communication, the fact that there is a gap in 
communication between the CPU and the community which is why they don’t know that they 
have a CRR for the borough? 
PD: I think it’s if you tell them they have a CRR, what are they getting out of that fact? So, I 
mean, some of the good ---- of seeing boroughs promoting a Community Risk Register is 
through schools, and doing workshops with classes at schools, because you know children go 
back and tell their parents. So, I mean that’s one of the ways of, kind of, getting people to 
maybe look at the document online, you know, or giving them access to it through some kind 
of school campaign.  
MA: Going down mostly the same road, is it your opinion that the CRRs are actually 
important in preventing emergencies from getting worse or are they just a tool mostly for the 
identities to use because as you said most people might not know, most people might not 
even care because what you want them to be prepared. Is it that important publicly or is it 
more important internally?  
PD: It’s really important that, um, for professional partners that there is a risk register, and so 
that the borough planning is tailored for those, um, kind of high risks. I think it’s something 
that’s potentially missing around, um, kind of higher likelihood, lower impact things that 
particularly aren’t given the attention that they deserve because of the, um, low likelihood, 
high impact stuff, but they happen within boroughs. The thing that Hounslow has done a lot 
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with some of their work on identifying hazardous sites that store lots of junk that catch fire, 
and that happens often, so it’s, kind of, whether you actually use it to focus on that borough’s 
specific aspects and that you have more impact on doing things with. Getting back to when I 
worked in a borough, there was more about settling cylinder fires because --- and we would 
regularly have a fire, which causes a lot of problems. So, I think in that respect it’d be better 
if we focus on things like that than some that are, kind of, the higher stuff. 
AS: I think we have answers to all our questions. 
SM: Thank you very much for your time! 
AS: That was really helpful! 
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14. Appendix H: Mark Leigh Interview Transcript 
We interviewed Mark Leigh, an expert on CRRs and risk. The transcript of the 
interview can be found below. This interview helped us complete objective 2 of our project.  
 
Mark Leigh Interview Transcript 
04.04.16 11:30am 
 
Date:  04 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Mark Leigh (via phone), Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Shelby McQueston (SM): Miguel is gonna start by going over what our project goal and 
some of our objectives are before we get started in this interview. 
Mark Leigh (ML): How long are you anticipating to take? 
SM: Probably about a half an hour  
Miguel Almeida (MA): So, what we are trying to do is create two different versions, well a 
technical internal version of the CRR and then a public version to go with that CRR. We are 
attempting to do this by analyzing what exists right now, then revising and creating a public 
version and then creating the communication plan to advertise the public version and to raise 
awareness in the community. 
ML: Right, this is a community disaster risk register, is it? 
SM and MA: Yes! 
ML: And is this for Hounslow?  
SM: Correct. 
ML: And it is a county level register, is it? Which county is it subordinate to? 
SM: It is part of the London resilience forum. 
ML: Oh, right. Ok, thank you. That’s fine. Ok. 
Ahsan Shaikh (AS): Our first question about our project should be what factors should we 
take in consideration when determining what to add or delete from the current version of the 
CRR? 
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ML: Based on the ones that I’ve seen, that is the county level ones: England, Whales, and 
Scotland, I think it is quite important that you specify where ever it’s safe to do so, the 
location of site specific risks. 
SM: Ok. 
ML: This is almost never done. And in some counties if you are talking about some 
vulnerable site, it’s fairly meaningless for the population of a larger county, unless you tell 
them where it is.  
AS: Right. 
ML: My second suggestion is that you encourage maximum use of the identification of 
existent risk controls. Again, this is something that is very rarely done and answers the so 
what questions which is: so you told me these risks exist, hopefully where they exist as well, 
but what are you doing about it? 
SM: Ok. 
AS: Right. 
ML: So if you think laterally about what constitutes a risk control, for example, that can be 
anything from people’s capability, their experience, the training, the existing plans, the 
protocols, doctors adjoin working, all of those things, effectively a risk control. And that 
should be included. There is only a hand full of risks that registers nationally that do that, one 
I can recommend you have a look at is probably Kent. But that could be a useful thing that is 
more widespread. I think thirdly, actually a critical thing, is to promote awareness that the 
register has two distinct functions, which are in terms of language, need to be dealt with 
separately. The first function drives planning and capability development, choices about 
priorities, in other words. But the second function is the public facing one, which is about 
informing and warning the public about the risks and consequences of emergencies. If it is 
not written in a public communication style language, it won’t be read, so it won’t support the 
warning and informing statuary duty.  
SM: We have actually gotten to the point in our project where we decided to create two 
separate documents, a planning risk register, and also a public facing document more about 
warning and informing. 
ML: I think that is a very good policy, but what you need to be aware of is that some, ahm, 
resilience forums have gone too far in the direction of warning and informing, and they have 
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to include in enough detail in their register to satisfy the obligation to publish assessments, if 
you see what I mean. So, there has to be two. 
SM: Yep. 
ML: Or, well realistically there has to be two, or if it there is one it has to be the public 
facing version, with sufficient detail to inform the internal debate. 
SM: Ok, that makes a lot of sense.  
AS: Right, thank you. My next question, our next question would be do you believe there are 
parts of the CRR that people in general find confusing?  
ML: Sorry, could you repeat that? 
AS: Sure, do you believe that are any parts of the CRR that people in general find confusing?  
ML: Sure, I think any of the technical language, in fact. Most things to do with the 
classification of risks, on the scale of 1 to 5 where impacts are measured. 
AS: Great. 
ML: Virtually all of the quantitative data, most of the language describing the risks, as well. 
When it’s cut and paste from the local risk management guidance. And I say all that, because 
that is meant for the internal language. So you are probably aware of this, the central 
government produces a risk assessment guidance, and they are risk specialists writing for 
other risk specialists, and the risk specialists on the receiving end normally cut and paste in to 
their risk register. And the language is an advert subject matter.  
AS: Do you still want us to include descriptions of risks in our public friendly version? In a 
much less technical language, or do you want to discard the risk description in general? 
ML: It goes back to having one or two risk registers, bear in mind the critical thing is both 
have to be published. If your public facing, very general, non technical language register, or 
publication doesn’t include the actual facts of the assessment, then you are probably meeting 
a warning and informing duty, but failing to meet the assessment, the publication of 
assessment duty. So, if you have a public facing…if the risk detail isn’t in the public facing 
one, then you are going to have to publish the technical one anyway. Do you see what I 
mean? 
TEAM: Yes.  
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ML: So, if you are going to have a public one, which is non technical, very descriptive, but 
then doesn’t go into the technical detail of the assessment, then you still have to publish your 
technical one, and therefore it is still in the public domain, so some thought has to still be 
given to what people will make of it, by change they might tumble across it on the net, or 
more actively if they are more actively involved or interested in this, they might find it with a 
particular activist lead motivation for finding it. I think it goes back to bearing in mind those 
two separate duties, the two functions: inward looking, and outward looking. And the two 
functions which are warning and informing, and the publication of assessments. The point I 
am getting at it is, I’d let you describe the risk given its likelihood, and its impact value, and 
devaluation relative to other risks. I can’t be called a risk assessment. 
SM: Would it be wise to instead of having the risk matrix like the chart with the high, 
medium, low, very high instead of doing that like have a graph that is publish in the national 
risk register, as more of a public friendly kind of matrix? 
ML: Yeah, I think you probably could, because you’re then in the middle ground. Ultimately 
I think the fundamental purpose of the assessment is not mainly to give the technical detail 
the scoring system that has been allocated to if, if you’d like, I think it is more to tell the 
public where it is relative to other risks. So, if you use like the NRR does, a very 
deconstructed matrix showing generic groups of risks, that makes the need to have an 
assessment because it is like saying where things are relative to each other. 
SM: Ok. 
AS: Great. Moving to our next question about communication, what are in your opinion the 
best ways to promote a CRR, what strategies do you think the CPU needs to employ in order 
to inform the community on civil emergencies? 
ML: That is a good question. I think in my training course on the subject, which we have 
done here in the college, I basically teach the fact that there is a guide, a two-pole model of 
public risk communication. And basically at one end I have the, expert lead, where experts 
correct the gap in public understanding. It is a very expert lead, a very didactic, corrective 
way of communicating. The other end, the polar opposite, it is what we call the public 
inclusion policy, that presupposes that you are recognizing that there isn't one single absolute 
truth. We are dealing with risk here, so in a sense the expert evaluation and assessment of a 
risk is only one person’s take on it, and different people have different views. They are 
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equally valid, because from their standpoint it is a perfectly legitimate conclusion, even if it 
differs from the expert. Does that make sense? 
TEAM: Yes. 
ML: It is much more easy to say what is wrong with those communication strategies, than 
what is right, if you like it. You know the expert approach is much more common. So it is 
about establishing that perspective, and when you do that… You can score your public 
version using a tool I created, to determine the extent it is a social inclusion document, 
opposed to a social exclusion document. I published that as one of our own college papers, it 
is number one, occasional paper number one.  
SM: I am not sure we read that one, but we definitely read a couple of other ones. 
AS: Right, do you know of any resilience fora that have comprehensive strategies for 
communicating risk to the community? And if yes what parts of their CRR do you think are 
responsible for making communication so effective? 
ML: The first, I have yet to come across one that does that in any of the UK community risk 
registers. It seems, at least in my experience, a job regarded less than you do. You produce a 
register and then you publish it somewhere. There is no consistency about where it is, it is all 
on the web, and they all publish the CRR itself, but there is no consistency in which website 
to use. That should be specified, where it lives, it should be located in the central government 
website as well as published by the local. Category 1 responders are required to publish it, but 
it should be made available by the central government. It (Central Government) should also 
track when they are being updated, changed, and in what ways. This does not happen, there is 
an assumption that every time the local risk management guidances is being produced, which 
at the moment is a two year interval, which leads to each LRF making checks and revisions. I 
do not think that actually happens. We don’t see much of strategized communication. We 
don’t see many updates, or revisions. What was the second part of the question? 
AS: We wanted to know if you know of any CRRs are effective communicating risks, and 
what parts made them effective in communicating risk? 
ML: Yea, I will give you two cases. The first one is Darlington, because it is the only risk 
register that actually says where the site-based hazards exist. People living can assess the 
extent that is close enough to their neighborhood. The second one, look at Lincolnshire, 
because they take a very redacted public communication line. Very light on technical detail, 
but heavy on user friendly, graphic based simple dos and don’ts on risk information. 
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SM: We have gone over that one before. 
ML: That’s good. The third one I would say is Kent, because it is good on the risk controls. 
What are you doing about it? Listed than described, but it is there. The last time I did a 
survey on these things, which was about a year ago, something like 40% of risk registers, 
tried to explain what we have in place to deal with these risks. The rest didn’t even go there at 
all. The ones that did went over it in a very superficial sort of way. And there is much more 
than can be said, cause ultimately it is a description of the capability you have to protect 
people from the consequences of those risks. So it is the natural things that any person would 
ask. 
SM: Do you think design has any consequences on how well people will understand those 
risks? Or, using the register. 
ML: I think if it’s presented in the right way, and the right language, and going back to your 
earlier question, if it is designed by a communication professional, it would be very 
interesting to people, providing it has the kind of granularity that tells you if that risk is either 
equally spread across the county, or a part of that county is to be affected by it. If people have 
the kind of means to make that deduction from what they are told, I think it is a fairly 
meaningful document. It should say the consequences of risks, in terms of how it might affect 
them. Again I think that you make people interested in reading it. Too much of the risk 
description material describes the impacts of the risks in fairly macro terms. Not surprisingly, 
because it is a nationally produced document designed for technical audience. So you need to 
think about that. One of the impediments to that, and this is something I think the UK 
resilience professionals have to learn about is there is a lot of cynicism about the public’s 
appetite for this knowledge, and their ability to understand it. It is quite wide spread in the 
professional community. One reason that cynicism persists is because there is an insufficient 
level of training that the people build for CRRs. To understand the risks you are talking about 
in the community risk register requires a fairly sophisticated understanding of people, 
societies, groups, how they perceive, react to risk. I don't think that’s understood with 
sufficient nuance and appreciation of its complexity by most of the people doing it.  
AS: In 11 weeks of working on this project, we have found out that the majority of the 
community does not know what a CRR is. Would you recommend any physical means of 
communicating risk to the community? 
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ML: It should be part of civic education in general, that’s an absolute given. Essex has done 
a lot of work on that, on kids educated programs. You tell the children and they tell their 
parents. It should happen. County councils don't afford to distribute copies, but they have to 
say it is out there. 
SM: Ok. 
AS: Right. 
SM: That’s pretty much all the questions we had for you, so thank you very much for your 
time. 
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15. Appendix I: Rosaline Harris Interview Transcript 
We interviewed Rosaline Harris, a Hounslow resident, who works in the Hounslow 
Civic Centre, about her knowledge of emergencies in the borough. The transcript of the 
interview can be found below. This interview helped us complete objectives 2 and 3 of our 
project.  
 
Rosaline Harris Interview Transcript 
13.04.16 11:30am 
 
Date:  13 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, 1st floor mezzanine 
Attendees:  Rosaline Harris, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
  
Shelby McQueston (SM): In that case, this is going to be very short. [In reference to the fact 
that Rosaline hasn’t seen the Hounslow CRR.] So I’m sorry to waste your time, but,  
Rosaline Harris (RH): That’s okay. 
SM: Thanks. Um, so you haven’t seen the risk register before? 
RH: No 
SM: Okay, well we do have a copy for you, if you want to take a quick glance at that.  
RH: I’ve never seen it before 
SM: Okay 
RH: Is it supposed to be available to staff? 
SM: It’s supposed to be available to everyone in the borough. It’s public, it’s on the website, 
of course you have to go and search for it, but, that’s what we’re trying to change. We’re 
trying to make a more public friendly version that is easily accessible.  
RH: Yeah, cause this is not public friendly. 
Miguel Almeida (MA): I don’t know if you want to show this, its an incomplete work but… 
SM: Not public-friendly at all, it’s full of confusing tables, things like that.  
RH: Yeah, I can, I can uh get it, but that’s because I work for the council.  
 
 
78 
 
SM: Mhm 
RH: If I was just, not working for the council, [unintelligible] what does this, what does this 
tell me? 
SM: Yup, lots of confusing jargon. In that case, um, just a quick question, why do you think, 
well, never mind, that was a, do you think anyone you know is, knows about the risk register? 
Anyone in your community? 
RH: No  
SM: Okay. Um, so we were coming up with a new draft of this document, to hopefully cut it 
back down and just include some of the top risks that Hounslow is susceptible to. Um, and 
we have a quick draft, that’s very incomplete, but if you wouldn’t mind taking a look at it and 
seeing if you like this one a little bit better. 
RH: Oh, definitely. It’s a lot lighter for a start.  
SM: Oh, yup 
RH: It’s clear. It’s perfect. 
SM: Perfect? That’s, wow, thank you. 
RH: Well. I mean it’s not finished but  
SM: Obviously, but definitely easier to read than the other one? 
RH: Yeah because like the one we had, the houses that exploded in the Bath Road. 
SM: Mhm 
RH: Last year, I actually thought, if that was my house or my neighbour’s house, apart from 
calling 999, what would the council do about it? Its only when it was on the website, the 
internal website, that is said what Hounslow what response that they you know provided 
emergency accommodations and the rest of it. But I do remember thinking, when it 
happened, what does Hounslow do? What would I do? 
SM: So you’d be interested in learning more about being resilient and more prepared for 
these kinds of emergencies 
RH: Yeah, absolutely 
[unintelligible] 
MA: So house fires, are going to be in that final version too 
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RH: That’s  [unintelligible] this (current doc) to this (new doc) and especially if you had it 
one click, on the front page 
SM: Mhm, definitely 
RH: You’d get more people looking at it 
SM: Okay 
Ahsan Shaikh (AS): Would you say you have any recommendations uh for this small 
document in order to make it even better? Do you have any recommendations for that? 
SM: We understand it’s very incomplete at this moment. 
RH: Uh, get rid of that front picture, especially since its all changing and all that. I take it it’s 
not going to say Public Document on it?  
SM + MA: No 
RH: Its gonna say what it is. It’s a bit if I was reading this as a member of the public, I don’t 
want to know the purpose of the Hounslow public CRR is to educate people blah blah blah. I 
just want to know what this is. The risk is uh what to do in the event of  dot, dot, dot, dot 
SM: Okay. 
RH: Or how you can help. Or who to contact. That’s what I’d want to know. Uh, fire, police 
stations, a bit toy town, the graphics. You’re saying it’s not finished but it’s a bit insulting. 
SM: Understandable 
RH: Uh, And there are only three risks. Only three? 
AS: Yeah, these are the top risks, its gonna also include fire 
[unintelligible] 
MA: because if you include all of them, it’s gonna be the size of the other one you have 
beneath it.  
RH: Okay so maybe instead of calling it top risks, because I’m think well what are the 
others? I’m panicking because they’re not here. But if you just put risks or just what they are, 
the risk of flooding. DO you see what I mean? Because I wasn’t to know what the rest are.  
AS: Because then we can refer to the document to consult the other version 
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RH: Yeah, if people want to go into it further, cause there are some people that are really into 
that kind of stuff and some of them just want the headlines.  
SM: Yup 
RH: Yeah, telling me to keep healthy for influenza is not helpful. 
SM: Okay 
RH: I know you’ve got the public health agenda and all the rest of it but we’re talking about 
people that just want to know what to do. And the first one of keeping healthy, yeah I try, but 
what do I do if I’ve got influenza. Like the second one that says, identify an influenza friend, 
is brilliant.   
SM: Okay 
RH: Because some people may live alone, may not have family so that would be a useful 
thing to know…keep personal stocks of over the counter. See that [the keep healthy section] 
could go under there where it says about NHS. Um, I would put, what are we doing in 
Hounslow second,  
SM: Okay 
RH: Consequences next, and then the risk impacts. Because its interesting but its. 
SM: Not as important 
RH: Yeah, in my opinion. It’s just my opinion. Loos of utilities is not completed. Um, I think 
you should follow the same thing  
AS: Yes 
RH: Okay, the Hounslow Resilience Forum produces the Hounslow Community Risk 
Register, who cares? I’m more interested in weblinks and more information and contacts. 
This bit [the HRF produces… can do down at the bottom]  
SM: Okay 
RH: And I’m sure you can use the back page for something useful. 
SM: Yes 
MA: We’re also going to put another page with um just a blank list of contacts that you 
might have to put it there so you have it with you like the school, the fire station, the police 
station, gas supplier, electric supplier  
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RH: Perfect, that would be good. And Hounslow emergency contact details because I 
actually don’t have these. 
SM: Okay  
RH: And I’ve lived in the borough for 28 years 
SM: Okay, that’s very important then. 
RH: So, apart from knowing to call 999, that’s it, that’s all I know. So if you produce 
something, I don’t know if you know in the borough, they send out these little cards about the 
recycling, the rubbish collection, so a card, you could put it on the back of that or a card like 
that that people could put on their fridge.  
MA: Yeah we’re thinking about refridge magnets 
RH: Yeah, that would be a good idea 
SM: Excellent 
RH: So people will know, and if English is not the first language, you just you know, proper 
policemen’s number, do you know what I mean? [unintelligible] because most people have 
got mobile phones so they can call. 
SM: Do you two have any other questions for her?  
AS: Yes, as a resident of the borough, how would you want to receive information about the 
risk register? How would you receive this document, the public one? It will be electronically 
published, but we believe 
RH: A leaflet, cause when Hounslow sent out leaflets before, like a tri-fold leaflet, people do 
take notice, I find, they look at it. It could be in the local paper, you could have it out at the 
front desk, in all the offices, so that. 
SM: Would you be likely to read about it if there was an article in Hounslow Matters 
RH: Yeah, I read Hounslow Matters. 
SM: Okay 
RH: Most people do  
SM: Excellent, anything else? Thank you very much, that was extremely helpful. 
RH: You’re welcome 
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SM: Thank you 
RH: I look forward to seeing the new version.  
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16. Appendix J: Matthew Hogan Interview Transcript 
Our fifth interview was with Matthew Hogan of the London Resilience Forum. We 
interviewed Mr. Hogan because he is an expert at communicating risk with the public and 
may have ideas to help our team. We conducted this interview on 15 April 2016. This 
interview helped us complete objective 3.  
 
Matthew Hogan Interview Transcript 
15.04.16 10:30 am 
Date:  15 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Matthew Hogan, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Shelby McQueston (SM): First, first of all, can you explain a little bit about what you do in 
the London Resilience Forum? 
Matthew Hogan (MH): Who am I? Why am I here? Why am I speaking to you? Yeah, of 
course. Um, so, I guess for the benefit of your recording, I’m Matthew Hogan. London 
Resilience Officer with the London Resilience Team. Uh, it was a team that was established 
informally in 1998 to prepare for the millennium bug and then formally established in 2002, 
really on the back of 9/11 to make sure that London had got plans in place for essentially the 
same things happening here. 
Ahsan Shaikh (AS): Right 
MH: Um, it started life as a government office function, so it was central government and 
over time, it sort of devolved to the Mayor’s Office. So, in the same way that in the States 
you’ve got offices of emergency management, essentially that’s what we are. We coordinate 
emergency planning and response activity. Mostly across the public sector, but also linking in 
with some private sector organisations. Essentially they’re defined by the Civil Contingencies 
Act as Category 1 and Category 2 organisations. We coordinate their activity. We haven’t 
actually got any power. So we can’t tell anybody to do anything. It’s a sort of influence of 
direction, show people the benefits of working together, in the planning phase so the response 
hopefully goes a little bit smoother. Um, in terms of my specific role within the team, uh, I’m 
the lead on risk assessment, which is probably why you’ve invited me but I also lead on some 
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of the capability areas so, um, pandemic flu, flooding, essentially some of the top risks are in 
my area as well. What else do you need in terms of background? 
SM: That was perfect.  
AS: That was very good. 
SM: Very helpful. Um, so are you, I’m assuming you’re part of the team that puts together 
the London Community Risk Register? 
MH: Yeah, so, um, there’s a group called the London Risk Advisory. It’s predominately as I 
said, those category 1 organisations, so emergency service, local authorities, NHS, u m come 
together and I think it’s four times a year, come together and discuss what are the risks in 
London, assess them in terms of impact and likelihood and then produce the London Risk 
Register. Um, that’s required under the Civil Contingencies Act, so it’s a statutory duty of all 
the organisations to contribute to that. In term of my role, I’m the sort of Secretariat of that, 
so I do essentially all the work, and everyone else takes the credit.  
SM: That’s good for us; it means you have a lot of information. Um, just a quick question, 
did you ah, you know the Prezi that London has for their Risk Register? 
MH: Yeah 
SM: Did you create that too? 
MH: Yeah 
SM: I’m in love with that Prezi. I think it’s fantastic and it was the first thing I found out 
about risks. 
MH: Excellent  
Miguel Almeida (MA): Yeah for the past 12 weeks, we’ve been hearing her talk about it. 
*laughter* 
SM: It does such a good job of explaining everything! 
MH: So, I guess we might, come onto this later on, but, the duty within the act is for category 
1 organisations to assess risk and then to communicate risk to the public. Um, what most 
organisations have done in the past, it just put the risk register online and go there it is if you 
want to have a look. We’ve communicated because it’s available.  
AS: Right 
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MH: Actually, because we’re part of the Mayor’s Office, there approach is a lot more 
engaging, with Londoners. So, they wanted to go a bit further than, “the document’s there.” 
And have essentially some sort of narrative to explain, this is what you’re looking at. So, that 
was where the Prezi came from was a sort of mayoral direction that, it’s not good enough to 
just put the document there, we need to explain and inform people about why we’ve done 
that.  
SM: That’s pretty much what we’re trying to do with our new document.  
AS: Are there any other methods that the Resilience Forum in London has employed to 
communicate with the public? 
MH: So, we’ve um, in terms of communicating with the public in sort of its broadest sense, 
um, there’s a group again, of similar agencies particularly sort of press offices, within those 
organisations that um, I guess tries to make sure that there’s a coherent message coming out, 
rather than, the partnership itself is about 170 different organisations, so you could have 170 
different versions of the same thing. So this group’s there to try and, essentially sort of come 
up with a common message. Any push that out. Both in the sort of planning phase, but also, 
more importantly in [unintelligible]. But we did do, February last year, we held an event at 
city hall. So again, the mayor’s office wanted us to be bit more engaging about not just the 
risk side, but what we’re doing to respond to some of those risks as well. So we held an event 
at city hall, which we called Talk Resilience and invited sort of community groups to say you 
know, you’ve been exposed to flooding or power cuts, or large fires, how was it for you, did 
you feel you were getting the support you needed from the organisations involved. And one 
of the things we did at that was to essentially crowd-source a risk register. Which I’ll see if 
I’ve got. So, it’s not scientific at all, but invited, I think it was about 80 or so people came 
along, and said, here’s just a list of hazards, risks, just put a dot next to the one you think is 
the most important. And, you know, methodologically, it wasn’t the most sound approach but 
just to give us a sort of indication and make it a bit more engaging. [unintelligible] And about 
60% of that correlates with our assessment of risk as well, so people have put flooding, 
pandemic flu and terrorism at the top of thee list. Other things like volcanic eruption further 
down the bottom. 
AS: Right. 
MH: Um, I guess what that sort of showed, is that we’re doing a reasonable job of 
communicating risk. But there is about 40% of that where people either overestimated or 
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underestimated the risk.  And so that’s the identified areas that we can start focusing on.  So 
we don’t need to tell people that flooding’s a top risk anymore, they understand that.  But we 
can start to explain some of those other risks in a bit more detail. 
AS: Right. That’s a very good way to engage the public and you know, bring the public’s 
ideas. 
MH: Yeah, I mean, it was, it uh, had its roots in um, some work that San Francisco did. They 
did a lot of work on a project called SF72 and working with the local community, working 
with local businesses to sort of say, what do you think the risks are and then sort of adjust 
their strategy based on that. So we do sort of keep our eye on what’s happening elsewhere, to 
sort of gain from everybody’s expertise.  
AS: Right. 
SM: That might be worth looking a little more into. So, based upon um, what we’ve been 
looking at, we’re basically creating two different risk registers. Well, one’s a risk register, 
one’s more of a public awareness document. 
MH: Okay. 
SM: Um, but do you think there’s some things that are in the risk register that shouldn’t be 
included in the this public document? Um, technical things? 
MH: Um, I guess technically speaking, yes. Particularly when you’re looking at some of the 
malicious risks, so terrorism, particularly. Um, there are some elements around that are, the 
responders need to know a little bit more than the general public does. But broadly, I think 
our approach is let’s just try and be as open as possible. You know, for, for a long time, I 
think until 2012, we didn’t include threats in the London risk register. 
SM: Mhm 
MH: Because there was all this sort of sensitivity around we can’t talk about terrorism, it’s a 
national thing, tis led from central government. We can’t talk about it. But to me, that then 
made our document look really odd. You know, we’ve got significant experience of terrorism 
in London, so for people logging on and looking at that document, going we haven’t included 
terrorism, so how do we know the rest of its nay good? So I think we need to be as open as 
possible, is the sort of base point that we start with. There’s obviously some things, I don’t 
know if you’ve seen the report from the Emergency Planning College, about risk registers? 
SM: Which one? 
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MH: The one that’s particularly about identifying particular locations. 
SM + AS: Mhm 
SM: We actually talked to Mr. Leigh a couple of, last week, 
MH: Brilliant. I think that’s again, a good thing to do. If that information’s out there, why not 
include it? So we were looking at some of the flooding response work. We did this whole 
assessment of what infrastructures at risk, all that sort of stuff. So, what’s in the flood zone. 
And there were hundreds of schools and electricity substations and whatever. And we drew 
up this list and the police go, oh, you can’t share that. Well, why not? People could do that 
work themselves. Those flood layers are our there. They could get a map or drive around 
London and see what physically there and do that themselves. We’re not actually going any 
further than what’s publically available anyway. So, I think there are some limitations, buts 
sometimes people use that as a bit of a barrier where it shouldn’t be. 
SM: Mhm. Okay.  
MA: Do you want to take a look at what we’ve done so far? 
MH: Yeah, sure. 
MA: Give some comments. 
SM: We had some printing issues. Clearly, our cover page kind of died. 
MH: So this is the public-facing one, is it? 
MA: Yes. 
MH: And what was your um, I guess, what was objective when you were doing it? 
SM: Um, well we had the current risk register and they were finding that a lot of people just 
weren’t reading it, a lot of people didn’t know it existed. It’s about 70 pages, and nobody 
really wants to read it, so we wanted to keep it short and just include top risks, that people 
really need to know about, and what they needed to do in case of those risks. Things like that.  
MA: [unintelligible] 
SM: She actually works here, so.  
MA: There’s actually lot missing. Nice images that aren’t there. We’re still completing 
[unintelligible] 
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MH: No, no that’s fine.  So, I mean I’ve just had a quick scan over it, I think the, you’ve sort 
of got in there where to find further information. Perhaps you could expand that a little bit 
more, within these individual risk that you’ve identified. So, there’s a lot on the London Fire 
Brigade website on preparing your house for fires, that sort of thing. 
SM: Okay 
MH: Again, advice from the environmental agency on what to do in case of flood. 
SM: Mhm. 
MH: So I guess put links into more relevant stuff. 
AS: Right.  
MH: What we’re um, trying to do is ah, a lot more sign posting. 
SM: Mhm. 
MH: So, the website that we’ve got, London Prepared, um, has been around for about 10 
years, and people have slowly been going, oh let’s put this on the website, let’s put this on the 
website and it got to this like ridiculous sized website, that nobody was looking at really, 
because information’s all over the place. What we’ve done know, is really scaled it back. 
We’ve gone, all that information is actually on the police website, or on the environment 
agency website or an NHS website, so we just point people on where they need to go.  
AS: Right. 
MH: So I think that’s what you’re trying to achieve here, is actually you’ve raised the 
awareness, now go and find out some more about it.  
SM: Mhm, exactly 
AS: We have just identified the top risks that the borough is susceptible to, so if people want 
to know more about the other risks, we also have a link to the actual technical version, which 
is available to both the CPU and the public.  
MH: Yeah.  
SM: Do you have any suggestions on ways to either promote it or make more people aware 
of it?  
MH: Um, sorry, I’ve got distracted a bit.  
SM: No problem. 
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MH: Um, I think that’s [the map] really good. Again that’s what we were talking about isn’t 
it? Where all those locations are. And you’ve got the zone on there as well to say there’s a 
police station in the flood zone, it’s interesting to do that. I know, that um, previous 
placement students that have come over have done, essentially tried to map some of these 
risks. I don’t know if you’ve had a look at any of that.  
[Unintelligible] 
MH: That was really interesting to see sort of flight paths into Heathrow, the sort of 
exclusion zones around COMAH sites, and that sort of thing. There’s probably a lot more 
that collectively the public sector could do on mapping sort of combined risks. At the minute, 
we talk about risks sort of separately, which is understandable, but actually you’re not going 
to have a fluvial flooding event is going to result in disruption to utilities. So you then need to 
start layer up the complexity of those different things as well.  
SM: Mhm. 
MH: Um, in terms of how to promote it, um, I think what you need is ah, perhaps a bit of a 
stronger call to action. So, what do you want people to do with the information? It’s fairly 
easy to get people to read things, but what you actually want is some behaviour changes with 
that. Um, and try to be a bit clearer about that and use that to influence how you promote it. 
So, um, you could focus particularly on schools or something and really just nail that. That’s 
a really good way to do things because then they take that information home and share it with 
their parents and that sort of thing. It sort of spreads out organically. And you don’t have to 
do too much of that hard sell. So, I think maybe it’s working with the education team within 
the authority to say can we do a little project with schools on flooding. 
AS: Does London have a partnership like that with schools to promote? 
MH: We’ve got a pilot started in 2014, September 2014. Uh, it’s called the London 
Curriculum. And essentially is was all the policy areas within City Hall, so not just resilience, 
but housing, health, and environment, all went away and said if we’re using this school 
network, what do we want kids to know about? And came up with some resources. And its 
not a you must use these resources, it’s a these resources are available if you want to use it so. 
We came up with some stuff, so if the schools doing a project on flooding then as well as 
teaching them about the sort of mechanics of flooding and what happens in Bangladesh, 
which is typically the example that they use, actually here’s some information already on the 
risk in London with some maps and some diagrams. You know, Can you find your own 
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house it the flood plain? And that sort of thing. So that, if they want to, they can bring that a 
bit closer to home and say what does that mean for you? It’s a pilot project at the minute, I 
think it’s running in about 20 schools, um, I haven’t had any feedback on how its been 
received, but I think its definitely a good option to sort of engage people. 
AS: Is there anyway we can look at what are the contents of that project. 
MH: I think if you Google or go through the London.gov website, you’ll be able to find the 
London Curriculum there. And as I said its lots of resources it’s not just flooding it all sorts 
of different things. 
AS: Great 
 
*End of interview* 
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17. Appendix K: Billy Regan Interview 
We interviewed Mr. Regan because he is a community member with limited knowledge of 
risk and may have ideas to help our team and improve our document. We conducted this 
interview on 15 April 2016. This interview helped us complete objective 2.  
 
Billy Regan Interview Transcript 
26.04.16 11:30 am 
Date:  26 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Billy Regan, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Shelby McQueston (SM): There we go, okay. Um, so just to start off, have you ever heard 
of the Hounslow Community Risk Register? 
Billy Regan (BR): I have not. 
SM: Okay, cool. That gets rid of all those questions. 
BR: Is that correct? 
SM: You’re not the only one who’s said that so. 
Miguel Almeida (MA): It’s this really big document with risk assessments  
BR: Wow, look at that. 
SM: Um, so, our project has been to come up with a new way to present this information 
towards uh, public, the public, so residents of Hounslow. So we can up with this document 
and we’re hoping you could take a look at it. 
BR: That looks slimmer. 
SM: Much slimmer, yes. 
BR: I’m glad I’m not reading that one. 
SM: If you could just take a quick look at it, over some suggestions or anything you have to 
say about it. 
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BR: Okay, maybe the council could get a new building, because that looks ugly. Isn’t that a 
depressing site?  
SM: We’ve been trying to find a better picture.  
BR: There must be, the park maybe? I’m not sure where you’d go for a picture. Maybe the 
town centre. Okay, major emergency we hope that doesn’t happen. This all looks good.  
BR: Fluvial? 
SM: Fluvial is like relating to rivers. 
Miguel Almeida (MA): Yes and on the next draft, it will probably say River Flooding.  
SM: We weren’t familiar with the term either.  
*silence while BR examines at document* 
BR: This is nice, lovely picture of someone coughing is it. 
SM: We could find a better picture for that. 
BR: I don’t know, it hits home 
BR: Identify a flu friend I presume that doesn’t mean going a finding someone who has the 
flu to befriend. Cause that’d be counterintuitive to stop the spread of influenza wouldn’t it. 
BR: This is good. I thought it was a lousy photo but it sums up the loss of utilities perfectly.  
BR: That’s pretty reasonable. Is that all the risks? 
MA: No, these are the top risks. That’s why there’s more information if you want to read 
about the, 
SM: The ones people really need to know about.  
SM: Do you have any suggestions on something you’d like to see in there or something that 
doesn’t make sense? 
BR: No to be honest, it all makes sense. I guess because I’m reading it with the help of you 
guys, I know the context it’s in. Um, I don’t know whether the introduction feels a bit short 
and suddenly we’re jumping into there are all these dangerous things and I haven’t really 
taken in the introduction. I’m left with thinking oh my goodness I’ve been handing this and 
its all doom and gloom. Why do I need to know this? I suppose what I would do is go back 
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and read the introduction to understand cause I’ve kind of just skipped the introduction and 
just looked at the nice pictures and then read about the different risks. 
*reads introduction*  
BR: I mean that does, the introduction does encapsulate it, but I was sort of left with the 
feeling at the end of it oh my God, why do I need to know all of this?  
SM: Okay 
BR: So I don’t know how you’d make that more implicit. I mean that concise and it is 
implicit. And yeah I suppose anyone right minded would do the same thing as me, read it, get 
scared and go back and see that its alright okay its just in case of emergencies.  
SM: Well we might consider adding a conclusion  
BR: Yeah a conclusion might be good so I don’t have to go back and sort of like this is just 
in case of emergencies changes are it won’t happen but better to be prepared than not.  
SM: Yeah. 
BR: I can never understand maps of Hounslow because its such a weird shape borough. Maps 
look odd.  
SM: Any other comments on it? 
BR: I think its quite good really. 
SM: Awesome, thank you 
BR: It looks smart, it’s not too long, I has expecting to get bored before the end of it and I 
turned over and I was on the last two pages and I thought good. 
MA: that was one of the main goals of it, to keep people focused.  
BR: Yeah, I think they way its laid out is really good. The boxes are particularly good. It lays 
it out really well. I think it’s great. 
SM: Thank you very much! 
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18. Appendix L: Andrea Tidy Interview Transcript 
We interviewed Ms. Tidy because she is a community member with limited 
knowledge of risk and may have ideas to help our team and improve our document. We 
conducted this interview on 15 April 2016. This interview helped us complete objective 2.  
 
Billy Regan Interview Transcript 
26.04.16 13:00 
Date:  26 April 2016 
Location:  Hounslow Civic Centre, Emergency Control Centre 
Attendees:  Andrea Tidy, Shelby McQueston, Miguel Almeida, Ahsan Shaikh 
 
Shelby McQueston (SM): To start off, have you ever heard of the community risk register? 
Andrea Tidy (AT): I have heard of it, yes. 
SM: Excellent! 
SM: So, you are familiar with this (original) version of it? Have you ever read through it? 
AT: I kind of skimmed through it, yes. I haven’t read it in dept. I have to say some of the 
risks I didn’t even think of. 
SM: Definitely. 
AT: It is quite interesting. 
SM: But we are developing a new public document to make people more aware of the risks 
Hounslow faces. We created a much smaller document that we would like you to take a look 
at. Just give us some feedback on thinks you think we should improve upon, things you wish 
were there. 
AT: Much easier to read. There is one thing I don’t know if you can add, but the people 
living in flats, we recently implemented something that’s called Section 41 that basically 
gives us the power to remove things from communal areas. The reason we do that is to keep 
them free for the fire brigade. So you’ve got what you need to do, maybe this is not the place, 
maybe somewhere separate on fire prevention perhaps. 
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AT: Turn off taps.  
Miguel Almeida (MA): It’s on the new version. We have just finished a new version of the 
document. 
AT: We just have so many floods cause by people leaving the taps on when water has been 
turned off. 
MA: And the gas lines as well. 
AT: The gas lines as well. Do not use lifts, in the fire. 
AT: That’s a very good idea, so that people have that in one place (contact information page). 
MA: Exactly. 
AT: I think it is really good (document in general), it is concise, it is to the point. Doesn’t tell 
the reader any more than they need to know. Does not scare them. I like the visuals, they are 
quite good. 
SM: Any other comments? 
AT: No, I think it is well put together.  
SM/MA: Excellent, thank you very much. 
  
 
 
96 
 
19. Appendix M: Risk Assessment Activity  
To complete this activity, we will ask participant to circle the emergency or 
emergencies they believe will cause the most harm to them or the borough. It will take place 
during the educational programme at school. It will provide teachers with guidance on what 
emergencies they should cover during the following presentation.  
Risk Assessment Activity 
Please circle the emergencies you believe to be the most significant in the borough. 
 
Drought  
 
Explosion at a high-pressure natural gas pipeline  
 
Influenza Type Disease  
 
Railway Accident  
 
Flooding  
 
Maritime Pollution 
 
Loss of Utilities  
 
Aviation Accident  
 
Storms and Gales 
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20. Appendix N: Risk Presentation 
This is the presentation we propose that students show to their students. Modifications 
are expected as each teacher has an individual teaching style and we are not experts in 
communicating risk to children. 
 
 
  
 
 
98 
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21. Appendix O: Questionnaire 
This is the question that we suggest teachers use after their class on risk. It will 
provide information on what teachers can do to improve the class, as well as information for 
the Hounslow Resilience Forum to determine what community members are learning about. 
It may be modified to reflect the teacher’s style and presentation.  
Attendees Questionnaire 
 
1. On a scale of 0 to 10, how helpful do you believe the Emergency Preparedness 
Workshop was? ____________ 
 
2. Please rate all the activities on a scale of 0 to 10 for their educational value. 0 being 
not educative, and 10 being very educative. 
a. Risk Assessment Activity              ________ 
b. Presentation                      ________ 
c. Risk Localization Activity             ________ 
 
3. What other activities do you believe would be helpful to communicate risk 
preparedness? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. What other information do you believe would be helpful regarding risk preparedness 
that has not been covered in the workshop? 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Other suggestions 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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22. Appendix P: Hounslow Matters Article 
 
What to Do 
in an 
Emergency 
Would you know what 
to do when an 
emergency happens 
around you? 
We can’t predict the future, but that does not mean we can’t prepare for what might happen. 
Being prepared can mean the difference between a home and homelessness, or even life 
and death. Thankfully, little things you do now can make all the difference when you need it 
most.  
If you find yourself involved in an emergency always call 999 immediately to inform the 
relevant emergency services. If you are anywhere in the EU you can also call 112 from a 
mobile telephone which will connect you to the relevant country’s emergency services. For 
non-emergency matters you can call 101 for police assistance or 111 for health matters.  
If you need to inform the Council of an emergency, call 020 8583 2222.  
There are many simple ways to better prepare yourself for emergencies: 
 Know the number for your electric, gas, and water providers so you have them to 
hand during a utility failure.  
 Make an emergency plan. Know where to go if you need to evacuate and who can 
help you and your family. 
 Install smoke detectors and test them on a regular basis. Make sure everyone knows 
how to evacuate the house in case of fire.  
 Prepare a “grab bag”. Consider including batteries, a flashlight, bottled water, a 
battery-powered radio, a first-aid kid, extra sets of keys, and personal hygiene items.  
 Educate yourself on risks in your area. Find out what you can do to help mitigate the 
impacts. 
 
The Council has created a new document entitled “Community Resilience,” to help you learn 
about the risks that you are most likely to face here in Hounslow. The document is available 
online on the Council website and in print at Hounslow Civic Centre. Familiarise yourself with 
this document so you know what you can do to keep you and your family safe.  
For more information, contact us at contingency.planning@hounslow.gov.uk or Contingency 
Planning Unit, Civic Centre, Lampton Road, Hounslow TW3 4DN 
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23. Appendix R: Community Resilience Document
   
 
Community Resilience 
April 2016 
  
2 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of the Hounslow Community Resilience document is to educate people 
about the risks that could occur where they live, so they can think about what they 
are able to do to be better prepared for emergencies.  
The document starts with a list of risks that Hounslow is most susceptible to. In the 
same page, there is a map of the borough including flood zones, specific risks, and 
available infrastructure. Each next page corresponds to a specific risk. These pages 
start with a short description of the risk, followed by 4 boxes. The boxes explain what 
to do in case an emergency occurs, the consequences and impacts that emergency 
will create, and what is being done in Hounslow to assist the population. 
 
Who we are 
 
The London Borough of Hounslow Resilience Forum carries out work to ensure that 
the Borough is prepared to deal with an emergency that might affect large numbers 
of people. The team works with other multi-agency organisations to ensure that 
plans and processes align cross-agency.  
The Hounslow team also works with other Local Authorities across London and 
feeds into the wider London arrangements. 
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Risks 
 
Fires 
Fluvial Flooding 
Influenza Type Disease (Pandemic) 
Loss of Utilities  
Map of Risk and Infrastructure 
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Impacts 
 
 Loss of property. 
 Air, soil, and water contamination. 
Consequences 
 
 Explosions would cause primarily burns, 
crush, cuts and bruise-type injuries. 
 Smoke may cause respiratory injuries.  
What do you need to do? 
 
 Alert everyone in the property. 
 Have an escape route planned. Plan 
for secondary escape routes, in the 
case the main one is obstructed. 
 Do not delay your escape to look for 
valuables. 
 If there is smoke, crawl on the floor. 
 Close any doors, or windows you 
can, to slow the spread of the fire. 
 Once out and safe, call 999. 
 Do not go back inside to save 
valuables or people, inform the 
rescue teams of people left inside. 
They will be able to find them quicker. 
 Do not use the lift. 
What are we doing in 
Hounslow? 
 
 Control of Major Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) 1999 – authorities detail the 
procedures that will take place if an 
incident were to happen. 
 Building design and fire protection 
systems to prevent or limit the spread of 
fire. 
 Hounslow Hazardous Sites Working 
Group – Hounslow Resilience Forum 
members work to identify potential 
hazardous sites in the Borough which 
have the potential to be a fire safety 
hazard.  
Fires 
 
It is important to be vigilant and to act 
responsibly to protect you and those around 
you from the risk of fire.  
Always remember, if fire breaks out: 
GET OUT, STAY OUT and CALL 999 – don’t 
try and fight a fire yourself. 
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Risk Impacts 
 
 Risk to life (people and animals). 
 Damage to property, businesses, 
agricultural land, roads, structures and 
infrastructure. 
 Pollution and contamination of local 
environments. 
 Long-term damage to tourism, businesses 
and agriculture. 
Consequences 
 
 Disruption to utilities, electricity and water 
supplies. 
 Evacuation of residents. 
 Short, medium and long-term 
accommodation of those whose homes 
are flooded. 
 Long-term psychological and health 
impacts. 
 Long-term restoration and recovery issues 
for homes and businesses. 
What do you need to do? 
 Find out if your property is within the flood 
risk area by logging on to the 
Environment Agency (EA) website or 
calling Floodline on 0845 988 1188. 
 Plan where you will go if you have to 
evacuate and how you will get there. 
 Identify neighbours who may need 
assistance or who may be able to provide 
assistance to you, in case of evacuation. 
 Prepare an emergency grab bag with 
bottled water and non- perishable food, 
warm waterproof clothing and blankets, a 
torch with spare batteries, a wind-up or 
battery radio, first aid kit and prescription 
medication, baby food and baby care 
items, copies of your insurance 
documents and important contact 
numbers.  
 Where possible, move irreplaceable items 
to upper floors during times of flood risk. 
What are we doing in 
Hounslow? 
 
 EA Flood Warnings – the EA publishes 
flood warnings to notify the public about 
any potential flooding. 
 Met Office National Severe Weather 
Warning Service – this warning service 
publishes alerts for a range of severe 
weather. 
 Preparedness – most HRF agencies will 
receive relevant weather updates. If they 
are aware that a severe weather event is 
likely to happen, they will put certain 
resources in place. 
Fluvial Flooding 
 
Fluvial flooding is caused by an increase in 
river levels either due to extensive rain or due 
to the effects of upstream rivers and the tide 
from the English Channel. 
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Risk Impacts 
 
 Many millions of people around the world 
will become infected causing global 
disruption and a potential humanitarian 
crisis. 
 Up to half the UK population may 
become infected and between 50,000 
and 750,000 additional deaths may have 
occurred by the end of a pandemic. 
 Health care and local authority social 
care systems become overloaded. 
 Normal life is likely to face wide 
disruption, particularly due to staff 
shortages affecting the provision of 
essential services, including production 
and transport of goods. 
Consequences 
 
 Vulnerable people exposed to lower levels 
of care. 
 Longer and more frequent disruptions to 
essential utilities. 
 Reduced levels of emergency services 
cover. 
 Disruptions to businesses and 
organisations through staff shortages and 
supply chain interruptions. 
 Impacts on the national and local 
economy. 
What do you need to do? 
 
 Identify a flu friend – somebody who 
would collect your medication, food and 
other supplies allowing you to be isolated 
from the Public.  
 Keep personal stocks of “over the 
counter” cold and flu medication to help 
relieve your symptoms. 
 Know the arrangements for your child’s 
school. 
 Look out for and observe advice and 
guidance from the NHS. 
What are we doing in 
Hounslow? 
 
 The Hounslow Resilience Forum has a 
Pandemic Influenza plan detailing the 
roles and responsibilities of agencies 
during a pan-flu event. 
 Health agencies have communications 
procedures in place to ensure they would 
be able to get relevant Public Health 
information pushed out through the right 
channels to help educate people during a 
pandemic. 
 All agencies have Business Continuity 
Plans in place to outline what they would 
do in the event of a reduction of staffing 
levels. 
Influenza Type Disease 
 
A flu (influenza) pandemic is possible when a 
new type of influenza virus emerges and 
almost all the population are potentially 
susceptible. This differs greatly from 
seasonal flu as few, if any, people will have 
immunity against the virus allowing it to 
spread more easily and cause more serious 
illness. 
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Risk Impacts 
 
 Production at companies halted. 
 Potential loss of life support machines. 
 Failure of telecommunication networks 
and water supply systems. 
 Shutdown of rail transport. 
 Civil unrest. 
 
What are we doing in 
Hounslow? 
 The London Resilience Forum has 
produced a Water Supply Disruption Plan. 
 Work has been recently ongoing between 
Local Authorities in London and utility 
suppliers to ensure that there is adequate 
collaboration between local authorities 
and suppliers during utility incidents. 
 Many utility companies offer Priority 
Services for those particular 
vulnerabilities – this means that certain 
customers can receive extra assistance 
during utility failure incidents. 
 
Consequences 
 
 Loss of revenue. 
 People in the affected areas unable to 
establish communication links with the 
outside world. 
 People in the affected areas unable to 
travel to other places. 
What do you need to do? 
 
 Unplug all electrical equipment. 
 Turn off light switches. 
 Do not use any candles or any type of 
flame for lighting. 
 Shut off the gas. 
 Shut off water outlets. 
 Have a torch, and bottled water available 
at home. 
Loss of Utilities 
 
This hazard involves the smaller scale loss of 
utilities including gas, water and electricity for 
a period of more than 24 hours. With aging 
infrastructure, utility failure is becoming more 
common across London. Incidents can range 
from small power cuts, which inconvenience 
a small amount of people to large failures, 
which affect thousands of people. 
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More Information 
 
In addition to the Community Resilience document, the Hounslow Resilience Forum 
produces the Hounslow Multi-Agency Community Risk Register, which is the 
complete risk assessment document for the London Borough of Hounslow. For 
further information please follow the contact details bellow. 
 
Web links and further information 
This document is a guide based on the Hounslow CRR. To see the entirety of the 
Hounslow CRR, please follow the link below. 
http://www.hounslow.gov.uk/resilience_forum 
 
Contact us: 
For any enquiries regarding risks, or any aspects of the work of Hounslow’s 
Resilience Forum please contact us on 
Contingency.planning@hounslow.gov.uk 
020 8583 5111 
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Emergency Directory 
Please use this page to enter important contact information to quickly access in case 
of an emergency. 
 
 
Electricity distributor  
 
 
Gas supplier 
 
 
 
Telephone line provider 
 
 
Water provider 
 
 
Schools 
 
 
Pharmacies 
 
 
Other useful contacts 
 
GP 
 
 
  
 
 of 
 amp  Road 
4DN. 
 020  
communications@hounslow.gov.uk. 
 
 
 
www.hounslow.gov.uk                                                                                                                             0 
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24. Appendix Q: Updated Hounslow Multi-Agency Community Risk Register 
 
  
  
 
Hounslow Multi-Agency CRR 
April 2016 
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Document History 
 
Review Date Version Summary of Changes Amended By 
September 
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April 2013 Draft 0.4 Final review of risk (impact and likelihood) 
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For agreement of the Hounslow Resilience 
Forum, sign off 11/04/2013 
Twm Palmer (CPU) 
April 2013 1.0 Final version signed off by the Hounslow 
Resilience Forum 
Ben Axelsen (CPU) 
August 2013 1.1 Review of Risk Numbers and Colours. 
Amendments from ToR and COMAH site 
update 
 
 
April 2016 2.0 Colours, stated purpose of the CRR, limitations 
of risk assessment, design, local history of 
emergencies, withholding information, other 
forms of communication, public involvement, 
contact details 
Fiona Hodge (CPU), 
Miguel Almeida, 
Ahsan Shaikh, 
Shelby McQueston 
(WPI) 
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Amendments  
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All Twm Palmer 
(CPU) 
September 
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9-27 Twm Palmer 
(CPU) 
March 
2012 
Draft 0.3 Recommended changes from the 
Environment Agency and Red Cross 
15-36 Ben Axelsen 
(CPU) 
March 
2013 
Draft 0.4 Final review of risk (impact and 
likelihood) ratings based on Hounslow 
Resilience Forum suggestions and 
comments 
All Twm Palmer 
(CPU) 
April 2013 
1.0 Likelihood scoring scale updated 12 Ben Axelsen 
(CPU) 
April 2013 
1.1 Risk Numbers, Risk Colours, ToR 
update & COMAH sites 
All Ben Axelsen August 
2013 
1.2 Reformatting All Fiona Hodge March 
2014 
1.3 Alignment to National Risk IDs All Fiona Hodge July 2014 
1.4 Amendments made to risk ratings 
following Sept 14 RAWG meeting 
All Fiona Hodge November 
2014 
1.5 Amendments made to risk ratings 
following December 14 RAWG 
meeting 
All Fiona Hodge February 
2015 
1.6 Amendments made to risk ratings 
following March 15 RAWG meeting 
All Fiona Hodge May 2015 
1.7 Amendments made to risk ratings 
following June 15 RAWG meeting 
All Fiona Hodge August 
2015 
1.8 Amendments made following LFB Risk 
Assessment meeting 
All Fiona Hodge December 
2015 
2.0 Colours, stated purpose of the CRR, 
limitations of risk assessment, design, 
local history of emergencies, 
withholding information, other forms 
of communication, public 
involvement, contact details 
All Fiona Hodge April 2016 
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Distribution List 
 
Organisation No of 
Copies 
Draft circulated to the Hounslow Resilience Forum  
Published and available on the London Borough of Hounslow website  
Published on ResilienceDirect  
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Document Security Markings  
This document is OFFICIAL, meaning that this document does not contain any 
SENSITIVE material in accordance with the principles outlined in the Government’s 
“Protective Marking System.” 
This document can be distributed through unsecure means electronically and 
physically. 
 
Notes  
The Hounslow Risk Register is collectively owned and maintained by Category 1 and 
2 Responders within the London Borough of Hounslow, as defined by the groups 
Terms of Reference.  
 
Exclusion Notes  
The main text section of this Hounslow Multi-Agency Community Risk Register only 
covers and talks about non-malicious events (i.e. hazards occurring in the borough 
and the emergencies that the borough is susceptible to) rather than threats (i.e. 
terrorist incidents)*  
*This does not mean that the Hounslow Resilience Forum does not cover these and 
related threats/risks within its risk assessment work, but given the sensitivity of the 
information, specific details about these will not be made available in the public 
version of the risk register as a matter of Local and National Security.  
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Hounslow Resilience Forum Representatives 
 
Category I Responders 
 
 The London Borough of Hounslow Contingency Planning Unit (CPU)  
 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)  
 London Fire Brigade (LFB)  
 London Ambulance Service (LAS)  
 NHS England  
 Public Health England (PHE)  
 West London Mental Health Trust (WLMHT)  
 West Middlesex University Hospital (WMUH)  
 Hounslow and Richmond Community Healthcare (HRCH)  
 Environment Agency (EA) 
 
Category II Responders 
 
 Utility Companies: Electricity, Gas, Water and Sewerage  
 NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups  
 Public Communications providers (fixed and mobile)  
 Transport for London (TfL)  
 Network Rail  
 Train Operating Companies  
 Highways Agency  
 BAA Heathrow  
 Port of London Authority  
 Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
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Existing Non-Category I or II Hounslow Resilience Forum 
Representatives 
 
 London Resilience Team  
 British Army  
 Royal Air Force (RAF)  
 Voluntary Sector  
 Faith Community Representatives  
 Others 
 
Secretariat   
 
 The London Borough of Hounslow Contingency Planning Unit, Chair of the 
Hounslow Resilience Forum 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
8 
 
Introduction 
Hounslow’s Community Risk Register (CRR), divided into a Community Resilience 
document and a Multi-Agency CRR, provides information on the various 
emergencies that could happen in Hounslow. Together with an assessment of how 
likely they are to happen and the impacts if they do. 
The purpose of the Hounslow public CRR is to educate people about the risks that 
could occur where they live, so they can think about what they are able to do to be 
better prepared for emergencies.  
National Risk Register  
The National Risk Register was first published in 2008 and provides updated 
information on the types of civil emergencies people in the UK could face over the 
next five years. The latest edition was published in 2015. 
London Risk Register  
The London Risk Register is used by the London Resilience Partnership to help to 
prioritise resilience activities towards higher rated risks. It looks at nationally 
recognised risks and how these translate into the risk faced by London. The latest 
edition of the London Risk Register was published in 2014.  
West London Local Resilience Forum Community Risk Register  
The risk assessment work now undertaken by the London Resilience Partnership 
used to be undertaken by London Sub Regional Resilience Forums – Central 
London, North Central London, North East London, South East London, South West 
London and West London Resilience Forums.  
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Hounslow Resilience Forum  
The Hounslow Resilience Forum (HRF) is a partnership, made up of organisations 
that have a responsibility, under the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, to prepare for and 
respond to major incidents in Hounslow. The Forum includes the emergency 
services, local authorities, the Environment Agency, and health agencies along with 
voluntary agencies. Under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) every local resilience 
forum of the United Kingdom is required to establish a resilience forum.  
Hounslow Community Risk Register 
The Hounslow Community Risk Register is divided into two different versions: a 
technical, Multi-Agency CRR for the Hounslow Resilience Forum, and a Community 
Resilience document for the community. Members of the community who wish to 
know more about the Community Risk Register can gain access to the Multi-Agency 
CRR on www.hounslow.gov.uk/resilience_fourm 
 Multi-Agency CRR 
This document looks at all the risks identified in the London Risk 
Register and how these translate into the risk faced by the London 
Borough of Hounslow. In addition, it provides an assessment of the 
likelihood and impact of these scenarios for the London Borough of 
Hounslow.  
 Community Resilience  
This document looks at the top risks faced by the London Borough of 
Hounslow, and has suggestions on what members of the community 
should do in case of an emergency.  
The risks included in the two versions of the Hounslow Community Risk Register 
represent ‘reasonable worst case scenarios’ and their inclusion in the register does 
not mean that they are going to happen, or that if they did do that they would be as 
serious as the descriptions included here. ‘Reasonable worst case scenarios’ are 
nationally developed and informed by historical and scientific data, modelling, trend 
surveillance and professional expert judgement. 
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Risk assessment and risk management, however, are mostly subjective. This means 
that the exposure or non-exposure of the committee working to assess risks plays a 
crucial role in determining how the CRR would eventually look like, i.e. how the 
public will be informed of emergencies. 
Furthermore, in this modern era of environmental changes, Hounslow might be 
vulnerable to a few additional environmental risks that have not been included in this 
risk register solely because there is no information available on these risks as of yet. 
Risks are assessed by the Hounslow Resilience Forum Risk Assessment Working 
Group (RAWG). The RAWG meets quarterly to assess local risks and this 
information is used to provide local consistent planning assumptions, prioritise work 
programmes, training, exercising and plan updates and inform both HRF partners 
and the public of local risks.  
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Contextualisation Statement 
The London Borough of Hounslow is part of the West London Sub Regional 
Resilience Forum area which also comprises of the London Boroughs of Brent, 
Ealing, Hammersmith & Fulham, Harrow and Hillingdon. 
 
 
 
Overview 
The London Borough of Hounslow is an outer London Borough which is bordered by 
the London Boroughs of Hillingdon, Ealing, Hammersmith & Fulham and Richmond 
and also Surrey to the South West. The Borough covers approximately 37km2 and 
stretches from the boundary with Heathrow Airport in the West to Chiswick in the 
East. The total population of Hounslow is approximately 253,957 as of the 2011 
census. 
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Transport 
The London Borough of Hounslow has both excellent and major transport routes.  
The A4 and the M4 run through the Borough and the area has a total of eight 
underground stations and seven mainline railway stations. There is also Heathrow 
International Airport bordering the Borough which means Hounslow forms part of 
London’s international gateway. 
Social Factors 
Between 2001 and 2011 the population of Hounslow increased by 17.6%. This was 
the fifth highest rate of growth within England and Wales. The London Borough of 
Hounslow has an increased number of working aged adults and a lower than 
average elderly population. 
Hounslow is a culturally diverse community with almost half of the population coming 
from ethnic minority communities. Hounslow also boasts a total of 140 spoken 
languages. 
Economic Factors 
The Borough contains several major shopping areas (i.e. Hounslow, Chiswick, 
Feltham), along with leisure facilities, business and light industrial premises and 
Brentford Football Club. 
The Brentford golden mile provides the location for both national and international 
HQ’s including Sky TV and GlaxoSmithKline. 
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Industry and Environment 
Hounslow has one top tier COMAH site within the Borough: 
 Esso West London Oil Terminal 
There are also two top tier COMAH sites in neighbouring Borough Hillingdon which 
have to be considered when planning for Hounslow: 
 Heathrow Hydrant Operating Company (HHOpCo) 
 Lufthansa Technik Landing Gear Services 
Weather and Flooding 
The London Borough of Hounslow enjoys similar weather conditions to the rest of 
the London region (i.e. a slight urban warming/sheltered factor compared with the 
South East) with no known local variations. The impact of severe weather tends to 
make itself felt on the transport network where, due to density of use, local peaks, or 
other difficulties (of snow, for example) can lead to “gridlock” on the roads given the 
high density factors noted in the Transport section. 
There are three main rivers within the Borough; the River Thames which is tidal 
along its length and the Rivers Crane and Brent which flow into the Thames along 
with the Grand Union Canal. 
There is also one reservoir within the Borough which falls under the Reservoirs Act, 
1975: 
 Osterley Middle Lake, Osterley Park 
Other reservoirs outside the Borough could also have an effect on the Borough: 
 Queen Mary Reservoir, Sunbury-On-Thames 
 Staines Reservoir, Staines-Upon-Thames 
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Human Disease 
Special factors which have to be taken into account for not only Hounslow but for 
West London as a whole with regard to human disease are mainly around 
Heathrow’s role as ‘Gateway to Britain’ for most people from far-flung locations 
historically associated with pandemics. 
Public Protest, Industrial Action, Community Cohesion, 
International Events 
The potential for industrial action within the London Borough of Hounslow, along with 
the rest of London, is high and in recent month’s industrial action from both the Rail, 
Maritime and Transport (RMT) Union and the Fire Brigade has been staged. 
The history of public protest in the London Borough of Hounslow has tended to be 
relatively small-scale with larger protests almost invariably taking place in Central 
London. 
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Hounslow Risk Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Descriptions of the individual risks mentioned on the risk matrix above can be found 
on the next two pages. 
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Risk Summary Table 
Risk 
Ref. 
Hazard Sub-Category Page 
H 23 Influenza Type Disease (Pandemic) 46 
??? Loss of utilities 51 
H 45 Technical failure of regional electricity network 50 
HL 18 Local/Urban flooding fluvial or surface runoff 38 
HL 19 Flooding: Local fluvial flooding 39 
H 41 Technical failure of national electricity network (Blackstart) 50 
L 19 Flooding from other sources 40 
H 46 Biological substance release during an unrelated work activity/industrial process 
(e.g. Legionella) 
25 
HL 11 Railway accident 33 
H 39 Failure of water infrastructure or accidental contamination (non-toxic) 49 
H 48 Heat Wave 37 
HL 4 Major pollution of controlled waters 28 
H 17 Storms and gales 36 
H 18 Low temperatures and heavy snow 36 
H 24 Emerging infectious diseases 46 
H 56 Severe Space Weather 41 
HL 12 Localised accident involving transport od hazardous chemicals 34 
H 50 Drought 40 
H 43 Telecommunication infrastructure – human error 50 
HL 22 Building collapse 42 
H 4 Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site or site storing flammable and/or toxic 
liquids under atmospheric pressure 
19 
H 9 Large toxic chemical release 22 
H 44 Major reservoir dam failure/collapse 44 
HL 16 Local coastal/tidal flooding 37 
H 26 Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (e.g. highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) 
rabies and West Nile virus 
47 
H 31 Significant or perceived significant constraint on fuel supply at filling stations 47 
HL 43 Plant Disease 29 
HL 7 Industrial explosions and major fires 18 
H 37 International security incident resulting in influx of British Nationals who are not 
normally resident in the UK 
48 
H 11 Accidental release of radioactive material from incorrectly handled or disposed of 
sources 
23 
H 49 Loss of drinking water supplies due to a major incident affecting infrastructure 51 
H 7 Explosion at a high pressure natural gas pipeline 21 
H 5 Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline 21 
HL 8 Fire, flooding, stranding or collision involving a passenger vessel in or close to UK 
waters or on inland waterways, leading to the ship’s evacuation 
30 
HL 34 Fire, flooding or collision involving a passenger vessel in UK inland waterways, 
leading to the ships full/partial evacuation at sea 
29 
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HL 30 Localised explosion at a natural gas main 21 
HL 28 Localised fire or explosion at the fuel distribution site or tank storage of 
flammable and/or toxic liquids  
19 
H 12 Biological substance release from facility where pathogens are handled 
deliberately (e.g. pathogen release from contaminated laboratory)  
23 
HL 3 Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release  22 
HL 9 Aviation accident  32 
HL 14 Local (road) accident involving transport of fuel/explosives  35 
HL 22a Large building collapse  43 
HL 105 Complex built environments  45 
H 16 Aviation accident over a semi-urban area 31 
H 38 Technical failure of critical upstream oil/gas facility, gas import pipeline terminal, 
or Liquefied Natural Gas(LNG) import reception facility, leading to disruption in 
upstream oil and gas production  
48 
HL 21 Land movement (i.e. caused by tremors or landslides)  42 
HL 23 Bridge collapse  44 
H 58 Forest or grassland fire  29 
H 14 Major contamination incident with widespread implications for the food chain 26 
H 54 Disruption to aviation as a result of volcanic ash 42 
H 25 Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases e.g. foot and mouth disease 47 
H 40 No notice loss of significant telecommunications infrastructure in a localised fire, 
flood or gas incident 
49 
HL 10 Local accident on motorways and major trunk road  32 
H 15 Maritime pollution (e.g. affecting tidal River Thames)  26 
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Borough Risk Register 
Risk 
Ref. 
Hazard Sub-
Category 
Outcome Description/Variation and Further 
Information/Past Events 
Likelihood Impact 
Lead 
Responsibility 
Controls In Place 
Risk Rating 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION 
HL 7 Industrial 
explosions  
and major fires 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 1km around site, causing up to 10 serious injuries 
and up to 10 casualties. Explosions would cause 
primarily burn, crush, cuts and bruise-type injuries. 
Potential environmental contamination and impact, 
affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, agriculture 
and waste management. May require remediation 
and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Evenly distribution across the Borough 
Past Events 
16th December 2013: A large residential fire occurred in 
a block of flats as a result of a lit tea-light being left 
unattended in the house of a vulnerable person. This 
resulted in one fatality and the evacuation of 25 
residents to a Rest Centre. On the same day, a large 6-
pump fire broke out in Goddard’s Furniture shop on the 
second floor. Thirty-five fire-fighters were deployed to 
the scene and the fire was brought under control.  
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
2 
(Minor) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Control of Major  
Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) Regulations 
1999 
 
Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
Building design and fire 
protection systems to 
prevent or limit the 
spread of fire 
 
Emergency Services 
and other responder 
specialist resources 
Medium 
` 
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H 4 Fire or explosion 
at a fuel 
distribution site 
or site storing 
flammable and/or 
toxic liquids 
under 
atmospheric 
pressure 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 3km around site causing up to 150 fatalities and 
2000 casualties.  Potential short-term disruption to air 
transport fuel supply.  Excessive demand on core health 
services and social care. Closure of roads in locality. 
Potential environmental contamination and impact, 
affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, agriculture 
and waste management. May require remediation 
and/or decontamination. 
 
1 
(Low) 
5 
(Catastroph
ic) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Control of Major  
Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) Regulations 
1999 
 
The Dangerous 
Substances and 
Explosive Atmosphere 
Regulations 2002 
 
Petroleum Regulations 
 
Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
Site Operators on-site 
contingency plans 
 
Emergency Services 
specialist resources 
High 
HL 
28 
Localised fire or  
explosion at the 
fuel distribution 
site or tank 
storage of 
flammable and/or 
toxic liquids  
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 1km around the site, causing up to 15 fatalities 
and 200 casualties. Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Impact on environment, including widespread impact 
on air quality 
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Control of Major  
Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) Regulations 
1999 
 
The Dangerous 
Substances and 
Explosive Atmosphere 
Regulations 2002 
 
Petroleum Regulations 
Medium 
` 
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Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
Site Operators on-site 
contingency plans 
 
Emergency Services 
specialist resources 
H 5 Fire or explosion 
at an onshore fuel 
pipeline 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 1km around site causing up to 100 fatalities and 
up to 500 casualties. Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
A release point close to a populated (i.e. 
urban/residential) area.  Impact on environment 
including persistent/widespread impact on air quality.   
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Requisitioned Land and 
War Works Act 1948 
 
The Land Powers 
(Defence) Act 1958 
 
Shell-Mex and BP 
(London Airport 
Pipeline) Act 1959 
 
Esso Petroleum 
Company Act 1961 
 
Pipelines Act 1962 
 
Pipeline Safety 
Regulations 1996 
 
Control of Major 
Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) Regulations 
1999 
Medium 
` 
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Emergency Services 
specialist resources 
H 7 Explosion at a 
high  
pressure natural 
gas pipeline 
 
Outcome Description 
Local to site, causing up to 200 fatalities and up to 200 
casualties. Potential environmental contamination and 
impact, affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, 
agriculture and waste management. May require 
remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Risk based on the release point proximity to populated 
(i.e. urban) area.  Impact on environment, including 
persistent/widespread impact on air quality. 
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Pipeline Safety 
Regulations 
1996 
 
Regulatory and 
industry measures 
including provision of 
maps for evacuation 
 
Emergency services 
and other responder 
specialist equipment 
Medium 
HL 
30 
Localised 
explosion at  
a natural gas 
main 
Outcome Description 
Local to site, causing up to 200 fatalities and up to 200 
casualties. Potential environmental contamination and 
impact, affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, 
agriculture and waste management. May require 
remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Risk based on the release point proximity to populated 
(i.e. urban) area.  Impact on environment, including 
persistent/widespread impact on air quality. 
Past Events 
28th October 2013: The explosion on Bath Road was a 
large gas explosion causing the destruction of 5 
terraced houses, two fatalities and the evacuation of 
around 45 people. The explosion was caused as a result 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Pipeline Safety 
Regulations 
1996 
 
Regulatory and 
industry measures 
including provision of 
maps for evacuation 
 
Emergency services 
and other responder 
specialist equipment 
Medium 
` 
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of a tree that was felled during the St. Jude’s Storm on 
the evening of the 27/10/2013 rupturing a gas pipe 
beneath a residence.   
H 9 Large toxic 
chemical  
release  
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 3km from the site of toxic chemical release 
causing up to 50 fatalities and up to 2000 casualties. 
Potential environmental contamination and impact, 
affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, agriculture 
and waste management. May require remediation 
and/or decontamination. Excessive demands on local 
healthcare in short and long term.  Risk to water 
supplies and contamination of land.  
Variation & Further Information 
E.g. chlorine release or large industrial complex or bulk 
storage of chemicals near to a populated area (i.e. 
urban) area.  
 
1 
(Low) 
5 
(Catastroph
ic) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Control of Major  
Accident Hazards 
(COMAH) Regulations 
1999 
 
Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
Emergency Services 
and other responder 
specialist equipment 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
High 
HL 3 Localised 
industrial  
accident involving 
small toxic 
release 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 
100 casualties. Potential environmental contamination 
and impact, affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, 
agriculture and waste management. May require 
remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Possible clustering of sites in industrial areas 
Past Events 
24th August 2013: Spillage of 200 litres of a powerful 
disinfectant (30% Sodium Hydroxide) took place in the 
yard of the Dairy Crest Ltd facility. The London Fire 
Brigade subsequently informed LBH BECC that no 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Control of Major 
Accident  
Hazards Regulations 
2005 (COMAH) 
 
Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Medium 
` 
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council assistance was necessary. 
 
H 11 Accidental 
release of  
radioactive 
material from 
incorrectly 
handled or 
disposed of 
sources 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 5 fatalities and up to 100 contaminated persons 
requiring medical monitoring.  Many worried well may 
present in hospitals.  Radiation concentration near 
source, potentially over kilometres. Potential 
environmental contamination and impact, affecting air, 
land, water, animal welfare, agriculture and waste 
management.  May require remediation and/or 
decontamination.  
Variation & Further Information 
Assume radioactive material is a medical source from 
radiotherapy equipment.  
 
1 
(Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
Environment 
Agency 
Radioactive Substances 
Act 1993 
 
High Activity Sealed 
Source Regulations 
2005 
 
Arrangements for safe 
handling and disposal 
of radioactive sources 
 
Radiation detectors at 
high risk sites 
 
Environment Agency 
inspections of all major 
sources 
 
Emergency Services 
specialist resources 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Medium 
H 12 Biological 
substance  
release from 
facility where 
pathogens are 
Outcome Description 
Up to 10 fatalities and serious injuries or off-site impact 
causing up to 1,000 casualties. Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Health Animal Health Act 1981 
 
Specified Animal 
Pathogens Order 1998 
 
` 
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handled 
deliberately (e.g. 
pathogen release 
from 
contaminated 
laboratory) 
 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Assume release in urban area. E.g. SARS. 
 
Medium 
Health & Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 
 
Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health 
Regulations 2000 
 
Management of Health 
& Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999 
 
Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and 
Dangerous 
Occurrences 
Regulations 
 
Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods (classification, 
packaging and 
labelling) Regulations 
 
Genetically Modified 
Organisms (Contained 
Use) Regulations 2000 
 
Regulation, audit and 
enforcement of 
legislation by HSE 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
` 
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H 46 Biological 
substance  
release during an 
unrelated work 
activity/industrial 
process.  (e.g. 
Legionella)  
Outcome Description 
Up to 10 fatalities and serious injuries or off-site impact 
causing up to 1,000 hospital admittances.  
Variation & Further Information 
Specifically related to Legionella release from industrial 
process.  Inadvertent Legionella contaminant of wet 
cooling systems such as cooling towers and evaporate 
condensers, air conditioning systems, humidifier and 
other industrial air scrubbers.  
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Health Health & Safety at 
Work Act etc 
1974 
 
Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health 
Regulations 2000 
 
Management of Health 
& Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999 
 
Reporting of Injuries 
Diseases and 
Dangerous 
Occurrences 
Regulations 
 
HSE Approved Code of 
Practice and Guidance 
2001 (not fully 
complied with) 
 
HSE and Local 
Authority inspections 
of cooling towers (not 
uniform) 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
High 
` 
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H 14 Major 
contamination  
incident with 
widespread 
implications for 
the food chain, 
arising from; i) 
Industrial 
accident; ii) 
Contamination of 
animal feed; iii) 
Incidents arising 
from production 
process. 
Outcome Description 
Food production / marketing implications depending on 
scale and area affected. Potential direct animal and 
consumer health effects.  Consumer confidence 
affected leading to lost markets, or panic buying.   
Variation & Further Information 
E.g. Dioxin animal feed contamination, resulting in 
contaminated animals and products.  
 
3 
(Medium) 
2 
(Minor) 
Local 
Authority 
EC Directives and 
Regulations 
 
Regulation (EC) 
852/2004 
 
Regulation (EC) 
853/2004 
 
Regulation (EC) 
854/2004 
 
Food Safety Act 1990 
 
Imports monitored 
 
Local Authority 
Environmental Health 
Sampling 
 
Public Health England 
monitoring and 
surveillance 
 
Food Standards Agency 
plans 
Medium 
H 15 Maritime 
Pollution  
(e.g. affecting 
tidal River 
Outcome Description 
Release of 100,000 tonnes of crude oil into sea polluting 
coastal and tidal areas.  Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
1 
(Low) 
2 
(Minor) 
Maritime & 
Coastguard 
Agency  
Dangerous Substances 
in  
Harbour Areas 
Regulations 1987 
` 
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Thames) 
 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
E.g. Oil super tanker sinks in Thames Estuary, with 
strong north-easterly winds and tide flowing up the 
Thames estuary.   
 
Low 
 
Merchant Shipping (Oil 
Pollution 
Preparedness, 
Response and 
Cooperation 
Convention) 
Regulations 1998 
 
Port State Control 
checks coordinated in 
European waters 
 
All vessels navigating 
on the tidal Thames 
required PLA licence 
 
PLA Vessel Traffic 
Service 
 
National Contingency 
Plan for Marine 
Pollution from Shipping 
and Offshore 
Installations (2000) 
 
Oil Spill Contingency 
Plan Guidelines for 
Ports, Harbours & Oil 
Handling Facilities 
 
Specialist equipment 
for response 
` 
28 
HL 4 Major Pollution of  
controlled waters 
 
Outcome Description 
Pollution incident impacting upon controlled waters 
(e.g. chemical spillage, untreated sewage).  Affecting 
water quality, major aquatic damage and serious 
damage to human health. Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Environment 
Agency 
Environment Act 1995 
 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 
 
Pollution Prevention 
and Control Act 1999 
 
Control of Major 
Accident Hazards 
Regulations 1999 
 
The Environmental 
Permitting Regulations 
(England and Wales) 
2010 
 
Groundwater 
Regulations 1998 
 
Anti-Pollution Works 
Regulations 1999 
 
Inspections and 
compliance monitoring 
undertaken by 
appropriate regulatory 
body 
 
24 hour incident 
High 
` 
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hotline and response 
system 
 
Pollution control 
equipment and 
resources 
H 58  Forest or 
grassland fire 
 
Outcome Description 
Forest or grassland fire resulting in up to 50 hectares 
being affected. Evacuation of up to 100 residential 
homes required.  Up to 5 fatalities and 20 casualties. 
Potential environmental impact affecting air. 
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
London Fire Brigade 
borough  
specific rural strategies 
 
Specialist firefighting 
equipment and 
resources 
Medium 
HL 
43 
Plant Disease Outcome Description 
Major outbreak of plant disease. Damage to native 
plants & ecosystems, or agricultural/horticultural crops 
(with knock on effects to rural economy should diseases 
become widespread within the tree population). Any 
significant loss of tree cover would have negative 
consequences on air pollution, urban heat island effects 
and surface water flooding. 
3 
(Medium) 
2 
(Minor) 
 Plant Health (England) 
Order 2005 
 
Prohibitions and 
certification schemes 
for plant imports 
Medium 
TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS  
HL 
34 
Fire, flooding or 
collision involving 
a passenger 
vessel in UK 
inland 
waterways,  
leading to the 
ships full/partial 
evacuation at sea 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 50 fatalities and up to 100 casualties 
Variation & Further Information  
Risk based on an accident to a smaller passenger vessel 
on the River Thames 
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Maritime & 
Coastguard 
Agency 
Port of London Act 
1968 (as amended) 
 
General Directions for 
Navigating in the Port 
of London 2009 
 
Port of London River 
Bylaws 1978 
 
Medium 
` 
30 
Port State Control 
checks coordinated in 
European waters 
 
Compulsory PLA 
pilotage for visiting 
cruise ships 
 
PLA Vessels Traffic 
Management System 
and coordination with 
Thames Barrier 
Navigation Centre 
 
Provision of life saving 
equipment on river 
banks and specialist 
response resources 
HL 8 Fire, flooding, 
stranding  
or collision 
involving a 
passenger vessel 
in or close to UK 
waters or on 
inland 
waterways, 
leading to the 
ship's evacuation.  
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 50 fatalities and up to 100 casualties  
Variation and Further Information  
The risk is based on an accident to a smaller passenger 
vessel on the UK coast or inland waterways.  
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Maritime & 
Coastguard 
Agency 
Port of London Act 
1968 (as amended) 
 
General Directions for 
Navigating in the Port 
of London 2009 
 
Port of London River 
Bylaws 1978 
 
Port State Control 
checks coordinated in 
European waters 
 
Compulsory PLA 
Medium 
` 
31 
pilotage for visiting 
cruise ships 
 
PLA Vessels Traffic 
Management System 
and coordination with 
Thames Barrier 
Navigation Centre 
 
Provision of life saving 
equipment on river 
banks and specialist 
response resources 
H 16 Aviation accident 
over  
a semi-urban area 
Outcome Description 
Loss of up to two aircraft and passengers, with debris 
over a semi-urban area. Potential environmental impact 
affecting waste management (i.e. excessive waste 
producing during incident, some of which may be 
hazardous). May require remediation and/or 
decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information 
Collision of 2 commercial airliners – death of all 
passengers and crew (600 fatalities), to 50 fatalities and 
300 casualties on the ground.  No significant damage to 
key infrastructure.  
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Stringent controls on 
aircraft entering UK 
airspace including the 
mandatory use of 
Aircraft Collision 
Avoidance system on 
heavy aircraft 
 
UK flight separation 
rules 
 
CAA Maintenance and 
Flight Safety Standards 
 
Airline maintenance 
regimes 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Medium 
` 
32 
HL 9 Aviation accident 
 
Outcome Description 
Aviation accident causing up to 50 fatalities and up to 
250 casualties. Potential environmental impact 
affecting waste management (i.e. excessive waste 
producing during incident, some of which may be 
hazardous). May require remediation and/or 
decontamination. 
Variation & Further Information  
Accident involving 1 commercial airliner, probably upon 
take-off or landing. 
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Stringent controls on 
aircraft entering UK 
airspace including the 
mandatory use of 
Aircraft Collision 
Avoidance system on 
heavy aircraft 
 
UK flight separation 
rules 
 
CAA Maintenance and 
Flight Safety Standards 
 
Airline maintenance 
regimes 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Medium 
HL 
10 
Local accident on  
motorways and 
major trunk roads 
 
Outcome Description 
Multiple vehicle incident causing up to 10 fatalities and 
up to 20 casualties (internal injuries, fractures, possible 
burns).  Subsequent closure of lanes and carriageways 
causing major disruption. Potential environmental 
contamination and impact, affecting air, land, water, 
animal welfare, agriculture and waste management. 
May require remediation and/or decontamination. 
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
1 
(Limited) 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
Road Traffic Act 1988 
 
Road Vehicle 
(Construction and Use) 
Regulations 1986 
 
Traffic Management 
Act 2004 
 
VOSA patrols to 
enforce legislation 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Low 
` 
33 
HL 
11 
Railway Accident 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 30 fatalities and up to 100 casualties. Fractures 
and internal injuries (burns less likely). Possible loss of 
freight, major disruption to rail lines, possible closure of 
tunnels. Potential environmental contamination and 
impact, affecting air, land, water, animal welfare, 
agriculture and waste management. May require 
remediation and/or decontamination. 
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
British 
Transport 
Police (BTP) 
Railway and Transport 
Safety Act 2003 
 
Railways (Access and 
Management) 
Regulations 2005 
 
Railways (Accident 
Investigation and 
Reporting) Regulations 
2005 
 
Railways (Licensing of 
Railway Undertakings) 
Regulations 2005 
 
Railways Act 2005 and 
1993 
 
The Railways Safety 
Levy Regulations 2006 
 
Transport Act 2000 
 
Health & Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 
 
The Railway (Safety 
Case) Regulations 2000 
 
Improved Inspection 
regimes to detect track 
defects 
High 
` 
34 
 
Train Protection 
Warning Systems 
 
ATOC Guidance and 
Directives 
 
Specialist Emergency 
Services and other 
responder resources 
HL 
12 
Localised accident  
involving 
transport of 
hazardous 
chemicals 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 50 fatalities and up to 500 casualties. Direct 
(fractures, internal injury and burns) and indirect 
(chemical contamination over a wider area) effects 
depending on the substance characteristics, quantity 
and location. E.g. Chlorine 
Variation & Further Information  
Density of hazardous chemical infrastructure may affect 
likelihood.  
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Rail 
Regulations 1996 
 
Packaging, Labelling 
and Carriage of 
Radioactive Material by 
Rail Regulations 2002 
 
Radioactive Material 
(Road Transport) 
Regulations 2002 
 
Air Navigation 
(Dangerous Goods) 
Regulations 1994 
 
Merchant Shipping 
(Dangerous Goods and 
Marine Pollutants) 
Regulations 1990 
 
Specialist Emergency 
High 
` 
35 
Services and other 
responder equipment 
and resources 
HL 
14 
Local (road) 
accident  
involving 
transport of 
fuel/explosives 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 30 fatalities and 20 casualties within the vicinity 
of accident/explosion.  Area would require a 1km radius 
exclusion zone depending on substances involved.  
Potential released of 30 tonnes of liquid into the 
environment and watercourses (including the use of 
high qualities of fire foam).  Roads closed and access 
routes blocked.   Emergency services access limited, or 
impossible.  
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Rail 
Regulations 1996 
 
Packaging, Labelling 
and Carriage of 
Radioactive Material by 
Rail Regulations 2002 
 
Radioactive Material 
(Road Transport) 
Regulations 2002 
 
Air Navigation 
(Dangerous Goods) 
Regulations 1994 
 
Merchant Shipping 
(Dangerous Goods and 
Marine Pollutants) 
Regulations 1990 
 
Specialist Emergency 
Services and other 
responder equipment 
and resources 
Medium 
SEVERE WEATHER 
` 
36 
H 17 Storms & Gales 
 
Outcome Description 
Storm force winds affecting most of the South East 
England region for at least 6 hours. Over 55mph winds, 
gusts of up to 84mph. Up to 5 fatalities and 50 
casualties. Short term disruption to infrastructure 
including power, transport networks, homes and 
businesses. 
Past Events 
28th October 2013: During the storms of the night of the 
27/10/2013 a tree fell down outside a property on Bath 
Road and resulted in damage to a gas main which 
caused an explosion early in the morning of the 
28/10/13. There were 2 confirmed fatalities and three 
other hospitalisations including head injuries and burns. 
The affected road was cordoned off which resulted in 
all homes within the cordon been evacuated. 
 
3 
(Medium) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Local 
Authority  
Regular inspections of 
trees and 
highways for 
maintenance 
 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
Met Office Hazard 
Manager Service 
 
Responder specialist 
resources 
High 
H 18 Low 
temperatures and 
heavy snow 
 
Outcome Description 
Snow fall covering Borough for 3 days, with a depth in 
excess of 10cm and a daily mean temperature of -3oC.  
Risk of excess deaths, mainly amongst elderly and 
vulnerable. Disruption to transport networks, 
businesses, schools, power and water supply.  Weather 
related incidents.  
 
3 
(Medium) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Local 
Authority 
Highways Act 1980, 
Railways 
and Transport Act 2003 
 
Governments 'Snow 
Code' 
 
Specific plans for traffic 
management 
 
Coordination of gritting 
and salt stocks 
 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
High 
` 
37 
 
Responder specialist 
services 
H 48 Heat Wave 
 
Outcome Description 
Daily maximum temperatures in excess of 32oC and 
minimum temperatures in excess of 18oC for at least 5 
consecutive days. Excess deaths through this period, 
mainly amongst elderly. Potential disruption to power 
supply and transport infrastructure. 
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Health Health & Safety at 
Work etc. Act 
1974 
 
Public Health Act  
 
Heatwave Plan for 
England 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
Climate Change 
Strategy for London 
 
Heat-Health Watch 
High 
HL 
16 
Local Coastal /  
Tidal Flooding 
 
Outcome Description 
Sea surge, high / spring tides, gale force winds, heavy 
rainfall, some defences overtopped.  Flooding of 1000 
properties for up to 14 days. Up to 1 fatality and 20 
casualties. Up to 2,000 evacuees with some requiring 
temporary accommodation for an extended period. 
Widespread disruption and damage to infrastructure, 
debris, transport issues, contaminated water supplies 
and pollutants.  
 
1 
(Low) 
5 
(Catastroph
ic) 
Environment 
Agency 
Flood & Water 
Management Act 
2010 
 
Land Drainage Act 
1991 
 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
EA Flood Warning 
Direct Service 
 
High 
` 
38 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
EA inspection of flood 
defences 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
HL 
18 
Local / Urban 
flooding 
fluvial or surface 
run-off 
 
Outcome Description 
Flash flooding and rapidly rising river levels across 
entire region threaten large urban towns. Localised 
flooding of 1,000 to 10,000 properties for 2-7 days. Up 
to 15 fatalities and 150 casualties. Up to 15,000 people 
evacuated. Up to 500 people stranded over a large area 
and in need of rescue. Road and rail links impassable for 
up to 5 days. Sediment contamination of water 
supplies. Loss of essential services (gas, electricity, 
water & telecoms) to 20,000 homes for up to 14 days. 
Up to 1,000 people needing assistance with sheltering 
for up to 12 months. Sewage treatment works flooded. 
3 
(Medium) 
4 
(Significant) 
Environment 
Agency/Local 
Authority 
Flood & Water 
Management Act 
2010 
 
Land Drainage Act 
1991 
 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
EA Flood Warning 
Direct Service 
` 
39 
Up to 50 properties destroyed and many more 
uninhabitable. Localised economic damage and 6-18 
months recovery time required. 6-18 months recovery 
before business as usual conditions are restored. 
Past Events 
29th January 2014: Floods in Feltham. The incident 
required the deployment of a LALO from the BECC 
alongside representatives from the Hounslow Highways 
Drainage team to pump water away, however this was 
unsuccessful. Thames Water was then contacted and 
the cause of the flooding was found to be hydraulic 
overload and the water was then pumped directly into 
the river. 
 
Very High 
 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
EA Inspection of flood 
defences 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
 
HL 
19 
Flooding: Local 
Fluvial 
Flooding 
 
Outcome Description 
Sustained period of heavy rainfall extending over 2 
weeks (e.g. snow melt), resulting in steadily rising river 
levels over a region. Localised flooding of 100-1000 
properties for 2-6 days. 5 fatalities, 50 casualties. Up to 
5,000 people evacuated, up to 200 people stranded 
needing rescue. 250 people requiring shelter for up to 
12 months. 
Past Events 
6th November 2013: This event of river flooding resulted 
in the submersion of two parked cars along Chiswick 
Road South.  
 
3 
(Medium) 
4 
(Significant) 
Environment 
Agency 
Flood & Water 
Management Act 
2010 
 
Land Drainage Act 
1991 
 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
EA Flood Warning 
Direct Service 
 
Very High 
` 
40 
High 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
EA Inspection of flood 
defences 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
L 19 Significant, local 
non fluvial 
flooding – surface 
water, 
groundwater or 
burst water main 
Outcome Description 
A rapid increase in volume of water in a localised area 
due to either; heavy rainfall, groundwater emergence 
or a burst water main which overwhelms to local 
drainage or river system, collect in low lying areas 
resulting in flooding of property or infrastructure. 
5 
(High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
 Flood and Water 
Management Act 2012 
 
Land Drainage Act 
1991 
 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
Environment Agency 
Floodline and public 
warnings 
 
Met Office, National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
Flood Guidance 
Statements 
High 
H 50 Drought 
 
Outcome Description 
Periodic water supply interruptions for a time affecting 
businesses. Emergency drought orders in place 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
Environment 
Agency 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
 
` 
41 
authorising rota cuts in supply.   
 
High 
Flood & Water 
Management Act 2010 
 
Progressive restraints 
on consumption to 
preserve supply for 
critical services 
 
Storage reservoirs 
SEVERE SPACE WEATHER 
H 56 Severe Space 
Weather 
Outcome Description 
Disruption to two coastal electrical substations serving 
approximately 100,000 customers each for two or more 
months. Consumers would experience a loss of supply 
for up to half of this period, and rota disconnections 
may be used during the following four weeks. 
Disruption to satellite services for several days including 
interruptions and degradations to GPS, potentially 
resulting in casualties and fatalities. 
Up to 2 weeks disruption to aviation (including 
increased error rates in flight control and air traffic 
systems) and temporary loss of wireless systems 
including mobile phones and internet. 
Increase in error rate in ground based unprotected 
digital control systems which are ubiquitous in modern 
technology, for the duration of the storm. 
3 
(Medium) 
3 
(Moderate) 
 Electricity Industry 
monitoring and analysis 
of GIC 
 
Space Weather is 
assessed as part of the 
Daily Hazards 
Assessment 
 
National Grid design 
standards and response 
arrangements 
 
Alternative positioning, 
navigation and timing 
signal systems 
 
Forecasting through 
Met Office Space 
Weather Operations 
Centre 
 
High 
VOLCANIC HAZARDS 
` 
42 
H 54 Disruption to 
aviation as a 
consequence of 
volcanic ash 
Outcome Description 
Volcanic ash incursions for up to 25 days resulting in 
sporadic and temporary closures of significant parts of 
UK airspace for up to a total of 15 days during a 3 
month eruption period. The entire UK mainland and 
potentially other parts of Europe could be affected for 
up to 10 of these days. A single period of closure within 
the 3 month eruptive episode may last for up to 12 
consecutive days, depending on meteorological 
conditions. 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
2 
(Minor) 
 Met Office Volcanic Ash 
Advisory Centre 
forecasting 
 
CAA Volcanic Ash 
Safety Regime 
 
Airline Response Plans 
Medium 
STRUCTURAL 
HL 
21 
Land Movement 
(i.e. 
caused by 
tremors or 
landslides) 
 
Outcome Description 
Roads and access routes impassable for a time.  
Emergency access into/out of large populated areas 
difficult or impossible, severe congestion over a wider 
geographical area. Potential environmental impact 
affecting waste management (i.e. excessive waste 
producing during incident, some of which may be 
hazardous). May require remediation and/or 
decontamination.   
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Land Use planning 
restrictions 
 
Building Control 
regulations enforced 
by Local Authorities 
 
Construction, 
renovation, 
maintenance and 
demolition standards 
Medium 
HL 
22 
Building Collapse 
 
Outcome Description 
Collapse of a low-rise building (or part).  Potential for a 
number of trapped and missing persons.  Local access 
routes affected due to road closures.  Up to 5 fatalities 
and 20 casualties. Potential environmental impact 
affecting waste management (i.e. excessive waste 
producing during incident, some of which may be 
hazardous). May require remediation and/or 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
Local 
Authority 
Building Control 
regulations enforced 
by Local Authorities 
 
Construction, 
renovation, 
maintenance and 
demolition standards 
` 
43 
decontamination. 
Variation and Further information 
 Depends on age, size and construction of building, and 
occupancy rates.  
Past Events 
15th July 2014: A partial structural collapse, occurred at 
around 16:30hrs when demolition works which were 
taking place at Hounslow House on London 
Road, Hounslow, and caused part of a wall to collapse in 
an uncontrolled manner. The incident 
resulted in a large plume of dust engulfing the road and 
part of the hoarding around the site fell onto the 
footpath. 
High 
and enforcement 
 
Emergency Services 
and other responders 
specialist resources 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
 
HL 
22a 
Large Building  
Collapse 
 
Outcome Description 
Collapse of a large building (e.g. high rise block). Up to 
100 fatalities and 350 casualties.  Potential for number 
of trapped and missing persons. Severe congestion. 
Potential environmental impact affecting waste 
management (i.e. excessive waste producing during 
incident, some of which may be hazardous). May 
require remediation and/or decontamination. 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Local 
Authority 
Building Control 
regulations enforced 
by Local Authorities 
 
Construction, 
renovation, 
maintenance and 
demolition standards 
and enforcement 
 
Emergency Services 
and other responders 
specialist resources 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
 
Medium 
` 
44 
HL 
23 
Bridge Collapse 
 
Outcome Description 
Roads, access routes and transport infrastructure 
affected.  Severe congestion for a length of time.  
Emergency access affected.  Potential for a number of 
persons to be trapped or missing. Potential 
environmental impact affecting waste management (i.e. 
excessive waste producing during incident, some of 
which may be hazardous). May require remediation 
and/or decontamination. 
 
1 
(Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Local 
Authority 
Building Control 
regulations enforced 
by Local Authorities 
 
Highways Act Regular 
Inspections 
 
Height and weight 
restrictions and signs 
reduce the likelihood 
of an incident 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans  
 
Medium 
H 44 Major Reservoir 
Dam 
Failure/Collapse 
 
Outcome Description 
Collapse without warning resulting in almost 
instantaneous flooding. Significant movements of 
debris (including vehicles) and sediment.  Complete 
destruction of residential and commercial properties 
(up to 500).  1,000’s of properties potentially flooded, 
and sever damage to infrastructure and communication 
routes.   Up to 50 missing persons and people stranded.  
Hazardous recovery conditions.  Water supply lost to 
homes and businesses. Up to 200 people requiring 
temporary accommodation for 2-18 months. 
Potential environmental impact affecting waste 
management (i.e. excessive waste producing during 
incident, some of which may be hazardous). May 
require remediation and/or decontamination. 
1 
(Low) 
5 
(Catastroph
ic) 
Local 
Authority 
Reservoirs Act 1975 
 
Water Act 2003 
 
Regular statutory 
inspections 
 
Met Office National 
Severe Weather 
Warning Service 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
High 
` 
45 
HL 
105 
Complex Built 
Environments 
 
Outcome Description 
Major incident affecting a large building complex / built 
environment.  Incidents have the potential to trigger a 
complex chain of events that lead to serious 
consequences for the public. 
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Local 
Authority 
Health & Safety at 
Work etc. Act 1974 
 
Management of Health 
& Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999 
 
Fire and Rescue 
Services Act 2004 & 
guidance pursuant to 
the Regulatory Reform 
(Fire Safety) Order 
2005 
 
Safety at Sports 
Grounds Act 1975 and 
Fire Safety and Safety 
of Places of Sport Act 
1987 
 
Local building safety 
systems and practices 
 
Safety Advisory Groups 
in place at major sports 
grounds 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
` 
46 
HUMAN HEALTH 
H 23 Influenza Type 
Disease 
(Pandemic) 
 
Outcome Description 
Pandemic occurring in one or more ‘waves’, possible 
weeks or months apart with each wave lasting 15 
weeks.  Up to half the population affected in a worst 
case scenario. High numbers of cases overwhelming 
Health and other critical services, and adversely 
effecting businesses and economy.  
Variation & Further Information 
Pandemic planning worse case clinical attack rate of up 
to 50% spread over 1 or more waves resulting in 
fatalities of 2.5%  
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
4 
(Significant) 
Public Health 
England (PHE) 
NHS Vaccination 
Programme (seasonal 
and provision for 
pandemic specific) 
 
Capacity planning in 
NHS trusts 
 
Comprehensive 
surveillance systems 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Very High 
H 24 Emerging 
Infectious 
Disease 
 
Outcome Description 
Based on SARS outbreak  - resulting in 100 fatalities and 
up to 2000 casualties 
 
3 
(Medium) 
3 
(Moderate) 
Public Health 
England (PHE) 
NHS Vaccination 
Programme (seasonal 
and provision for 
pandemic specific) 
 
Capacity planning in 
NHS trusts 
 
Comprehensive 
surveillance systems 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
ANIMAL HEALTH 
` 
47 
H 25 Non-zoonotic 
notifiable 
animal diseases 
e.g. foot and 
mouth disease 
(FMD), classical 
swine fever, Blue 
Tongue and 
Newcastle Bird 
Disease 
Outcome Description 
Most serious disease in the category is FMD, which 
drives the impact assessments.  Assessments based on 
the cull and disposal of 4 million animals across the 
country over 900 infected premises.  
 
3 
(Medium) 
2 
(Minor) 
Local 
Authority 
Animal Health Act 1981 
 
Animal Health Act 2002 
 
Other secondary 
legislation and EU 
directives 
 
National disease 
control strategies 
Medium 
H 26 Zoonotic 
Notifiable  
animal diseases 
(e.g. Highly 
pathogenic Avian 
Influenza (HPAI), 
rabies and West 
Nile Virus) 
 
Outcome Description 
The most significant disease in this category is the 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), largely a 
disease of birds.  
 
 
3 
(Medium) 
2 
(Minor) 
Local 
Authority 
Animal Health Act 1981 
 
Animal Health Act 2002 
 
Other secondary 
legislation and EU 
directives 
 
National disease 
control strategies 
Medium 
INDUSTRIAL ACTION 
H 31 Significant or 
perceived 
significant 
constraint on fuel 
supply at filling 
stations 
Outcome Description 
Filling stations, depending on their locations, would 
start to run dry between 24-48 hours. Panic buying 
would exacerbate the situation. Replenishment of sites 
would take between 3-10 days depending on location 
much would depend on whether drivers from other 
3 
(Medium) 
2 
(Minor) 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
Legal requirements re: 
conduct of industrial 
disputes. 
 
Stocks of contingency 
fuel to varying degrees 
` 
48 
companies judged that they were able to maintain safe 
operations in the presence of picket lines or protests, 
and the extent of the supply of fuel from other 
locations. 
Medium 
 
National Emergency 
Plan for Fuel 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL EVENTS 
H 37 International 
security 
incident resulting 
in influx of British 
Nationals who are 
not normally 
resident in the UK 
 
Outcome Description 
Up to 10,000 British nationals not normally resident in 
the UK, returning to UK within a 4-6 weeks period 
following conventional war, widespread civil unrest or 
sustained terrorism campaign against British or other 
Western Nationals. 
That there would be an influx from Heathrow which 
would mean agencies/organisations would need to help 
provide welfare support accommodation and social 
services for them under their duty of care.  
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
2 
(Minor) 
Local 
Authority 
- 
Medium 
INDUSTRIAL TECHNICAL FAILURE 
H 38 Technical Failure 
of  
critical upstream 
oil/gas facility, 
gas import 
pipeline terminal, 
Outcome Description 
Catastrophic incident destroying all parts of a critical 
upstream facility. Causing an impact on fuel supply.  
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
National Emergency 
Plan for Fuel 
 
National Blackstart 
Plan 
 
` 
49 
or Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) 
import reception 
facility, leading to 
disruption in 
upstream oil and 
gas production 
Medium 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
H 39 Failure of Water 
Infrastructure or 
accidental 
contamination 
(non-toxic) 
 
Outcome Description 
Loss of or non-availability of drinking water supply for 
up to 50,000 people, for more than 24 hours  - 3 days, 
affecting industry, domestic, commercial piped water 
sources.  
Water companies required to provide 10 litres per 
person, per day. 
Potentially critical infrastructure; hospitals, schools and 
businesses affected where they do not maintain 
separate supply.  
 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
3 
(Moderate) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
 
Security and 
Emergency Measures 
Direction 1998 
 
Water companies 
mutual aid 
arrangements in place 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
High 
H 40 No notice loss of 
significant 
telecommunicatio
ns infrastructure 
in a localised fire, 
flood or gas 
Outcome Description 
Loss of service for up to 100,000 people for up to 72 
hours.  Possible building damage to a large urban 
telecoms facility. 
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
2 
(Minor) 
Metropolitan 
Police Service 
(MPS) 
Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 
 
Telephone provider 
demand and network 
capacity management 
` 
50 
incident 
 
Medium 
strategies 
 
National Emergency 
Alert for Telecoms 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
H 41 Technical Failure 
of National 
Electricity 
Network 
(Blackstart) 
 
Outcome Description 
Total blackout for up to 3-5 days due to loss of the 
national grid.  Damage (e.g. storms) resulting in 
potential loss of life support machines, civil unrest, no 
alarms, street lighting, gas heating, rail transport, water 
supply and loss of mobile telecoms.  
Sites affected without backup generators.  
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
5 
(Catastroph
ic) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Testing and 
maintenance regime 
 
National emergency 
plans 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Very High 
H 45 Technical failure 
of regional 
electricity 
network 
 
Outcome Description 
Total shutdown of the electricity supply over an entire 
region, in the working week lasting 24 hours  
 
3 
(Medium) 
4 
(Significant) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Testing and 
maintenance regime 
 
National emergency 
plans 
 
Mutual aid resources 
available 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
Very High 
H 43 Telecommunicati
ons infrastructure 
- Human error 
 
Outcome Description 
Widespread loss of telecommunications (including 
public land lines and mobile networks) at a regional 
level, lasting for up to 5 days 
 
2 
(Medium 
Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
London Fire 
Brigade (LFB) 
Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 
 
Telephone provider 
demand and network 
` 
51 
High 
capacity management 
strategies 
 
National Emergency 
Alert for Telecoms 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
H 49 Loss of drinking 
water supplies due 
to a major incident 
affecting 
infrastructure 
 
Outcome Description 
Loss or non-availability of drinking water piped supply 
for 24 hours, lasting up to 2 weeks.  
 
1 
(Low) 
4 
(Significant) 
Local 
Authority 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
 
Security and 
Emergency Measures 
Direction 1998 
 
Water companies 
mutual aid 
arrangements in place 
 
London Resilience 
Partnership Plans 
 
Medium 
??? Loss of utilities 
 
Outcome Description 
Smaller scale loss of utilities (gas, water, electricity) for 
>24 hours at a site containing vulnerable persons.   
Past Events 
1st April 2013: A gas and electricity disruption occurred 
at Heston House, an older people’s residential care 
home, for over 48 hours during a cold weather snap 
leaving residents without heating, hot water or catering 
facilities. The incident occurred during a Severe Winter 
Weather Level 2 warning by the Met Office 
4 
(Medium 
High) 
4 
(Significant) 
Local 
Authority 
 
Very High 
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Risks Not Applicable and Removed 
 
The risks below are those which are included in the London Risk Register but which 
are considered by the Hounslow Resilience Forum to be ‘not applicable’ to the 
London Borough of Hounslow at the current time. As risk assessment is a dynamic 
process the status of these risks is re-assessed on a regular basis. 
ID Risk Sub-Category 
HL 17 Local coastal/tidal flooding (in one region) 
H 55 Severe effusive (gas rich) volcanic eruption overseas 
HL 37 Release of significant quantities of hazardous materials as a result of a major shipping 
accident 
HL 42 Loss of cover due to industrial action by workers providing a service critical to the 
preservation of life 
H 30 Emergency services: loss of emergency fire and rescue cover because of industrial action 
H 35 Industrial action by key rail or London Underground workers 
H 33 Unofficial strike action by prison officers 
H 19 Flooding: Major Coastal and Tidal Flooding  
H 21 Flooding: Severe Inland Flooding 
  
`  
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Appendix 1 – Understanding the Risk Register 
The following column headers can be found within the Borough Risk Register. 
Risk Identifier  
Hazards are subdivided into ‘H’, ‘HL’ and ‘L’. 
i. ‘H’ risks are those hazards which will require a national as well as a local 
response and are identical to those in the National Risk Assessment (NRA). 
These risks are planned for by the Government, while local responders will 
need to be aware of the national arrangements and integrate accordingly. 
ii. ‘HL’ risks give a commonly recognised local picture of the national ‘H’ risk (if 
this is judged to be wholly unrepresentative of the local manifestation of the 
risk for example where a ‘H’ is not applicable to an LRF then the ‘HL’ may be 
appropriate due to the magnitude of the event or relevance). HL risks are also 
those which would prove a significant challenge to LRFs, but are unlikely to 
prompt a national response and are therefore not included in the NRA. 
iii. ‘L’ risks are those risks with unique consequences that are very specific to a 
particular LRF, and are therefore not covered by the generic descriptions and 
consequences of ‘H’ or ‘HL’ risks. While some other LRFs already include 
these types of risks in their assessment, the recognition of these LRF-specific 
local risks, together with guidance on formulating risk outcome descriptions, 
will allow, if included, greater freedom to identify and assess the risks within 
Hounslow. The HRF may also wish to take into account longer-term risks. 
iv. If new ‘HL’ and ‘L’ risks are identified, the HRF will highlight these to CCS, via 
DCLG RED Advisors/Devolved Administration, for consideration in LRAG, and 
with neighbouring LRFs so they can consider the relevance of the risk in their 
respective assessments. 
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Risk Category 
This indicates the type of hazard in question (e.g. industrial accident, severe 
weather, public protests), and so set the context for the outcome description. 
Outcome Description 
This is based upon the principle of a “reasonable worst case scenario”, which can be 
defined as a ‘challenging yet plausible manifestation of the risk’. It describes the 
likely immediate consequences or significance of the event, such as the facilities that 
might have been affected, the numbers of facilities that might have been destroyed, 
the number of fatalities and casualties, or extent of contamination. It is this 
information which enables the subsequent local or national impact assessment. 
However, where a national NRA ‘H’ risk outcome description is judged to be wholly 
unrepresentative of the risk at the local level or the risk is not of a sufficient 
magnitude to warrant an NRA risk, ‘HL’ risks describe a local “reasonable worst case 
scenario”. 
Variation and Further Information 
This provides, where possible, further information on the risk and the historical 
evidence and assumptions made when formulating the risk outcome description. For 
example, variation and further information on H33, the risk of an unofficial strike by 
prison officers, gives details about the proportion of officers expected to strike, 
historical evidence on how much notice would need to be given, and the types of 
prison that would likely be affected. 
Likelihood Score and Rationale 
These columns state the risk likelihood score, the agency that undertook the 
assessment and the evidence base that underpins the likelihood score. 
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Appendix 2 – Impact and Likelihood Scoring Scales 
 
Impact Scoring Scales – Qualitative Measures*1 
 
Level Descriptor Categories of Impact Description of Impact 
1 Limited Health  Limited number of injuries or impact on 
health 
Social  Limited number of persons displaced and 
insignificant personal support required 
 Limited disruption to community services, 
including transport services and infrastructure 
Economic  Limited impact on local economy 
Environment   Limited Impact on environment 
    
2 Minor Health  Small number of people affected, no fatalities, 
and a small number of minor injuries with first 
aid treatment 
Social  Minor damage to properties 
 Minor displacement of a small number of 
people <24 hours and minor personal support 
required 
 Minor localised disruption to community 
services or infrastructure <24 hours 
Economic  Negligible impact on local economy and cost 
easily absorbed 
Environment  Minor impact on environment with short-
term or long-term effects 
    
3 Moderate Health  Sufficient number of fatalities with some 
casualties requiring hospitalisation and 
medical treatment and activation of MAJAX, 
the automated intelligent alert notification 
system, procedures in one or more hospitals  
Social  Damage that is confined to a specific location, 
or to a number of locations, but requires 
additional resources 
 Localised displacement of >100 people for 1-
3days 
Economic  Limited impact on local economy with some 
short-term loss of production, with possible 
additional clean-up costs 
Environment   Limited impact on environment with short-
term or long-term effects 
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4 Significant Health  Significant number of people in affected area 
impacted with multiple fatalities, multiple 
serious or extensive injuries, significant 
hospitalisation and activation of MAJAX 
procedures across a number of hospitals  
Social  Significant damage that requires support for 
local responders with external resources 
 100 to 500 people in danger and displaced for 
longer than 1 week. Local responders require 
external resources to deliver personal support 
 Significant impact on and possible breakdown 
of some local community services 
Economic  Significant impact on local economy with 
medium-term loss of production 
 Significant extra clean-up and recovery costs 
Environment  Significant impact on environment with 
medium to long-term effects 
    
5 Catastrophic Health  Very large numbers of people in affected 
area(s) impacted with significant numbers of 
fatalities, large number of people requiring 
hospitalisation with serious injuries with 
longer-term effects 
Social  Extensive damage to properties and built 
environment in affected area requiring major 
demolition 
 General and widespread displacement of 
more than 500 people for prolonged duration 
and extensive personal support required 
 Serious damage to infrastructure causing 
significant disruption to, or loss of, key 
services for prolonged period. Community 
unable to function without significant support 
Economic  Serious impact on local and regional economy 
with some long-term, potentially permanent, 
loss of production with some structural 
change 
 Extensive clean-up and recovery costs 
Environment  Serious long-term impact on environment 
and/or permanent damage 
 
Note *1:  
Levels 1 and 2 on the impact scale are likely to fall below the threshold for an emergency. Therefore 
there may be no statutory requirement to plan for events that score 1 or 2 on the impact scale. 
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Explanation of Categories of Impact*2 
 
Category Explanation 
Health Encompassing direct health impacts (numbers of people affected, fatalities, injuries, 
human illness or injury, health damage) and indirect health impacts that arise 
because of strain on the health service 
Social Encompassing the social consequences of an event, including availability of social 
welfare provision; disruption of facilities for transport; damage to property; 
disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of an 
electronic or other system of communication; homelessness, evacuation and 
avoidance behaviour; and public disorder due to anger, fear, and/or lack of trust in 
the authorities 
Economic Encompassing the net economic cost, including both direct (eg loss of goods, 
buildings, infrastructure) and indirect (eg loss of business, increased demand for 
public services) costs 
Environment Encompassing contamination or pollution of land, water or air with harmful 
biological/chemical/radioactive matter or oil, flooding, or disruption or destruction 
of plant or animal life 
 
Note *2:  
This is based on the model likelihood and impact scoring scales published in Annex 4D of 
‘Emergency Preparedness’, HM Government, 2005. 
 
Likelihood Scoring Scale 
 
Level Descriptor Likelihood Over 5 Years Likelihood Over 5 Years 
1 Negligible >0.005% > 1 in 20,000 chance 
2 Rare >0.05% > 1 in 2,000 chance 
3 Unlikely >0.5% > 1 in 200 chance 
4 Possible >5% > 1 in 20 chance 
5 Probable >50% >1 in 2 chance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
`  
58 
 
Appendix 3 – Definitions of Nationally Approved 
Risk Ratings*3 
 
Definitions of Nationally Approved Risk Ratings 
Very High (VH) Risk These are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. 
They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential 
consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may 
mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, 
but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and 
training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a 
regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific 
to the risk rather than generic. 
High (H) Risk These risks are classed as significant. They may have a high or low likelihood 
of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to 
warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as ‘very high’. 
Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or 
eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of at least (multi-
agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and 
monitored on a regular frequency. 
Medium (M) Risk These risks are less significant, but may cause upset and inconvenience in the 
short term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being 
appropriately managed and consideration given to their being managed 
under generic emergency planning arrangements. 
Low (L) Risk These risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They 
should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and 
require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments 
show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category. 
 
Note *3:  
This is based on the model risk rating matrix published in Annex 4F of ‘Emergency Preparedness’ 
(HM Government, 2005). 
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Further Information 
 
In addition to this version of the risk register, the Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) 
also publishes a much shorter version that looks at the top risks faced by the London 
Borough of Hounslow, and has suggestions on what members of the community 
should do in case of an emergency. Community members can get access to printed 
copies of that version at the Civic Centre.  
The Hounslow Resilience Forum is also looking into conducting workshops in 
schools to educate children about the purpose and benefits of a risk register. To find 
out more about this, please use the details given in the following section to contact 
us. 
 
Questions? 
 
If you have any concerns or questions about the risk register in general, or wish to 
engage with the Contingency Planning Unit (CPU) on the assessment of risks in the 
borough, the CPU can be reached via email, phone, and mail at: 
 
Email: contingency.planning@hounslow.gov.uk 
Phone number: 020 8583 5111 
Address:  Emergency Control Centre, 
Civic Centre,  
Lampton Road,  
Hounslow, TW3 4DN 
 
 
  
 
 of 
 amp  Road 
4DN. 
 020  
communications@hounslow.gov.uk. 
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